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Abstract 
The thesis comprises four essays on corporate governance and ownership structure in 
the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC). Specifically, these essays examine the role nad 
impacts of multiple directorships, nomination committee, joint-audit investment 
committee and cost of debt, investment efficiency, corporate life cycle and corporate 
cash holdings. Corporate governance policies and structures in emerging markets 
such as the GCC region vary considerably from those in developed countries due to 
the geo-political and religious dynamics of member countries. Although governance 
structures have been adopted from the Anglo-American systems, the pace of 
development of governance structures varies across member countries . However, the 
institutional, cultural and religious characteristics of the GCC are key ingredients that 
implicitly or explicitly underpin the effectiveness of corporate governance systems 
and practices in member countries. The four essays extend our knowledge of 
corporate governance and its relation with capital market decisions and structures in 
an emerging market context. 
Chapter one provides background relating to the political and economic 
environment, institutional and capital markets development of the GCC. This chapter 
examines specific characteristics of the GCC institutional setting to provide context 
and to motivate the study. 
The second chapter titled, “Multiple Directorships, Family Ownership and the 
Board Nomination Committee” explores the association between outside board 
directorships and family ownership concentration. The paper found a positive 
association between family ownership and the number of outside directorships held 
by board members. The results also suggest that the institutional factors of emerging 
economies such as those in the GCC can work against the benefits of multiple 
directorships, which could impair the quality of corporate governance. 
The third chapter titled of the thesis “Joint-audit, political connections and cost of 
debt capital”, investigate the association between joint-audit and cost of debt for a 
sample of non-financial publicly listed firms from the GCC. The beneficial impact of 
joint audit has not been convincingly documented. We provide further insights on 
this matter from GCC countries. We document a significantly negative effect of joint 
audit on cost of debt in GCC countries. This effect is most pronounced in cases 
where at least one of the joint audit firms is a Big 4 auditor. We then investigate 
iii 
 
whether political connections with royal families moderate the association between 
joint audit and the cost of debt. Our results suggest that the beneficial effects of joint 
audits in terms of lower cost of debt are greater in firms with such political 
connections. 
The fourth chapter titled “Investment Committee (IC) characteristics and 
Investment Efficiency” investigates the association between investment committee’s 
characteristics and corporate investment efficiency. The paper found that the 
existence of an investment committee reduces both under- and overinvestment that 
financial expertise of committee members positively affects firms’ investment 
efficiency. These findings are consistent with the assertion that a board investment 
committee assists with the monitoring and control of firms’ investments. 
Chapter five of the thesis titled “Investment committee, corporate cash holdings and 
corporate life cycle”, investigates the association between voluntary formation of 
board investment committee (IC) and corporate cash holdings of firms over corporate 
life cycle. The paper suggests that existence of an IC increases corporate cash 
holdings in the growth and maturity stages of firms’ life cycle progression compared 
to introduction/old (decline) stages. Governance, investment, strategy and 
resourcing/decision-making capabilities that differ across life cycle stages account 
for observed patterns.  
Finally, chapter six provides a summary of the findings and further research 
direction.  
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 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide the relevant background about the 
political and economic environment, institutional and capital markets development in 
Gulf Cooperation Council Countries (GCC). This chapter highlights specific 
characteristics of the GCC institutional setting as a way to provide context and to 
motivate the thesis. Moreover, the governance reporting, accounting and regulatory 
requirements are further discussed in this chapter. The chapter also highlights the 
contribution of the four essays to the corporate governance literature and finishes 
with an outline of the structure of the thesis.  
 The GCC institutional context 
The GCC was founded on May 25, 1981 by six countries: Saudi Arabia, Oman, 
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait. The GCC is a regional 
organization of states that shares common geo-political and socio-economic 
objectives across the region (Bley & Saad, 2012; Al-Malkawi et al., 2014). The main 
aim of the formation of the GCC was to achieve economic and financial integration 
among member states (Espinoza, Prasad & Williams, 2011). Compared to developed 
and well-established emerging markets, the GCC financial and stock markets are 
considered one of the few fastest growing economies in the global economy 
depending mainly on oil production as a major source of revenue. The GCC region 
alone holds approximately 40-45% of oil reserves and 23% of the world's gas 
reserves (Al-Shammari, Brown and Tarca, 2008; Espinoza, Prasad & Williams, 
2011; Bley & Saad, 2012). Thus the GCC region represents one of the major 
international players in the oil and gas industry. Notwithstanding, market 
capitalizations are relatively small in the GCC stock markets, and are also 
characterized by low and irregular trading of securities (Al Janabi, 2010), which in 
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turn force public and private firms to rely on bank borrowing as a major external 
financing source (Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Al-Yahyaee et al., 2011; Chowdhury & 
Maung, 2013).   
Since the oil boom of the 1970s, oil revenues have played a strategic and 
significant role in the GCC financial and economic development. Over the past 
couple of decades, the GCC emerging markets have become the focus of much 
attention from individual and institutional investors as a result of the growing 
financial and economic developments (Al Janabi, 2010; Bley & Saad, 2011). These 
developments appeared in the mid-1990s driven mainly by oil revenues. Recently, 
the GCC has made significant effort to establish an environment that promotes 
private sector participation and increase diversification coupled with improved 
financial and legal institutional infrastructure underpinned by state-of-the-art 
technologies. These infrastructure and technological initiatives have attracted 
international investors into the GCC markets (Al Janabi, 2010). In addition, the 
liberalization of the capital markets through wide-range reforms such as those 
concerning capital flow regulations has also contributed to the advancement of the 
capital markets in the GCC. Bekaert et al. (2005) argue that free capital mobility 
provides more efficient capital allocation and risk diversification benefits through 
sharing of risky opportunities which in turn decreases return volatility. The changes 
in the financial regulations in the GCC markets offered local and foreign investors a 
greater access to the financial capital markets (Al Janabi et al., 2010).  
Corporate ownership in GCC countries is highly concentrated in public sector 
institutions, holding firms, financial institutions, and family groups (Hawkama 2007-
2012; Santos, 2015). Al-Shammari et al. (2008) reveal that ownership structure is 
generally categorised into three shareholder groups who own a substantial equity in 
the firms listed in the GCC stock exchange. These groups are the government and its 
agencies, institutional investors and dominant families. Consequently, individual 
investors normally have very limited shares in these firms (Hawkama, 2007-2012).  
For example, foreign investors are limited to 49 percent of total shares in Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar. On the contrary, while direct 
foreign ownership of shares in Omani firms is limited to 70 percent of total shares, 
foreign ownership of shares in Bahrain firms is subject to government approval 
(Santos, 2015). 
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1.2.1 Corporate Governance in the GCC  
The GCC countries are presently undergoing corporate governance and institutional 
reforms with an emphasis on the privatisation of government-owned firms. These 
corporate governance and institutional reforms are designed to expedite private 
sector participation to boost GCC member economic growth and development. The 
organizational and legal structures that shape policies and governance practices in 
developed economies may not necessarily be applicable to emerging markets such as 
those of the GCC (Fan, Wei & Xu, 2011).  
Corporate governance practices and codes in the GCC are distinct owing to 
the complexities of their institutional and cultural settings, which differ from those of 
developed and well-established emerging economies (Bley & Chen, 2006; Baydoun 
et al. 2012; Mazaheri 2013). Although compliance with corporate governance codes 
is not mandatory in some GCC countries (e.g. Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait), many 
firms in the GCC have implemented corporate governance practices (Hawkamah, 
2010; OECD, 2011; Al-Malkawi, Pillai & Bhatti, 2014; Al-Hadi, Hasan & Habib, 
2015). Several professional surveys carried out in the GCC suggest that corporate 
governance is one of the primary concerns in the GCC business environment among 
major foreign investors.  
A number of institutions and regulatory bodies have established guidelines on 
how the region’s public and private firms can implement corporate governance 
practices (Al-Malkawi, Pillai & Bhatti, 2014; Dalwai, Basiruddin & Abdul Rasid, 
2015) for several reasons. First, the collapse of many firms in the region (e.g. the Al 
Gosaibi-Saad Group) as a result of their inability to fulfill their obligations to 
financial institutions during the global financial crisis prompted banks to require 
better corporate governance practices and greater disclosure and transparency,1 
which has led to the adoption of such practices by an increasing number of GCC 
firms. Second, as the GCC region has become the financial and commercial hub of 
the Middle East (Baydoun et al., 2012), the regulatory bodies in the GCC economies 
                                                     
1 See (Al-Hadi, Hasan and Habib 2015) on bank regulations in GCC countries. 
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needs to play a vital role in the establishment and implementation of governance 
reforms. Third, both regulators and investors are aware that corporate governance 
provides several benefits to firms such as achieving high levels of market confidence, 
the protection of both foreign and minority shareholders, economic diversification, 
and investment opportunities (Fasano & Iqbal, 2003; Mina, 2007; Callen et al., 
2014).  
Recent amendments2 to GCC governance codes such as those concerning 
board composition and committee formation, specialized nomination committees 
(NCs) in particular, have been incorporated. For instance, the governance codes of 
Kuwait, the KSA and the UAE mandate the formation of a NC, although NC 
composition varies depending on country-specific regulations. Oman’s corporate 
governance code does not mandate NC formation, but the number of Omani firms 
establishing NCs is gradually increasing, particularly between 2005 and 2013. The 
corporate governance code in the KSA allows firms to form a combined NC and 
Compensation Committee (CC), whereas those in Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait require 
firms to form a separate NC (these codes are called ‘comply or explain’ codes)3.  
 In addition, the current governance codes and regulations in the GCC do not 
mandate the formation of voluntary committees; however, the voluntary formation of 
board sub-committees does occur, e.g., GCC firms may voluntarily form risk 
committees to improve their risk reporting (Al-Hadi et al., 2016). Professional 
surveys highlight that boards in the GCC have nearly twice as many specialized 
(voluntary) committees as recommended (mandatory) committees, including audit, 
nomination, and compensation committees (BDI, 2011, 2013). 
GCC governance codes vary markedly in their guidelines for the 
development of board committees. The newly implemented corporate governance 
code in Oman encourages firms to form board remuneration and nomination 
committees. Many firms have responded by also forming compensation, risk, and 
audit committees. The formation of ICs and its duties, however, has not been clearly 
                                                     
2 Corporate governance rules were amended in GCC countries as follows: in the UAE in April 2010, 
Oman in March 2015, Kuwait in September 2013 and the KSA on January 5, 2009.  
3According to (Uzun, Szewczyk and Varma 2004; Ruigrok et al. 2006), NCs are established for the 
purpose of identifying and selecting board members to improve board effectiveness, evaluate 
directors’ qualifications and manage board composition to ensure its independence as a long-term 
function. 
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outlined in the governance code (Article 7-12 Chapter 4 subcommittees).4 Similarly, 
corporate governance codes in the UAE encourage corporate boards to create audit 
and compensation committees, but UAE firms are not required to establish a separate 
IC (Article 6, 6(3) in New Code, and Article 118 in Commercial Companies Law 
1984).5 The recent corporate governance framework in Kuwait (Articles 138-153) 
encourages boards to form several board committees to address corporate 
governance compliance, internal control, risk, audit, and compensation; however, 
these codes do not require the formation of an IC.6 Formation of an IC is encouraged 
in the corporate governance codes in Saudi Arabia,7 Bahrain,8 and Qatar.9 
Although the GCC corporate governance codes do not regulate the formation 
of ICs, a large proportion of firms listed across the GCC stock markets have 
established voluntary ICs.10 Once established, the presence of ICs requires firms to 
set up general criteria to regulate their investment decision-making processes. The 
specific duties of ICs may vary from firm to firm. In general, the main and most 
critical function is to oversee the firms’ financial resources and its maintenance of 
operational capital, and to identify future investment opportunities with the aim of 
maximizing shareholder wealth. Managing market and liquidity risks is also an 
important investment function of ICs, which helps firms to optimize and maximize 
returns.11 
                                                     
4 https://www.cma.gov.om/documents/En/Charter2014.pdf 
5 http://linklaters.com/pdfs/Insights/UAECorporateGovernanceRegime.pdf 
6 https://www hawkamah.org/uploads/reports/KuwaitCorpGov_0207.pdf 
7 http://www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?code_id=295 
8http://www.moic.gov.bh/En/Commerce/DomesticTrade/Corporate%20Governance/Documents/bb99
03e050a24fc6b65190cfcd637cd1BahrainCGCodeEN.pdf 
9 http://www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?code_id=327 
10 Panel D of Table 1 shows that the number of firms that have established ICs in the GCC increased 
from 10 in 2006 to 215 at the end of 2013. Firms in Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Oman (OMN) have the 
highest number of ICs—43% and 22.3%, respectively—in the 2005–2013 period.   
11 Over the years, the GCC publicly listed firms have been motivated to formulate a common standard 
for the duties of ICs in relation to growth and investment opportunities. For example, in its 2005 
annual report, the Qatar Telecom (Qtel) suggests that it’s “Investment committee reviews all proposals 
for strategic investment opportunities. Investment committee reviewed Qtel’s opportunities for growth 
in the region and initiated and recommended major investment opportunities for the company.” In 
Bahrain, the National Hotels Company 2011 annual report acknowledges that the investment 
committee is responsible for identifying investment and growth opportunities that will return a 
sufficient yield to maximize shareholders wealth. In its 2012 annual report, the Southern Province 
Cement Company (SOCCO) in the KSA suggests that the Investment committee seek new investment 
opportunities in line with the company’s growth requirements.  
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Firms with government and family ownership concentration, including 
business elites, tend to not comply with governance codes to the same degree as their 
counterparts ([IFC]/Hawkamah, 2008; Al-Hadi et al., 2016; Mazaheri, 2013); hence, 
public and foreign investors continue to face information asymmetry and agency 
problems (Mazaheri, 2013). The GCC region has also seen a marked increase in 
foreign direct investment (Mina, 2007). This internationalization of GCC listed firms 
makes them subject to greater scrutiny from stakeholders, regulators, and 
international institutional investors, who have recently been demanding greater 
governance and accountability from those firms (Abu-Nassar & Rutherford, 1996). 
The establishment of specialized ICs may be considered a response to these 
demands.  
The four essays in this thesis specifically examine the roles and impact of 
multiple directorships nomination committee, joint-audit, investment committee 
characteristics, cost of debt, investment efficiency, corporate life cycle and corporate 
cash holdings. Corporate governance policies and structures in emerging markets 
such as the GCC region vary from those in developed countries due to a number of 
factors relating to the geo-political and religious dynamics of member countries.  
These institutional, cultural and religious dynamics are key ingredients that implicitly 
or explicitly underpin the effectiveness of corporate governance systems and 
practices in GCC member countries. Corporate governance is constantly receiving 
the required institutional and legal considerations aimed at improving the governance 
standards in the GCC. This reflects in recent amendments to corporate governance 
regulations despite the existence of “comply or explain” initiatives in some GCC 
countries. The four essays in this thesis extend corporate governance and capital 
structure research in the GCC. 
 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY  
 Extensive research in the area of corporate governance, accounting and 
finance show that special characteristics of specialized board committees of play a 
significant role in both developed and developing economies. For example, prior 
studies in GCC (e.g., Al-Hadi et al. 2015; Al-Hadi et al. 2016) provides evidence that 
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voluntary formation of sub-board committees (e.g., risk committee) reduces the 
information asymmetry and risk estimations. In addition, studies (e.g., Subramaniam, 
McManus, & Zhang, 2009; Al-Hadi, Hasan, and Habib 2016; Al-Hadi et al. 2016 
among others) also indicate that the existence of a voluntary formation of board sub-
committees can ensure credible communication and effective oversight of 
organizational risk management strategies, policies, and processes leading to 
improve firms investment efficiency. Moreover, although equity markets in GCC is 
grown significantly over the years, accompanied by an increase in the number of 
listed firms, the economic system in the GCC is still bank dominated. Both public 
and family firms strongly rely on bank financing (Al-Yahyaee, Pham and Walter 
2011; Kern 2012; IMF 2013). Hence, it is important to understand the determinants of the 
cost of debt financing, as an outcome of direct economic consequence for corporations. 
Prior research has highlighted the benefits of joint audit in in introducing better 
financial reporting quality and lower earnings management (Marmousez, 2008; 
Bedard et al 2012; Lesage et al., 2012). Given that joint audit should improve audit 
quality because of shared audit efforts, however, empirical evidence has so far 
provided inconclusive evidence (Ratzinger-Sakel et al. 2015). Given the importance 
of the debt markets in the GCC, we consider the effect of joint audit on cost of debt 
as an attempt to extend this stream of literature by examining the effects of joint 
audit in the GCC region.This thesis provides further information on the determinants 
of directorships, cost of debt financing, investment efficiency and corporate cash 
holdings. In doing so, this thesis addresses the following four objectives using 
evidence obtained from the GCC firms. 
 
 To examine the role of Nomination Committee on the propensity of outside 
directorships among family firms in GCC countries.  
 To examine the effects of joint audit on firm-level cost of debt financing of the 
GCC firms. 
 To assess the role of adapting specialized Investment Committee on firms’ 
investment efficiency in the GCC countries. 
 To examine the role of adapting specialized Investment Committee on corporate 
cash holdings in the GCC countries. 
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 SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND SIGNIFICANCE 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
This section discusses the summary of results and discussion, and the 
significant contribution for each objective separately.   
 
1.4.1 Objective 1: Multiple Directorships, Family Ownership and the Board 
Nomination Committee: International Evidence from the GCC 
The purpose of the essay that investigates objective 1 is to examine the association 
between family ownership and multiple directorships.  Furthermore we test the impact of 
board nomination committee (hereafter NC) as concentration and specialization on multiple 
directorships among family firms in the Gulf Cooperation Council region. In particular, 
we test whether the existence of a NC has an impact on the multiple directorships held by 
board members. We also examine the relevance and significance of NC characteristics in 
explaining the extent of minimizing outside directorships.  
 Summary of results  
The findings suggest that a stand-alone NC significantly improves the extent and 
quality of board of directors. In particular, we find a positive association between family 
ownership and the number of outside directorships held by board members. I find the 
association between family ownership and the number of outside directorships are 
positive and statistically significant (p<.01). Furthermore, we test for the effect of NC 
existence on the association between family ownership and outside directorships. We find 
that existence of NC supress the relationship between the multiple-outside 
directorships and family ownership. In particular, we find that the coefficient of the 
interactions between family ownership and NC are negatively associated with the 
multiple-outside directorships proxies and statistically significant (p<.01).Moreover, 
when NC characteristics are taken into account, we find that NC characteristics (e.g., 
independence, size and NC factor) are significantly (at p<.01) decease the number of 
outside directorships. In addition, results show that the NC plays a dominant role in 
enhancing corporate board monitoring. We use instrumental-variable (IV) techniques 
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together with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation to mitigate endogeneity concerns. The 
IV results indicate that endogeneity cannot account for the positive relationship between the 
family ownership and multiple directorships.   
 Significance  
The first objective of this study (“objective 1”) contributes to the governance and 
disclosure literature in some important ways: First, we examine the incentive of family 
run business (through ownership or control) to appointing directors who hold 
multiple-outside seats (see e.g., Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard 2003; Perry and 
Peyer 2005; Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Hunton and Rose 2008; Jiraporn, Kim and 
Davidson 2008; Jiraporn et al. 2009; Jiraporn, Singh and Lee 2009; Field, Lowry and 
Mkrtchyan 2013). It provides empirical evidence that family own control firms 
increases the number of busy directors on corporate boards in GCC firms. Second, 
given the importance of internal corporate governance mechanism, we investigate the 
impact of special monitoring committee such as NC in reducing the influence of 
family control to appoint outside directorships among board of directors which in 
turn will mitigate agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders in 
family run public businesses. Prior studies find mixed evidence regarding the 
association between outside-multiple seats and membership of internal board 
committees. For example, (Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard 2003; Jiraporn, Singh 
and Lee 2009) find that a director how holds multiple-outside seats, less likely to set 
in internal board committees such as audit committee(AC). On contrary, (Faleye, 
Hoitash and Hoitash 2011) find advising internal committees’ assignment and 
memberships are compromised on the behalf to monitoring committee (e.g., audit 
and compensation committee), when firms have more outside-multiple seats. We 
argue that a specialised committee such NC may have a direct impact to determine or 
select the board’s directors. NC is considered as a final channel to contract the 
directors for the boards. Our result confirms our view, that NC managed to supress 
the family control to increase multiple-outside seats in the board. Third, our study 
adds to the theory by distinguishing the influence of family ownership control with 
regard to Type II agency and institutional based theories. Prior researches (e.g., Ali, 
Chen and Radhakrishnan 2007; Gilson and Gordon 2003; Leung, Richardson and 
Jaggi 2014; Maury 2006; Villalonga and Amit 2006)  have focused on agency type I 
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and Resources based-view (Peng 2002; Peng et al. 2009; Peng and Jiang 2010). The 
common attributes of monarchy political regime familyism economic in GCC such 
as kinship relations to maintain financing and facilitating business transactions; 
family businesses are given preference in business transaction.  Favouritism is a 
preferred practice in hiring, promoting, and transferring assets (Mazaheri 2013). 
Families’ intermarriages occur between established business families and elites. This 
suggests that business environment in the GCC countries is considered as family 
dominant and run businesses. Institutional based-view argues that if both formal and 
informal institutions used to govern firm behaviour, in situations where formal 
constraints are unclear or fail, the informal constraints will play a larger role in 
reducing uncertainty, providing guidance, and conferring legitimacy and rewards to 
managers and firms (Peng et al. 2009). To best of our knowledge, this is at first to 
use the Institutional based-view to explain the association between family ownership 
and busyness. Finally, this study has an implication and attention for regulators, 
investors and policy makers, particularly to protecting the minority shareholders.     
 
1.4.2 Objective 2: Joint-audit, Political Connections and Cost of Debt Capital 
In this essay that investigates “objective 2”, the effects of joint audit (hereafter 
JA) on firm-level cost of debt of non-financial public listed firms in Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) emerging countries. We examine whether the “joint 
audit” whereby two independent audit firms audit the financial statements with a 
shared audit effort provides investors with more confidential signals, in doing so, 
whether this reduces cost of debt financing. Moreover, we investigate whether 
political connections with royal families moderate the association between joint audit 
and the cost of debt. We hypothesize that the role of joint audit practices in reducing 
cost of debt financing more pronounce among politically connected firms. 
 Summary of results 
         We provide evidence to support the assertion that Joint audit reduces 
cost of debit financing. The beneficial impact of joint audit has not been 
convincingly documented (Marmousez, 2008; Bedard et al 2012; Lesage et al., 
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2012). We provide further insights on this matter from GCC countries. We document 
a significantly negative effect (at p<.05 or better) of joint audit on cost of debt in GCC 
countries. This effect is most pronounced in cases where at least one of the joint 
audit firms is a Big 4 auditor. Furthermore, our regression results show that political 
connections with royal families moderate the association between joint audit and the 
cost of debt. This findings suggest that the beneficial effects of joint audits in terms 
of lower cost of debt are greater in firms with such political connections. 
 
 Significance  
          The second objective of this study (“objective 2”) contributes to literature in 
some important ways: First, we enrich the scant literature on audit quality implications 
of joint audit. Prior evidence, using financial reporting quality and audit fees as the 
outcome variables, has provided mixed results on the benefits of joint audits. We 
consider the effect of joint audit on cost of debt, given the significance of the debt 
markets in the GCC. Our results shed light on the demand for audit, particularly joint 
audit, in an environment that differs in some very important respects from that found 
in the West. Second, we contribute to the literature on the contracting role of 
accounting from both the external auditing and debt financing perspectives. The 
GCC countries have unique financing arrangements that are characterized by high 
leverage where the main source of debt is bank financing (Al-Yahyaee, 2006; 
Chowdhury & Maung, 2013). In fact, loans from commercial banks are a major 
source of financing for GCC companies. Agency theory advanced by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) implies that agents may employ joint auditors to reduce information 
asymmetry and, thus, agency costs. Companies with high leverage can be expected to 
appoint joint auditors to reduce agency costs by reassuring debtholders that their 
interests are protected. Hence, it is possible that GCC companies use joint audit to 
reduce agency costs and information asymmetry and, consequently, the cost of debt. 
Third, our study also contributes to the recent stream of audit studies examining the 
effects of country-level institutional factors and whether introducing a new settings 
can explain the association between JA and audit quality. Different settings (e.g., 
Sweden, Finlan, Denmark, and France) and audit regime have been applied to 
explain empirically this association and provided mixed results. From voluntary 
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regime (e.g., Zerni et al. (2012; Zerni, Kallunki & Nilsson 2010; Lesage et al. 
(2012); Ittonen and Peni 2012). Further, from mandatory JA regime studies also also 
provides mix results (Lesage, Sakel 2012; Sakel, Coulier and Ketunen and Lesage 
2013; France et al. 2009; Holm and Thinggaard 2011; Lesage, Ratzinger-Sakel and 
Kettune 2016). One could argue about the relevance of an analysis of GCC countries, 
However, recent cross-countries’ studies (e.g., Ittonen and Peni 2012; Lesage, 
Ratzinger-Sakel and Kettune2016) that have investigated the impact of JA have not 
incorporated any observations of firms from GCC countries. Pinkowtiz et al. (2006) 
suggest that differences in institutional factors across countries may be associates 
with differences in financial constraints, information asymmetry and agency 
problems across firm. We believe that doing so should contribute and complement 
and provide different insights into the investigations conducted by previous 
international studies. 
1.4.3 Objective 3: Investment Committee Characteristics and Investment 
Efficiency 
In this essay that investigates “objective 3”, the effect of specialized 
investment committee on investment efficiency of non-financial firms belonging to 
six emerging markets in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region. Specifically, we 
examine whether Investment Committee (thereafter IC) characteristics reduces 
agency related issues stemming from under- and over-investment. We also 
investigate whether the presence of both voluntary IC and forging ownership 
improves firms’ investment efficiency. 
 Summary of results 
Using population of non-financial firms listed in the six GCC capital markets 
for the 2005–2013 period, we found that the existence of an investment committee 
reduces both under- and overinvestment that financial expertise of committee 
members positively affects firms’ investment efficiency. In particular, our results 
show that specialized investment committee is negative and statistically significant 
(p<0.01) for all investment efficiency estimates. These findings are consistent with 
the argument that the existence of an IC reduces information asymmetry and limits 
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managerial opportunistic behavior related to participation in value-destroying 
investments. Our results also suggest that the effect of an IC in suppressing under- 
and overinvestment is more pronounced in firms with high foreign ownership 
concentrations. 
 Significance 
This study makes several important contributions. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, this study is the first to examine the association between IC characteristics and 
investment efficiency. Further, prior research on investment committees in the U.S. has not 
evaluated the effect of governance characteristics of those committees on investment 
efficiency (see e.g. Collie, 2014; Ellis, 2011; Kearney, 2014; Yoder, 2011). Second, 
we find that ICs assist firms in mitigating the risks associated with under- and 
overinvestment, thereby improving investment efficiency. Our findings suggest that 
ICs reduce information asymmetry and suppress managerial opportunistic behavior 
that may lead to value-destroying investment decisions. Third, we add to the 
literature on investment management and corporate governance by exploring an 
alternative channel through which ICs can add value to firms: improved investment 
efficiency. In particular, this study extends the governance literature by examining 
how IC characteristics affect investment efficiency. Fourth, we draw our sample 
from six countries that comprise the GCC to examine the association between 
existence of an investment committee, and their characteristics, and firms’ 
investment efficiency. We are then able to capture differences in governance, 
institutional, political and other country level effects within an emerging market 
context. Prior studies on the effect of governance factors on firms’ financing 
decisions have largely been done on a single country basis. The GCC as a whole has 
newly adopted governance practices and face similar issues around accountability, 
risk management, politics and ownership structures. We also contribute to the 
governance literature by demonstrating that improvements in governance structure at the 
firm level through use of an investment committee are important in an emerging market 
context such as the GCC where governance structures and supporting regulations are 
evolving. Finally, our results are likely to be of interest to regulators, stock exchanges, 
capital suppliers and shareholders when they evaluate firm performance or the effect of 
governance and regulation in the GCC context. 
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1.4.4 Objective 4: Investment committee, corporate cash holdings and 
corporate life cycle 
The purpose of the essay that investigates “objective 4” is to examine the impact of 
investment committee concentration and specialization, and the stages of a firm’s life cycle 
in affecting corporate cash holding in the Gulf Cooperation Council region. In particular, we 
test whether the existence of an IC has an impact on the extent and quality of corporate cash 
holding. I also examine the relevance and significance of IC characteristics in explaining the 
corporate cash holdings. Furthermore, I study whether the role of the IC in affecting cash 
holdings varies with different stages in a firm’s life cycle.    
 
 Summary of results 
We   investigate   the   association   between   voluntary   formation   of   
board   investment committee (IC) and corporate cash holdings of non-financial 
firms over the corporate life cycle stages for a large sample of Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) firms during 2005–2016. We find that IC increases corporate cash 
holdings in growth and maturity stages of firm, compared to introduction, shake-out 
and decline stages. This suggests that   each   stage   would   manifest   integral   
complementarities   among   governance, investment strategy and corporate decision 
making; that corporate complexity would cause each stage to exhibit certain 
significant differences from all other stages. These results have important 
implications for investors, policy makers and regulators. Our findings are robust to 
various econometrics specifications. We   investigate   the   association   between   
voluntary   formation   of   board   investment committee (IC) and corporate cash holdings of 
non-financial firms over the corporate life cycle stages for a large sample of GCC firms 
during 2005–2013. The results show that IC increases corporate cash holdings in growth and 
maturity stages of firm, compared to introduction, shake-out and decline stages. This 
suggests that   each   stage   would   manifest   integral   complementarities   among   
governance, investment strategy and corporate decision making; that corporate complexity 
would cause each stage to exhibit certain significant differences from all other stages. These 
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results have important implications for investors, policy makers and regulators. Our findings 
are robust to various econometrics specifications. 
 Significance 
This study contributes to the extant literature in at least two dimensions: 
Firstly, it advances our understanding of the role of corporate governance in terms of 
IC on cash holding in emerging markets setting. The GCC countries provide a unique 
context compared to most developed countries. Although the GCC corporate 
governance codes do not regulate the formation of ICs, a large proportion of firms 
listed across GCC stock markets have established voluntary ICs. Moreover, even 
though the establishment of ICs is voluntary in the GCC, the presence of ICs requires 
firms to set up general criteria to regulate investment decision-making processes. In 
general, the main and most critical function of the ICs is to oversee the firms’ 
financial resources, maintenance of operational capital, and identifying future 
investment opportunities with the aim of maximizing shareholders wealth. Most 
importantly, managing market and liquidity risks becomes an important investment 
function of ICs in order for firms to optimize and maximize returns.12 Secondly, this 
paper attempts to combine two strands of literature that have usually been studied 
separately (i.e., investment decisions through different life cycle stages and corporate 
governance). Our empirical results suggest that the effect of ICs on cash holdings 
differs significantly across the firm life cycle stages. In particular, we find that ICs 
induce more cash holding for firms in the growth and maturity stages, while it is 
lower in the introduction and decline stage. These results imply that ICs can be 
effective in optimal allocation of resources through different stages by aligning the 
interests of investors and managers.Our paper is important for several regulators 
(e.g., policy makers and governance authorities) in the GCC.  Our paper suggests that 
                                                     
12 The GCC public listed firms have over the years been motivated to formulate a common standard 
concerning the duties of ICs in relation to growth and investment opportunities. For example, the 
Qatar Telecom (Qtel) in its 2005 annual report suggest that it’s “Investment committee reviews all 
proposals for strategic investment opportunities. Investment committee reviewed Qtel’s opportunities 
for growth in the region and initiated and recommended major investment opportunities for the 
company”. In Bahrain, the National Hotels Company 2011 annual report acknowledge that the 
investment committee is responsible for identifying investment and growth opportunities that will 
return sufficient yield to maximize shareholders wealth. The Southern Province Cement Company 
(SOCCO) in the KSA in its 2012 annual report suggests that the Investment Committee seeks for new 
investment opportunities in line with the company growth requirements.  
 
16 
 
corporate governance effectiveness (i.e., specialised board committees) on corporate 
financial policy varies and depends on stages of firm’s life cycle.13 
 Structure of thesis 
This thesis is organized into six chapters comprising four interconnected 
essays on corporate governance and an introduction and conclusion chapter. Chapter 
one provides the relevant background about the political and economic environment, 
institutional and capital markets development in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC). The chapter highlights specific characteristics of the GCC institutional 
settings as a way to conceptualize the study context. The chapter will end with the 
contribution of the four essays to corporate governance literature. Chapter two 
presents the first essay titled “Multiple Directorships, Family Ownership and the 
Board Nomination Committee”, which explore the association between outside board 
directorships and family ownership concentration, and the role of nomination 
committee. Chapter three presents the second essay titled “Joint-audit, political 
connections and cost of debt capital”, which examine the association between joint-
audit and cost of debt and the role of political connections with royal families. 
Chapter four presents the third essay titled “Investment Committee Characteristics 
and Investment Efficiency”, which investigate the association between a board 
investment committee’s characteristics and corporate investment efficiency.  
Chapter five presents the final essay titled “Investment committee, corporate cash 
holdings and corporate life cycle”, investigate the association between voluntary 
formation of board investment committee (IC) and corporate cash holdings of firms 
over the corporate life cycle. Chapter six provides a summary of the findings and 
further research directions. 
 
 
                                                     
13 For instance, firms in growth stages, have extensive types of investment, and may suffer 
management’s incentive to exasperate corporate cash, pre-requestions and incentive of empire 
building. Therefore, a specialized board committees (e.g., IC, and Risk Committee) are beneficial in 
such a stage. 
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Multiple Directorships, Family Ownership and the 
Board Nominiation Committee: International 
Evidence from the GCC 
 
 Introduction 
        Firms with board members who hold multiple outside directorships have been 
shown to be underperformers (Core, Holthausen & Larcker, 1999; Ferris, 
Jagannathan & Pritchard, 2003; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; TNI, 2008; Falato, 
Kadyrzhanova & Lel, 2014). Prior studies show, for example, that outside 
directorships may reduce firm value (Ferris, Jagannathan & Pritchard, 2003; 
Jiraporn, Kim & Davidson, 2008), weaken a board’s monitoring ability (Fich & 
Shivdasani, 2006), diminish its advisory capacity (Jiraporn, Singh & Lee, 2009), 
reduce the effectiveness of outside directors as corporate monitors (Core, Holthausen 
& Larcker, 1999; Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999) and influence firms’ financing 
choices and ability (Gilson, 1990). Multiple outside directorships can thus reduce 
investor confidence (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006), diminish creditor trust (Cooper & 
Uzun, 2012), result in the transfer of wealth from minority to majority shareholders 
(Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki, 2003), minimize the board’s ability to alleviate 
information asymmetry issues (Armstrong, Guay& Weber, 2010) and possibly lead 
to an increase in agency costs (Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999; Core, Holthausen & 
Larcker, 1999; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Prior research (e.g., Mike Burkart, 
Panunzi & Shleifer, 2003) has also suggested that multiple outside directorships may 
affect the efficiency and effectiveness of board functioning in general and the role of 
various board committees in particular.  
The contentious nature of multiple outside board directorships has initiated 
several reviews by governance agencies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) of 
the risks associated with them (Council for Institutional Investors - CII (1998); 
National Association of Corporate Directors- NACD 1996, and The National 
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Investor- TNI 2008).1 The objective of the study is to investigate the association 
between multiple outside board directorships and family ownership concentration in 
listed non-financial GCC firms. We further assess whether the existence and quality 
of a nomination committee (NC) suppresses the capacity of boards with family 
members to include other members with multiple outside directorships.  
The economic, institutional and socio-political environment of the GCC 
region makes it an interesting setting in which to examine the corporate role of NCs 
and their ability and incentives to develop a board structure that is in the firms’ best 
interests for several reasons. First, the recent literature (e.g., Sirmon et al., 2008) 
suggests that the family and/or founding owners of GCC firms use their influence to 
enhance their voting power over others and to intervene in the board’s selection of 
managers and directors for the firm, thus controlling the decision-making process.2 
Studies (Maury, 2006; Ali, Chen & Radhakrishnan, 2007; Leung, Richardson & 
Jaggi, 2014) also provide evidence to suggest that family and/or founder ownership 
results in Type II agency problems, whereby wealth is transferred from minority to 
family shareholders. Some 60% of the equity markets in the GCC are controlled by 
family firms (TNI, 2008). Hence, the concentration of family ownership is much 
higher in the GCC than in most developed countries, where firms are owned by a 
diverse group of investors (Musa, 2002). The implication is that GCC firms may face 
pronounced conflicts between minority and majority shareholders. In addition, 
professional surveys (e.g., The National Investor TNI, 2008) indicate that multiple 
directorships are a common phenomenon in GCC listed companies, which prior 
research suggests may undermine and weaken board efficiency (Core, Holthausen & 
Larcker, 1999; Ferris, Jagannathan & Pritchard, 2003; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). 
Hence, it is not unreasonable to assert that boards with high levels of family 
ownership select busier directors, i.e., those with multiple external directorships, to 
                                                     
1 For instance, with regard to corporate governance, a guideline issued by the Council for Institutional 
Investors (CII 1998) recommends that a director should not serve on more than two other boards. The 
National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD 1996) is more flexible, indicating that a director 
who is the board member of a firm should not have directorship seats and serve on more than three 
boards. Corporate governance in K.S.A requires a single director should not seat in more than 5 
outside directorships, and in Bahrain not excessed more than 3 outside directorship. In addition, the 
Institute for Corporate Governance (Hawkamah 2008) noted that directors with multiple outside 
directorships face difficulties in devoting enough time to all of the firms they serve. 
2 For example, Villalonga and Amit (2006) find family firms more likely to be headed by individuals 
who hold both the CEO and chair positions. 
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assist with monitoring. If this is the case, then we can expect family ownership to be 
associated with boards comprising members with multiple outside directorships.  
The GCC model of corporate governance has been influenced by the Anglo-
American model, which is generally referred to as the “market model,” and focuses 
on maximizing shareholder wealth. The market model is a one-tier system in which a 
shareholder-elected board of directors is the highest governing body, and individual 
shareholders do not directly affect the direction of the firm (Keasey & Wright, 1993). 
Consequently, the role of independent outside directors and ownership structure, 
among other factors, are important elements in monitoring managerial performance.3 
In the market model, individual shareholders cannot directly influence the direction 
of the firm, which may give family owners the upper hand in controlling the firm’s 
affairs. Family owners holding a majority of voting shares are likely to have personal 
interests and to use their power to take private advantage by appropriating resources, 
thereby expropriating the rights of minority shareholders (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
In the GCC region, individual shareholder power is diluted, and family power is 
strong (TNI, 2008). According to a 2008 TNI report, 25-75% of GCC firms have at 
least two board members from the same family and for some firms, families account 
for 100% of board constituents. The adoption of the market model in the GCC, 
where family ownership concentration and board control are both prominent, can 
exacerbate agency-related problems. In addition, the differences between the GCC 
model of governance and those of other developed and developing markets suggest 
the possibility that corporate governance characteristics may not have the same level 
of influence on the association between multiple directorship and family ownership 
concentration as documented in previous studies.  
Second, corporate governance practices and codes in the GCC are distinct 
owing to the complexities of the institutional and cultural settings that distinguish its 
member states from other developed and well-established emerging economies (Bley 
& Chen, 2006; Baydoun et al., 2012; Mazaheri, 2013). For example, compliance 
with corporate governance codes is not mandatory in most GCC countries. In 
                                                     
3 In contrast, the developing markets of Turkey and Korea, among others, have been described as 
more akin to the German-Japanese model of corporate governance (Robertson 2009), which serves the 
interests of a wider range of stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, and creditors. The 
German-Japanese model is a two-tier system in which a board of supervisors defines the interests of 
stakeholders and appoints a management board charged with conducting the day-to-day operations of 
the firm. As overlapping board responsibilities are permitted, members of the board of supervisors 
must be independent of management. 
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particular, these codes are silent on the issue of multiple directorships, and the 
number of outside directorships permitted is not clearly delineated. For example, in 
the KSA and Bahrain, the number of outside board seats allowed is five and three 
respectively, but no number is specified in the corporate governance codes of other 
GCC countries. The leniency or silence in some of the GCC codes concerning 
multiple outside directorships may afford family-controlled firms more room to 
extract benefits from minority shareholders.   
 Third, emerging economies, such as those in the GCC, provide a particularly 
appropriate laboratory for studying the issue of multiple directorships. Developed 
economies such as the U.S. and U.K. have institutional investor organizations with a 
relatively long history of actively seeking to limit the number of multiple 
directorships, and firms may be compelled to hire directors in accordance with 
recommended standards (Sarkar & Sarkar, 2009). In addition, directors themselves 
may share the view that taking up multiple directorships is not feasible, and 
consequently voluntarily seek to limit the number of board positions they accept 
(Korn-Ferry International, 1998). In such a situation, the frequency of multiple 
directorships is likely to be endogenously and nearly optimally determined, meaning 
that cross-sectional data may exhibit little variation within or across firm boards 
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), which in turn makes it difficult to identify the relationship 
between director busyness and family ownership concentration empirically.  
Fourth, the effect of family ownership concentration in public firms is a 
growing field of interest in the finance and accounting literature. Because such 
concentration can have important implications, empirical evidence is of paramount 
importance for judging its final effect and for orienting regulation. To date, the 
empirical literature on family ownership concentration has focused primarily on the 
U.S., starting with Shleifer & Vishny (1986). More recently, (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003) show that family ownership concentration is an effective organizational 
structure in the U.S., whereas (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006) found multiple directorships 
to adversely affect firm performance, as manifested in a positive market reaction 
following the departure of a busy director. There is a dearth of research on the effect 
of family ownership concentration in public firms outside the U.S. (Gomez-Mejia, 
Makri & Kintana, 2010). Daily, Dalton & Rajagopalan (2003, p.155) state that 
“agency effects may function differently in this context and prior findings from non-
family samples may not readily generalize into this setting.” There is certainly little 
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comprehensive evidence on this important issue in the GCC context. To the best of 
our knowledge, this study is the first to examine the association between multiple 
outside directorship and family ownership concentration and to assess whether the 
formation of separate NCs affects the relationship between family ownership and the 
appointment of busy directors in the GCC. 
Fifth, there is an increasing drive toward improving corporate governance 
regimes across the GCC in line with the region’s rapid economic growth and 
growing demand from regulators and international institutional investors for greater 
transparency and accountability. Evidence of governance reforms across the GCC 
comes from the burgeoning number of conferences and surveys on corporate 
governance and board of director quality in the region,4 as well as the number of 
codes and guidelines being issued and corporate governance taskforces being formed 
in select GCC countries. In recent years, the GCC region has also seen a marked 
increase in foreign direct investment (Bley & Chen, 2006). Further, there has been a 
general move toward opening the doors to international investment, with many new 
initiatives appearing in the wake of the global financial crisis (Bley & Saad, 2011).  
Finally, the GCC has strengthened its regulatory and financial institutions and 
adopted more reforms concerning the business environment. For instance, in 2013, 
the World Bank declared the KSA to be the region’s highest-ranking economy in 
terms of the “overall ease of doing business,” placing it globally in the 22nd spot 
among 185 countries (Mazaheri, 2013). The region’s political setting (family 
monarchical system) provides us with a very interesting setting in which to 
investigate the association between family ownership and board monitoring, as that 
political setting is considered to be one of the main reasons for GCC countries’ 
initiation of business environment reforms. As (Mazaheri, 2013, p.296) writes, 
“monarchies are better able to solve the credible commitment problem between the 
government and existing private sector elites than non-monarchical, authoritarian 
states.”  
To sum up, the institutional aspects of corporate governance in the GCC 
bring new and interesting dimensions to the association between multiple 
directorships and concentrated family ownership. In addition, GCC markets have 
become increasingly important over the years for investors seeking higher returns 
                                                     
4 See Hawkamah website [Link: http://www.hawkamah.org/] 
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and better opportunities and for countries seeking investment projects, suggesting 
greater demand for directors with high-quality monitoring and advising attributes 
(Baydoun et al., 2012). 
 Background: Family Ownership and Corporate 
Governance in the GCC Region 
The emerging economies of the GCC collectively constitute a rapidly growing group 
of developing countries that derive a considerable amount of their income from oil 
exports (Al-Malkawi, Pillai & Bhatti, 2014; Al-Shammari, Brown & Tarca, 2008) 
and that have rapidly expanding equity markets. Economic development in the GCC 
has been accompanied by an increase in the number of listed firms, which grew from 
473 in 2005 to 705 in 2013.5 GCC stock markets have recently attracted international 
investors in line with significant changes in member states’ economic and financial 
environment. The liberalization of GCC capital markets has taken place through 
several reforms in regulation and governance.6  
2.2.1 Family Ownership 
The literature examines how the ownership structure of firms affects corporate board 
monitoring and effectiveness (Mak & Li, 2001; Fama & Jensen, 1983), documenting 
that family control introduces agency problems for minority shareholders and rent-
seeking activities. For instance, (Villalonga & Amit, 2006) argue that agency 
conflicts are costlier for firms that are owned or controlled by family groups. Andres, 
Bongard, & Lehmann (2013) demonstrate that firm value decreases when family 
groups impose control over management and directors. In addition, (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Maury, 2006) reveal that in countries in 
which shareholder protection and transparency are weak, the potential for 
expropriation by family controllers may erode value for minority shareholders. 
                                                     
5 See Gulfbase website at http://www.gulfbase.com/ 
6 These reforms are “low interest rates, minimum translation of costs and uncertainty about capital 
repatriation, and new laws and governance to protect property rights, reduce corruption and ease 
ownership restrictions” (Al-Hadi, Hasan and Habib 2015, p.67). 
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Different shareholder groups typically have substantial equity ownership in 
companies listed on the GCC stock exchanges (Al-Shammari, Brown & Tarca, 
2008). These groups include governments and their agencies, dominant families, 
institutional investors, and minority shareholders. The GCC’s business environment 
is considered to be family-dominated, and family-controlled firms are represented by 
a small number of family investors (Al-Yahyaee, Pham & Walter, 2011). Some 60% 
of GCC firm equity is owned by just 207 large family groups (TNI, 2008; 
Hawkamah, 2013). The degree of family ownership concentration is much higher in 
GCC firms than in their counterparts in the U.S. and in other developed and 
developing countries. In fact, most businesses in the GCC have a few controlling 
shareholders, and family ownership is predominant (Saidi, 2004). The diverse 
shareholder ownership common in Western countries, and the resulting separation of 
ownership and control that highlights the stewardship and monitoring aspects of non-
executive directors’ functions, is limited in the GCC. The GCC family ownership 
concentration ratio by country is high, and is maintained by such practices as making 
rights issues to existing shareholders and inviting wealthy, influential families to 
subscribe to shares in IPOs (Musa, 2002). Yasin, Shehab, & Saidi (2004) suggest that 
the high degree of concentrated family ownership in the GCC undermines the 
principles of good corporate governance. 
Family groups launched businesses in the GCC at an early stage of national 
development, and have managed to maintain ownership over several generations 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Members of these controlling families routinely occupy 
the highest position in the firm (e.g., chairperson or CEO), and have incentives to 
appoint other family members to firm boards and management teams (Hawkamah, 
2013; Jaggi, Leung & Gul, 2009). Therefore, the family-controlled publically listed 
firms in GCC economies are subject to severe Type II agency conflicts between 
minority and majority shareholders and pronounced rent-seeking problems, which 
together work to diminish the effects of corporate governance practices (Ali, Chen & 
Radhakrishnan, 2007).  
 
                                                     
7 As the degree of ownership/powerful concentration in the hands of a few families is very high in 
GCC equity markets, a (TNI 2008) aggregates the top ten families in each market and each country. 
The survey lists these powerful families as a collection of individuals from the same country with the 
same surname (family name). See Appendix II for detailed information. 
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2.2.2 Corporate Governance  
The organizational and legal structures that shape policies and governance practices 
in developed economies may not necessarily be applicable to emerging markets such 
as those of the GCC (Fan, Wei & Xu, 2011). Corporate governance practices and 
codes in the GCC are distinct owing to the complexities of their institutional and 
cultural settings, which differ from those of developed and well-established emerging 
economies (Bley & Chen, 2006; Baydoun et al., 2012; Mazaheri, 2013). Although 
compliance with corporate governance codes is not mandatory in some GCC 
countries (e.g., Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait; see Appendix I), many firms in the GCC 
have implemented corporate governance practices (Hawkamah, 2010; OECD, 2011; 
Al-Malkawi, Pillai & Bhatti, 2014; Al-Hadi, Hasan & Habib, 2015). Several 
professional surveys carried out in the GCC suggest that corporate governance is one 
of the primary concerns in the GCC business environment. A number of institutions 
and regulatory bodies have established guidelines on how the region’s public and 
private firms can implement corporate governance practices (Al-Malkawi, Pillai & 
Bhatti, 2014; Dalwai, Basiruddin & Abdul Rasid, 2015) for several reasons. First, the 
collapse of many firms in the region (e.g., the Al Gosaibi-Saad Group) as a result of 
their inability to fulfill their obligations to financial institutions during the global 
financial crisis prompted banks to require better corporate governance practices and 
greater disclosure and transparency,8 which has led to the adoption of such practices 
by an increasing number of GCC firms. Second, as the GCC region has become the 
financial and commercial hub of the Middle East (Baydoun et al., 2012), the 
regulatory bodies and legal environments in GCC economies are playing a vital role 
in the establishment and implementation of governance reforms. Third, both 
regulators and investors are aware that corporate governance provides several 
benefits to firms such as achieving high levels of market confidence, the protection 
of both foreign and minority shareholders, economic diversification, and investment 
opportunities (Fasano & Iqbal, 2003; Mina, 2007; Callen et al., 2014).  
Recent amendments9 to GCC governance codes such as those concerning 
board composition and committee formation, specialized NCs in particular, have 
been incorporated in most of the GCC. For instance, the governance codes of 
                                                     
8 See (Al-Hadi, Hasan and Habib 2015) on bank regulations in GCC countries. 
9 Corporate governance rules were amended in GCC countries as follows: in the UAE in April 2010, 
Oman in March 2015, Kuwait in September 2013 and the KSA on January 5, 2009.  
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Kuwait, the KSA and the UAE mandate the formation of an NC, although NC 
composition varies depending on country-specific regulations. Oman’s corporate 
governance code does not mandate NC formation, but the number of Omani firms 
establishing one gradually increased between 2005 and 2013 (see Table 5A). The 
corporate governance code in the KSA allows firms to form a combined NC and 
CC, whereas those in Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait require firms to form a separate 
NC (these codes are called comply or explain codes).10 In this study, we investigate 
one important aspect of the recent corporate governance reforms in the GCC, 
namely, the adoption of NCs.11  
 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.3.1 Multiple Directorships 
Multiple directorships (a proxy for board busyness) refer to the number of outside 
directorships (i.e., three, four or five) held by the board members of a focal firm 
(Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; Jiraporn et al., 2009).12 Prior research shows that outside 
directorships can be valuable to a firm. For instance, (Fama & Jensen, 1983) argue 
that firms are motivated to appoint more outside directors to improve the reputation 
and monitoring capabilities of their directors. Empirical studies have also 
documented evidence to show that these attributes are valued differently depending 
on a firm’s operation cycle. For example, (Field, Lowry & Mkrtchyan, 2013) suggest 
that during IPOs, firms that lack public market experience are most likely to depend 
on expert directors with multiple outside directorships, which may prove essential to 
their ability to compete and use resources effectively. Furthermore, prior studies 
(e.g., Gilson, 1990; Wilson, Wright & Scholes, 2013) find that firms with multiple 
outside directorships are able to obtain financing more readily during periods of 
financial distress through their business and relation ties.  
                                                     
10 See Appendix I. 
11According to (Uzun, Szewczyk and Varma 2004; Ruigrok et al. 2006), NCs are established for the 
purpose of identifying and selecting board members to improve board effectiveness, evaluate 
directors’ qualifications and manage board composition to ensure its independence as a long-term 
function. 
12 We use “busyness” and “multiple directorships” interchangeably in this paper.  
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Conversely, there is also research suggesting that appointing busy directors to 
a board can undermine or at least weaken board efficiency (Core, Holthausen & 
Larcker, 1999; Ferris, Jagannathan & Pritchard, 2003; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). 
Ferris, Jagannathan, & Pritchard (2003) find that reputable directors are unlikely to 
take directorships in poorer performing firms. Jiraporn, Kim, & Davidson (2008) 
investigate the relation between multiple directorships and firm diversification, and 
find that firms with more outside board directorships engage in more diversification, 
which may diminish firm value. (Ferris, Jagannathan & Pritchard, 2003; Fich & 
Shivdasani, 2006) contend that directors are overcommitted when they hold several 
directorships, thus weakening firm performance. Furthermore, (Hunton & Rose, 
2008) investigate busy directors’ responses to auditor recommendations, and find 
that relative to directors who hold a single directorship directors with multiple 
outside directorships have less incentive to accept an auditor’s restatement 
recommendations.  
Several studies also address the association between multiple outside 
directorships and CEO compensation and firm performance. In this vein, Core, 
Holthausen, & Larcker (1999) show that multiple outside directorships are likely to 
weaken board monitoring and create avenues for CEOs to benefit from excessive 
rewards, resulting in poor firm performance. We argue that family owners have an 
incentive to rely on directors with multiple directorships to reduce the risk of their 
control being diminished. 
The requirements on multiple outside directorships in GCC corporate 
governance codes are also not clearly delineated. For example, in the KSA and 
Bahrain, the numbers of outside board seats allowed are five and three, respectively, 
but the number is not specified in the codes of other countries (TNI, 2008). This 
silence in many GCC corporate governance codes may provide more power for 
family owners to extract benefits from minority shareholders, which is consistent 
with our main hypothesis. In addition, the differences in GCC codes regarding 
multiple directorships facilitate our ability to examine whether countries that state the 
number of outside board seats have better governance than those that do not.  
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2.3.2 Hypotheses Development 
 Association between Family Ownership and Multiple Directorships 
Multiple directorships have received considerable attention in the literature and in 
governance surveys because of the fragmented nature of the monitoring and 
disciplining role that may occur if board members take on too many directorships 
(Ferris, Jagannathan & Pritchard, 2003; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). Busy directors 
have more incentive to shirk their core responsibilities, which may include, for 
instance, attending and contributing fully to the committees to which they have been 
appointed members (e.g., Jiraporn, Singh & Lee, 2009), and they have less incentive 
or time to attend board meetings (Jiraporn et al., 2009).  
In this study, two theories are applied to investigate the association between 
family ownership and control and the existence of multiple outside directorships: 
Type II agency theory and institutional theory. Several studies suggest that Type II 
agency theory is useful for explaining governance in family-owned and family-
controlled firms (e.g., Ali, Chen & Radhakrishnan, 2007; Maury, 2006; Leung, 
Richardson & Jaggi, 2014). This theory suggests that controlling shareholders 
engage in activities designed to serve their own interests and, if families, to 
maximize family wealth (Fan & Wong, 2002), including increasing their ownership 
stake (Maury 2006), strengthening their voting power (Villalonga & Amit, 2006), 
reducing corporate governance disclosures (Ali, Chen & Radhakrishnan, 2007), and 
decreasing firm diversification to enjoy personal control and to exercise their 
authority (Gomez-Mejia, Makri & Kintana, 2010), thereby maintaining control over 
minority shareholders.13  
Previous studies also find that family control reduces board monitoring. 
Anderson & Reeb (2004) find that family owners weaken board monitoring by 
reducing the number of independent directors (Jaggi & Leung, 2007) and that family 
directors reduce the number of board meetings. Additionally, Villalonga & Amit 
(2006) report that family-owned or controlled firms usually combine the CEO and 
chair positions.  
                                                     
13 Researchers also find that family firms to be more likely to control executive positions by 
exercising managerial control (Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000; Andres 2008). 
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Family shareholders are likely to appoint directors who will not act against 
their wishes (Jaggi, Leung & Gul, 2009). Prior studies show that busy directors 
attend fewer meetings, fail to ask hard questions, and place less importance on and 
dedicate less effort to monitoring activities (Walsh & Seward, 1990). In contrast, less 
busy directors may protect minority shareholders by contributing more time and 
effort to monitoring the board (Leung, Richardson & Jaggi, 2014), a view supported 
by  Lane et al. (2006) who find that busy directors are more faithful to controlling 
family owners.  
Given the social power and control of family-controlled or family-owned 
firms in the GCC, family owners are likely to preserve control and maximize 
family/personal wealth (agency type II), which suggests that we should expect 
family-controlled groups to appoint directors with insufficient time, experience and 
spare effort to question board-directed strategies and plans (Villalonga & Amit, 
2006; Jiraporn, Kim & Davidson, 2008; Jiraporn, Singh & Lee, 2009).  
 In addition to agency theory, the power and control of family-controlled and 
family-owned firms may be viewed from the perspective of institutional theory (Peng 
et al. 2009), which suggests that when formal constraints (laws, rules and 
regulations) are unclear or fail, informal constraints (culture, norms and values) take 
over that role by providing guidance and reducing uncertainty. Thus, control by 
family-owned firms may substitute for regulations and governance systems in the 
GCC. The management literature (Peng et al., 2009; Peng & Jiang, 2010) suggests 
that the institution-based view may explain the effects of societal norms and values 
on business transactions. This effect is evident in a range of emerging markets such 
as India, China, Indonesia, Argentina, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Taiwan, which are 
characterized by weak regulatory regimes (e.g., weak investor protection and 
governance regulations), strong social ties and the substitution of local family 
networks for market regulations (e.g., corporate governance and investor protection 
regulations). For instance, Kedia, Mukherjee & Lahiri (2006) reveal that family and 
business groups rely on their informal networks and alliances to influence formal 
regimes. 
In the GCC, family-controlled businesses are considered an important part of 
government economic reforms. Strong tribal customs and prominent business family 
names lead governments in the region to consider family interests in economic 
reforms and regulatory enforcement (Khalifah al-Yousef, 2008). For example, 
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Mazaheri (2013) shows that the social structures of GCC communities are dominated 
by tribal culture, cronyism and close personal ties. Furthermore, the institution-based 
view and strong secrecy culture of GCC society is reflected in the many family 
controlling shareholders who have a strong desire to maintain their families’ privacy, 
confidentiality and autonomy. Therefore, family shareholders are less likely to share 
information, power and management with busy board members (who exert less 
effort) than with other directors (who have more time and incentive for in-depth 
investigations)14 (Pearl Initiative 2012).15 Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H1: GCC listed firms with highly concentrated family ownership and control are 
positively associated with the presence of directors with multiple directorships on 
their corporate boards. 
 
The literature suggests that board efficiency is associated with board structure and 
the functioning of board committees (Harrison, 1987; Brick & Chidambaran, 2010; 
Tao & Hutchinson, 2013). The formation of board committees attracts scholars and 
regulators because of the central role played by committees in setting objectives, 
monitoring and advising the firm (Harrison, 1987; Carter et al., 2010). For instance, 
Klein (1998) investigates the relationship between the presence of specialized board 
committees and the role of directors in those committees, and documents a positive 
association between the existence of financing and investment committees and the 
firm’s stock market performance. This finding supports the notion that decisions 
made by groups (e.g., committees) are of higher quality than those made by 
individuals (e.g., family members) (Hill, 1982).  
Harrison (1987) reveals that internal board monitoring committees such as 
NCs are responsible for providing shareholders with an independent view of 
corporate affairs. For instance, an NC promotes corporate legitimacy and also 
provides objectivity in decision-making, which may include the interests of 
individual board members, particularly with regard to the selection and retention of 
directors. Given that busy directors are less likely to engage in monitoring (Core, 
Holthausen & Larcker, 1999), institutional investors and shareholders view the 
                                                     
14 Particularly with regard to the issues of firm management and the transfer of power from one 
generation to the next.  
15 The Pearl Initiative issued a report on the governance of family businesses in GCC countries in 
2012 based on analytical study of more than 100 interviews with senior figures in these businesses in 
collaboration with PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC). See http://www.pearlinitiative.org. 
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presence of an NC as an important signal of the board’s ability to build and maintain 
independence (Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999). In the U.S., for example, the corporate 
governance guidelines formulated by the Council for Institutional Investors (CII, 
1998) encourage firms to establish an NC to improve board efficiency through the 
appointment of qualified members to the board (Uzun, Szewczyk & Varma, 2004). 
In addition, the NC Monitoring Committee continually monitors the performance of 
directors and evaluates the effectiveness of firms’ internal corporate governance 
structure (Adams & Ferreira, 2007).   
Consistent with H1, Maury (2006) shows that conflicts between family and 
minority shareholders are more pronounced in countries characterized by a low 
degree of investor protection and high degree of concentrated family ownership. The 
establishment of an NC that is dominated by qualified independent directors may 
reduce a controlling family’s power to increase the number of board members’ 
outside directorships. Although there is growing evidence of the effectiveness of 
corporate governance regulations in emerging markets such as those in the GCC, the 
debate over the functions of corporate governance in family-owned and family-
controlled public firms has not been extended to the NC context. Given the effects of 
such regulation on the formation of NCs, the existence of such a committee may 
reduce family control over the selection of busy board directors. We hypothesized 
that the positive association between family ownership and control and the 
appointment of busy directors is suppressed by the existence of an NC. To test this 
expectation, we propose the following hypothesis:  
H2: The positive association between family ownership and control and the 
appointment of busy directors is suppressed the existence of a NC. 
 Methodology and Research Design 
2.4.1 Data and Sample  
Our sample comprises 185 non-financial firms drawn from the Bahrain, Oman, 
Kuwait, Qatar, KSA and UAE stock markets over the 2005 to 2013 period using 
S&P Capital IQ. Panel A of Table 1 shows that our initial sample comprises 3286 
firm-year observations. We exclude 72 jointly listed firm-years, 1688 firm-years with 
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missing corporate governance data and 435 firm-year observations with missing key 
control variables, giving us a final sample of 1091 firm-year observations. Corporate 
governance variables and family ownership data were hand-collected from the 
sample firms’ annual reports, which are available from the six GCC stock markets 
and the firms’ websites.16  
Panel B of Table 1 shows that Omani firms account for 45% of our sample, 
followed by the KSA (40%), the UAE (10%), Bahrain (4%) and Qatar (0.01%). 
Panel C of Table 1 shows that 20.67% of our sample was derived from the Materials 
industry sector, followed by firms belonging to the Industrial (19%) and Consumer 
(15%) industry sectors.  
Table 1 Panel A: Busy02 Sample selection 
Total Observations  
Number of Non-financial firms available in S & P Capital IQ for the GCC countries  3286 
Less 
Joint listed firms observation       -72 
Firms with an unavailable annual report for corporate governance data -1688 
Key control variables              -435 
Total Observations 1091 
 
Table 1 Panel B: Sample Distribution by year and Country (frequency) 
YEAR    BAH KSA OMN QAT UAE Total 
2006 1.00 13.00 55.00 0.00 0.00 69.00 
2007 1.00 27.00 59.00 0.00 2.00 89.00 
2008 1.00 53.00 63.00 0.00 4.00 121.00 
2009 4.00 60.00 63.00 0.00 7.00 134.00 
2010 7.00 70.00 65.00 1.00 18.00 161.00 
2011 9.00 70.00 63.00 2.00 26.00 170.00 
2012 10.00 71.00 64.00 2.00 27.00 174.00 
2013 9.00 70.00 64.00 2.00 28.00 173.00 
Total 42.00 434.00 496.00 7.00 112.00 1091 
 
Table 1 Panel C: Sample Distribution by Industry (frequency) 
INDUSTRY Freq. Percent 
Consumer Discretionary 170 15.58 
Consumer Staples 240 22 
Energy 51 4.67 
Healthcare 31 2.84 
Industrials 209 19.16 
Information Technology 8 0.73 
Materials 291 26.67 
                                                     
16 Furthermore, not all firms disclose the number of outside directorships held by board members 
owing to varying corporate governance code requirements (see Appendix I).  
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Telecommunication Services 35 3.21 
Utilities 56 5.13 
Total 1,091 100 
 
2.4.2 Variable Description 
Dependent Variable: We employ three variables (Busy_BSize, Busy(log) and Busy02) 
to proxy for the extent of multiple outside directorships or director busyness. In line 
with previous studies, Busy_BSize refers to the total number of outside directorships 
held by all board members, scaled by the total number of board members or board 
size (Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Jiraporn, Kim and Davidson 2008). Busy(log) is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of the total number of outside directorships held 
by all board members. Busy02 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the board has at least 
one member with two or more outside directorships, and 0 otherwise (Ferris, 
Jagannathan and Pritchard 2003; Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Jiraporn, Kim and 
Davidson 2008). These proxies are used to reduce any potential endogeneity issues. 
As a robustness check, we use another two measures (Busy03 and Busy04).17  
 
Independent Variables: Family ownership and nomination committee data were 
hand-collected from firms’ annual reports, corporate governance reports, stock 
market filings, Capital IQ filings and the firm’s website. There is no corporate 
governance database currently available for GCC firms. Typically, data pertaining to 
family ownership and the nomination committee were obtained from the corporate 
governance and ownership sections of firms’ annual reports. Data on ownership were 
examined to ascertain if it contains information on the founding owners of the firm, 
or in fact that founding owners are represented by another entity. For instance, some 
owners are institutions that are in turn owned by founding family members.  
Our family ownership variables comprise the percentage of family ownership 
of a firm’s share capital (FamOwn%) and the number of directors on the board 
belonging to one of the top 10 family groups (Claessens et al., 2000) identified in the 
GCC (FamilTop10(log)). We score the ultimate family owner or their family 
                                                     
17 Busy03 and Busy04 refer to boards with at least one member that has three or more outside 
directorships and four or more outside directorships, respectively. All busyness measures for year t are 
taken from the voluntary or mandatory disclosures in the annual reports of firms incorporated in GCC 
stock markets. 
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connections of the top-10 family groups as one irrespective of whether the board also 
comprises family connections of the ultimate owner. TNI reports (TNI, 2008) 
assisted us in identifying the 10 largest family shareholders among all publicly traded 
firms in the GCC.18 Following to (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 
2006), FamOwn% measures the degree of family ownership concentration, which 
provides an indication of the degree of control family members have in influencing 
board decision-making. Appendix II provides the names of these 10 family groups.19  
Our NC committee variables comprise NC_D which is scored as 1 if a firm 
has a nomination committee, otherwise 0; NC_Ind% calculated as number of 
independent directors on the NC scaled by the total number of nomination committee 
members, and a factor score of five governance attributes of the NC (NC_Factor).  
We follow Al-Hadi, Hasan, and Habib (2015) and Tao and Hutchinson (2013) by 
applying factor analysis to five governance attributes of the NC committee namely 
NC_Ind%, NC_Size, NC_ChairInd, NC_NoMeeting and NC_NoQual. NC_Size is the 
number of directors on the NC scaled by board size, while NC_ChairInd is scored as 
1 if the NC is chaired by an independent director, otherwise 0. NC_NoMeeting is 
calculated as a natural logarithm of the number of nomination committee meetings 
and NC_NoQual is scored as 1 if the NC has at least one director with accounting or 
finance qualifications such as a CPA, ACCA, and CFA, otherwise 0. 
 
 
Control Variables: We employ the following control variables: the number of years 
since incorporation (Age), the natural logarithm of the total number of board 
members (Boardsize(log)), the natural logarithm of total assets (Size), sales growth 
(Sale_Growth), operating margin (OpMargin), director ownership (DirOwnership) 
and AC characteristics (AC_Factor). A firm’s age is expected to be negatively 
associated with the number of directorships, as posited by (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006), 
who find that firms are able to reduce the perceived risk associated with busyness 
                                                     
18 We find that these families retained their position throughout our sample period. We use the natural 
log of the number of directors that belong to the top-10 family groups in the GCC based on TNI 
survey (2008). We also find this family ownership does not significantly change during our sample 
period.  
19 As a robustness check, we also use two alternative measures of family ownership: Fam_D and 
FamMem_D. Fam_D is a dummy variable scored as 1 if the family has shares in the firm, and 0 
otherwise. FamMem_D is computed as a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has more 
than two directors from the same family on the board, and 0 otherwise.  
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over time. We expect a positive association between board size and the number of 
outside directorships held by board members. Firm size is computed as the natural 
logarithm of total assets and is expected to be positively associated with board 
busyness (Ferris, Jagannathan & Pritchard, 2003). Following (Fich & Shivdasani, 
2006), we also control for sales growth (Sale_Growth) which is measured as sales in 
year t minus sales from the previous year, i.e., t-1, scaled by sales in t-1. A firm’s 
operating margin (OpMargin) is measured as operating income scaled by total assets, 
which is expected to exhibit no significant association with our directorship proxies. 
Directors who own more than 5% of a firm’s stock (DirOwnership) are more likely 
to consider the risks associated with the directorships held by board members. 
Following previous studies (Al-Hadi, Hasan and Habib 2015; Faleye, Hoitash & 
Hoitash, 2011), we also use AC_Factor to control for the influence of AC 
characteristics on board busyness (see Table 2, Panel C).20  
2.4.3 Model Design  
To investigate the association between family ownership and board busyness, we use 
Tobit21 (Busy_BSize), ordinary least-squares (OLS) (Busy(log)) and logistic (Busy02) 
models respectively.22 
Busy_BSize / Busy(log) / Busy02i,t = α0 + α1 FamOwn%i,t + α2 Agei,t + α3 Boardsizei,t + 
α4  Sizei,t + α5 Sale_Growthi,t  + α6  OpMargini,t + α7  DirOwnershipi,t + α8  
AC_Factori,t +  Year Dummies + IND Dummies + Country Dummies + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕       (1)              
                                                                                                      
Our main variable of interest is FamOwn% or FamilTop10(log). We expect the 
coefficient to be positive and significant for both variables. To examine the 
association between busyness and the interaction between FamOwn% and an NC 
(NC_D), we use the following OLS model. 
Busy_BSize / Busy(log) / Busy02i,t = α0 +  α1 FamOwn%i,t +  α2 NC_D i,t  +  α3 
FamOwn% * NC_D i,t +  α4 Agei,t + α5 Boardsizei,t + α6  Sizei,t + α7 Sale_Growthi,t  + 
α8  OpMargini,t + α9  DirOwnershipi,t + α10 AC_Factori,t +  Year + IND FE + Country 
FE + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕                                                                                                        (2) 
                                                     
20 We included three AC characteristics (i.e., AC chairman independence, AC size and AC director 
independence) in the factor analysis of audit committee governance attributes. 
21 We use Tobit analysis in this instance as the dependent variable Busy_BSize has a number of 
variables clustered at a limited value zero (McDonald and Moffitt 1980). 
22 Following (Al-Hadi, Hasan and Habib 2015), we conduct (Breusch and Pagan 1980) Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test to ascertain which model is more appropriate for our main analysis. The LM test 
shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero inefficiency. Therefore, we report our analysis 
using OLS. 
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Finally, as a robustness check, we also used NC_D with NC_Ind% and NC_Factor.  
 Results and Discussion 
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the variables included in the regression models for all 
GCC countries are reported in Table 2 of Panel A. Although most GCC corporate 
governance codes do not require identification of the number of board members’ 
outside directorships (except for the KSA and Bahrain; see Appendix I), our measure 
of multiple outside directorships is consistent with that used in prior studies. The 
mean (median) values of the Busy_BSize, Busy(log) and Busy02 indices are 31.6, 1.046 
and 0.559 with medians of 29.0, 1.0 and 1.0 respectively. These mean values are 
similar to those reported in previous studies:  33.7 reported by (Ferris, Jagannathan 
and Pritchard 2003) and 42.0 reported by (Jiraporn, Kim and Davidson 2008). Panel 
A shows that the mean (median) of FamOwn% (percentage of family ownership for 
firm i in year t) in the sample period is 0.078 (0.00), which is similar to the mean of 
0.06 reported by (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Overall, our variables are largely 
consistent with those reported in prior studies (Ferris, Jagannathan & Pritchard, 
2003; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; Field, Lowry & Mkrtchyan, 2013). 
 
Table 2 Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable              N          Mean               S.D.          0.25th       Mdn        0.75th 
Busy_BSize 1091 0.316 0.264 0.111 0.286 0.455 
Busy(log) 1091 1.046 0.680 0.693 1.099 1.609 
Busy02 1091 0.599 0.490 0.000 1.000 1.000 
FamilTop10(log) 1091 1.228 1.298 0.000 1.000 2.000 
FamOwn% 1091 0.078 0.155 0.000 0.000 0.106 
Age(log) 1091 22.324 12.424 13.000 19.000 31.000 
BoardSize(log) 1091 7.740 1.740 7.000 7.000 9.000 
Size(log) 1091 1430.520 5262.116 41.400 149.500 547.600 
Sale_Growth% 1091 39.203 486.093 -13.500 0.180 25.400 
OpMargin 1091 0.088 0.101 0.028 0.081 0.145 
DirOwnership 1091 0.061 0.116 0.000 0.000 0.100 
AC_Factor 1091 0.081 0.976 -0.507 0.352 0.774 
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Notes: Table 2 Panel A reports summary statistics for the key variables for a sample of 1091from the 
GCC countries over the period 2005–2013. The data cover the period from 2005 through 2013. 
 
2.5.2 Univariate Analysis  
Table 2 of Panel B shows the mean difference and t-statistics of multiple outside 
directorships with and without family ownership. We find that all measures of 
multiple outside directorships are significantly higher for firms with family 
ownership (t-values of 3.56, 3.29 and 4.52 with p<0.01 for Busy_BSize, Busy(log), and 
Busy02 respectively). This provides support for H1 in that family ownership 
increases board busyness. Table 2 shows that firms with family ownership are older 
than their counterparts, have higher levels of director ownership, poorer AC quality 
and a lower level of assets. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Panel B: Univariate Analysis: 
Variable Multiple Outside Directorships means     
 Fmaily_D=0 Fmaily_D =1 Difference  t-stat 
Busy_BSize 0.2955 0.355 -0.0599 -3.5682*** 
Busy(log) 0.9975 1.1402 -.14272 -3.2922*** 
Busy02 0.5677 0.7040 -.1362 -4.5249*** 
Age(log) 2.8441 3.1283 -0.2842 -7.6590*** 
BoardSize(log) 2.0249 2.0307 -0.0057 -0.4286 
Size(log) 5.2069 4.9299        0.2769  2.2659** 
Sale_Growth% 0.4046 0.2031  0.2014  0.2291 
OpMargin 0.0876 0.0904 -0.0028 -0.4548 
DirOwnership 0.0294 0.1352 -0.1058 -14.827*** 
AC_Factor 0.0835 0.0063  0.0771  1.262*** 
Notes: Busy_BSize, Busy(log)  and  Busy02 are proxies for the multiple outside directorships of board members; 
Fmaily_D is dummy variable take value of 1 if family own percentage of shares on firm capital structure; 0 
otherwise Age(log)  is the firm age measure as the natural log of the number of years since the firm was 
established; BoardSize(log) is the log of the total number of directors on firm board; Size(log) is the firm size 
measure as the natural log of total assets; Sale_Growth is the sales growth measure as the Sales revenues in year t 
minus sales revenues in year t_1 divided by sales revenue in year t-1; OpMargin is operating margin is annual 
operating income standardized by total assets; DirOwnership is the number of  directors who own more than 5% 
of firm ownership scaled by board size. AC_Factor is an eigenvalue obtained from three audit committee 
characteristics including size of audit committee, independent of audit committee chairman and number of 
independent directors on audit committee members. Each regression is reported using robust t-statistics at the 
firm level, industry lever and country level. 
The notation ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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2.5.3 Factor Analysis 
Panel C of Table 2 summarizes the results of factor analysis of governance attributes 
of both the NC and AC. Following (Al-Hadi, Hasan & Habib, 2015), we conduct 
component factor analysis for both the NC and AC. For the NC, we five governance 
variables: NC_Ind%, NC_Size, NC_ChairInd, NC_NoMeeting and NC_NoQual.23 All 
factor loadings are greater than 65%. For the AC, we use AC_ChairInd, AC_Size and 
AC_DirInd%. We obtain loadings of 64% and 67.31% for NC_Factor and 
AC_Factor respectively. The goal of factor analysis is to identify commonalities or 
factors underlying our measures of corporate governance quality. These factors are 
unobservable but manifest themselves through these observable outcomes (Bushman, 
Piotroski & Smith, 2004). We follow Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith (2004) and use a 
criterion of retaining factor with eigenvalues greater than 1, the analysis reveals one 
factor for each committee. Following Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith (2004), we then 
rotate the factors using a varimax rotation technique to clarify the interpretation of 
these factors. We present the rotation results in Panel C Table 2.  
Using the NC factor 1, qualifications appear relatively unimportant with a 
weight of 1%. Thus, the factor represents and captures substantial commonalities 
among the governance attributes of the NC. This clustering is intuitive as a higher 
number of independent directors in the NC committee are more likely will be headed 
by an independent committee chair, and both the independent chair and independent 
directors will regularly meet to monitor and administer board appointments and 
remuneration. Furthermore, both the number of independent directors and chair are 
highly correlated with committee size. We have labeled this factor as NC_Factor. We 
also repeat this process for the governance attributes (number of independent 
members, existence of an independent chair and size) of the audit committee (AC) 
giving rise to an audit committee factor AC_Factor. Prior literature (e.g Klein, 2002) 
                                                     
23 NC_Ind% is the percentage of independent directors on the NC, and NC_Factor is an eigenvalue 
obtained from five NC characteristics: NC size, independence of NC chairperson, number of 
independent directors on the NC, number of NC meetings per year and qualifications of NC members. 
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measure the AC as a dummy variable or as the number of audit committee 
independent directors. Following use of varimax rotation, we observe that audit 
committee chair independence and size are important, while number audit committee 
independence is not.  
 
Table 2 Panel C: Nomination Committee (NC) and Audit Committee (AC) 
Component Factor Analysis 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
NC_Ind% 3.2027 2.23068 0.6405 0.6405 
NC_Size 0.97202 0.43421 0.1944 0.8349 
NC_ChairInd 0.53781 0.34931 0.1076 0.9425 
NC_NoMeeting 0.18851 0.08955 0.0377 0.9802 
NC_NoQual 0.09896 . 0.0198 1.0000 
Rotation: Promax 
Factor Variance Proportion     
Factor1 3.2027 0.6405     
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
AC_ChairInd 2.0193 1.23341 0.6731 0.6731 
AC_Size 0.7859 0.5911 0.262 0.9351 
AC_DirInd% 0.1948 . 0.0649 1.0000 
Rotation: Promax 
Factor Variance Proportion     
Factor1 2.0193 0.6731     
2.5.4 Correlation Analysis 
Table 3 represents the Pearson correlation matrix between the dependent and 
independent variables included in this study. Consistent with the univariate analysis 
results, we find a positive and significant correlation between firms with multiple 
outside directorships and family ownership. For instance, FamOwn% is positively 
correlated with Busy02 at p < 0.1. Furthermore, firms with a higher proportion of 
top-10 family directors on their boards (FamilTop10(log)) are positively correlated 
with all of the directorship proxies (Busy_BSize, Busy(log) and Busy02) at p < 0.01. 
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Table 3: Pearson correlation matrix   
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Busy_BSize 1 
Busy(log) 0.9315*** 1 
Busy02 0.7704*** 0.8518*** 1 
FamOwn% 0.0372 0.0122 0.0486 1 
FamilTop10(log) 0.1865*** 0.2298*** 0.1764*** -0.1231*** 1 
Age(log) 0.0125 0.0074 0.018 0.1282*** 0.0667** 1 
BoardSize(log) 0.1633*** 0.3932*** 0.2959*** -0.0683** 0.2409*** 0.112*** 1 
Size(log) 0.2551*** 0.3192*** 0.2276*** -0.098*** 0.102*** -0.0208 0.3806*** 1 
Sale_Growth 0.0135 0.0134 -0.0148 -0.0049 0.0006 0.0032 0.0161 0.0809*** 1 
OpMargin 0.0379 0.057* 0.0526* 0.0051 0.0907*** 0.1656*** 0.0624** 0.1843*** -0.0147 1 
DirOwnership 0.0333 -0.0008 0.0414 0.4877*** -0.1135*** 0.0422 -0.0314 -0.0421 -0.0053 0.0637** 1 
AC_Factor -0.0739** -0.2024*** -0.1692*** 0.0334 0.0317 -0.134*** -0.5394*** -0.3777*** -0.0202 -0.0319 -0.097*** 1 
Notes: Busy_BSize, Busy(log)  and  Busy02 are proxies for the multiple outside directorships of board members; FamOwn% is the percentage of the shares own by family on firm capital 
structure; FamilTop10(log) is natural log of the big 10 family directors over the GCC listed firms (see appendix II); Age(log)  is the firm age measure as the natural log of the number of years since 
the firm was established; BoardSize(log) is the log of the total number of directors on firm board; Size(log) is the firm size measure as the natural log of total assets; Sale_Growth is the sales growth 
measure as the Sales revenues in year t minus sales revenues in year t_1 divided by sales revenue in year t-1; OpMargin is operating margin is annual operating income standardized by total 
assets; DirOwnership is the number of  directors who own more than 5% of firm ownership scaled by board size. AC_Factor is an eigenvalue obtained from three audit committee characteristics 
including size of AC, independent of AC chairman and number of independent directors on audit committee members. Each regression is reported using robust t-statistics at the firm level, 
industry lever and country level. 
The notation ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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 Regression Analysis 
2.6.1 Family Ownership and Busyness 
Table 4 presents the OLS estimates of the association between family ownership 
(FamOwn%, and FmilTop10(log)) and the multiple outside directorship proxies 
(Busy_BSize, Busy(log) and Busy02). Consistent with H1, we find the coefficients 
between these proxies and the family ownership variables to be positive and 
statistically significant. More specifically, in models 1 to 3, we find that the 
coefficients (0.112, 0.317 and 1.002) between these variables are significant at p < 
0.05. We also find the association between family ownership, as represented by the 
number of top-10 families, and the multiple outside directorship proxies in models 4 
to 6 are statistically significant at p < 0.01. Our regression results are consistent with 
the tenets of Type II agency theory, whereby family board members control voting 
rights through their concentrated ownership (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006). Consistent with (Ali, Chen & Radhakrishnan, 2007), these findings 
suggest that family directors control the information flow in firms and participate in 
activities designed to reward themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. 
Furthermore, given that GCC regulatory frameworks are in their infancy, family 
domination, tribalism, customs and traditions affect the strategic decisions of boards.  
We also find that multiple outside directorships are significantly associated 
with some of our control variables, namely board size, firm size and AC quality. 
These results are consistent with those of prior studies (Ferris, Jagannathan & 
Pritchard, 2003; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). We include country, industry and year 
dummies as controls in all of our regression models, and also corrected standard 
errors for hetereoscedacity, serial correlation and autocorrelation using White’s 
(1980) and Newey and West’s (1987) tests. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th levels. 
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Table 4: Association between family ownership and busyness   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Busy_BSize Busy(log)  Busy02  Busy_BSize Busy(log)  Busy02 
Tobit OLS Logit Tobit OLS Logit 
Intercept 0.2306*** -1.3663*** -7.7959*** 0.2303*** -1.1422*** -7.0020*** 
(45.97) (-4.88) (-6.65) (45.97) (-3.99) (-5.95) 
FamOwn% 0.1126** 0.3170** 1.0024** 
(2.15) (2.33) (1.96) 
FamilTop10(log) 0.0374*** 0.1010*** 0.3141** 
(2.64) (3.01) (2.28) 
Age(log) 0.0111 -0.0351 -0.1446 0.0101 -0.0325 -0.1342 
(0.80) (-1.04) (-1.05) (0.73) (-0.99) (-1.00) 
BoardSize(log) 0.1761*** 1.2065*** 3.5012*** 0.1468*** 1.1007*** 3.2077*** 
(4.18) (11.87) (7.80) (3.35) (10.61) (7.09) 
Size(log) 0.0301*** 0.0706*** 0.2084*** 0.0274*** 0.0633*** 0.1908*** 
(5.09) (5.21) (3.69) (4.60) (4.50) (3.32) 
Sale_Growth -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 
(-0.26) (-0.60) (-1.23) (-0.23) (-0.51) (-1.17) 
OpMargin 0.0203 0.1844 0.8864 -0.0018 0.1409 0.6988 
(0.27) (0.93) (1.17) (-0.02) (0.71) (0.92) 
DirOwnership 0.0697 0.0230 -0.0383 0.1345** 0.2048 0.5962 
(0.98) (0.12) (-0.05) (2.10) (1.15) (0.87) 
AC_Factor 0.0267*** 0.0565** 0.1252 0.0262*** 0.0518** 0.1149 
(2.74) (2.37) (1.32) (2.69) (2.20) (1.21) 
Firm Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IND Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1091 1091 1084 1091 1091 1084 
pseudo /R-sq 1.146 0.305 0.145 1.1540 0.300 0.1548 
 0.231*** - -    0.230*** - - 
 (45.97) - -  (45.97) - - 
Notes: Dependent variables in Table 4 are Busy_BSize, Busy(log) and  Busy02 which refer to the proxies for the multiple outside directorships of board members; Two independent variable 
use to examine the family ownership- control over the GCC listed firms; First, FamOwn% is the percentage of the shares own by family on firm capital structure; Second, FamilTop10(log) is 
43 
 
natural log of the big 10 family directors over the GCC listed firms (see appendix II); Age(log)  is the firm age measure as the natural log of the number of years since the firm was established; 
BoardSize(log) is the log of the total number of directors on firm board; Size(log) is the firm size measure as the natural log of total assets; Sale_Growth is the sales growth measure as the Sales 
revenues in year t minus sales revenues in year t_1 divided by sales revenue in year t-1; OpMargin is operating margin is annual operating income scaled by total assets; DirOwnership is the 
number of  directors who own more than 5% of firm ownership scaled by board size. AC_Factor is an eigenvalue obtained from three audit committee characteristics including size of AC, 
independent of AC chairman and number of independent directors on AC members. Each regression is reported using robust t-statistics at the firm level, industry lever and country level. 
The notation *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance relation at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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2.6.2 Association between Busyness and Interaction between Ownership and 
NC  
 
We test for the effect of NC existence on the association between family ownership 
and multiple outside directorships. Given the regulatory effect of NC formation, an 
NC can be considered a specialized committee responsible for assessing and 
appointing board members (Harrison, 1987; Uzun, Szewczyk & Varma, 2004). 
Hence, we hypothesize that the NC will be an effective monitor, and thus suppress 
actions that benefit families at the expense of minority shareholders by reducing 
board members’ number of outside directorships.  
Table 5 reports the results of the regression of the interactions between NC 
characteristics and family ownership using different proxies for directorships. Model 
1 exhibits our primary specification and estimates our baseline regression, whereas 
models 2 and 3 examine alternative NC and directorships proxies. In accordance with 
H2, we find that the coefficient of the interactions between family ownership and the 
NC variables (NC_D, NC_Ind% and NC_Factor) are negatively associated with the 
multiple outside directorships proxies (Busy_Bsize, Busy(log) and Busy02) to a 
statistically significant degree, which suggests that firms with family representation 
on the board and an NC in place have fewer busy directors than other firms. For 
instance, in Model 1 (Table 4), we find that the coefficient of the association between 
Busy_BSize and FamOwn% Model is 0.1120**,1 which is significant at the 0.05% 
level. Additionally, firms with family ownership (FamOwn%) and an NC have 
reduced family control with a size effect of 0.0187 (0.1998*** FamOwn% + -
0.1811* FamOwn% × NC_D) at the 0.1% level. 
The coefficients in Model 2 for the interaction term FamOwn%*(NC_D, 
NC_Ind% and NC_Factor) on multiple outside directorship proxy Busy(log) are 
negative and statistically significant (-0.5733, -0.3992 and -0.2505) at p < 0.05. 
Moreover, Model 3 presents the coefficients for the interaction term 
FamOwn%*(NC_D, NC_Ind% and NC_Factor) on multiple outside directorship 
proxy Busy02, and the results are consistent with models 1 and 2 (-1.4884, -1.4852 
and -1.0081). Overall, these results are consistent with H2 and provide evidence in 
                                                     
1 *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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support of our argument that an NC has a negative effect on the relationship between 
family ownership concentration and the outside directorships of board members. The 
presence of an NC thus suppresses the positive association between family 
ownership and board busyness. These results show that establishing board 
committees such as NCs, as recommended by GCC regulators, improves board 
efficiency of firms with concentrated family ownership.  
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Table 5 Panel A: Association between busyness and interaction between (Ownership and Nom. Committee) 
  Busy BSize   Busy(log)   Busy02 
 Model 1-3  Model 4-6  Model 7-9 
 Tobit  OLS  Logit 
Intercept 0 2296*** 0 2285*** 0 2306*** -1 4129*** -1 4164*** -1 4371*** -7 8547*** -7 8654*** -7 3783*** 
(41 09) (41 37) (38 28)    (-5 17) (-5 23) (-4 76)    (-6 76) (-6 77) (-5 98)    
FamOwn% 0.1979*** 0.1781** 0.1176*   0.5924*** 0.5347*** 0.3201**  1.6516** 1.8040** 1.1932**  
(2.62) (2.40) (1.91)    (2.98) (2.74) (2.02)    (2.30) (2.55) (2.06)    
NC_D 0.0720***                 0.2209***                 0.8435***                 
(3.04)                 (3.85)                 (3.37)                 
FamOwn% * NC_D -0.1777*                 -0.5733**                 -1.4884                 
(-1.83)                 (-2.26)                 (-1.52)                 
NC_Ind% 0.0933***                 0.2206***                 0.6421***                 
(4.53)                 (4.71)                 (3.16)                 
FamOwn% * NomInd% -0.1270                 -0.3992**                 -1.4852**                 
(-1.61)                 (-2.15)                 (-1.97)                 
NC_Factor 0.0458*** 0.1058*** 0.3198*** 
(3.45)    (3.49)    (2.58)    
FamOwn% * NC_Factor -0.0713    -0.2505**  -1.0081**  
(-1.51)    (-2.10)    (-2.23)    
Age(log) 0 0108 0 0092 0 0004    -0 0356 -0 0376 -0 0550    -0 1409 -0 1373 -0 2203    
(0 80) (0 69) (0 02)    (-1 05) (-1 11) (-1 47)    (-1 00) (-0 98) (-1 41)    
BoardSize(log) 0 1622*** 0 1511*** 0 2083*** 1 1621*** 1 1478*** 1 2630*** 3 4124*** 3 4403*** 3 5622*** 
(3 72) (3 48) (4 47)    (11 45) (11 35) (11 36)    (7 53) (7 58) (7 51)    
Size(log) 0 0296*** 0 0295*** 0 0241*** 0 0690*** 0 0685*** 0 0547*** 0 2048*** 0 2009*** 0 1552*** 
(5 47) (5 51) (4 16)    (5 09) (5 09) (3 76)    (3 56) (3 53) (2 59)    
Sale_Growth -0 0000 -0 0000 -0 0000    -0 0000 -0 0000 -0 0000    -0 0000 -0 0000 -0 0000 
(-0 16) (-0 12) (-0 72)    (-0 25) (-0 28) (-1 09)    (-1 01) (-1 06) (-1 06) 
OpMargin 0 0326 0 0435 0 1226    0 2284 0 2483 0 3692*   0 9788 1 1312 1 8201**  
(0 41) (0 55) (1 46)    (1 15) (1 25) (1 74)    (1 26) (1 46) (2 24)    
DirOwnership 0 0586 0 0625 0 0464    -0 0171 -0 0144 0 0135    -0 1407 -0 1762 -0 3249    
(0 73) (0 75) (0 50)    (-0 09) (-0 07) (0 06)    (-0 20) (-0 25) (-0 41)    
AC_Factor 0 0233** 0 0170* 0 0261**  0 0441* 0 0320 0 0559**  0 0892 0 0692 0 1403    
(2 29) (1 66) (2 33)    (1 84) (1 32) (2 10)    (0 93) (0 71) (1 38)    
Firm Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IND Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1091 1091 959    1091 1091 959    1084 1084 957    
pseudo R-sq 1 179 1 216 1 179    0 314 0 316 0 275    0 162 0 161 0 148    
sigma 0 2296*** 0 2285*** 0 2306***  - - -  - - - 
 (41 09) (41 37) (43 11)  - - -  - - - 
Notes: Dependent variables in Table 4 are Busy_BSize, Busy(log)  and  Busy02 which refer to the proxies for the multiple outside directorships of board members; NC_D is a dummy variable 
that takes a value of 1 if the firm has a dedicated nomination committee and 0 otherwise; FamOwn% is the percentage of the shares own by family on firm capital structure; FamOwn% * NC_D 
is the interaction between percentage of family ownership multiplied by nomination committee dummy; NC_Ind% is the percentage of independent directors on nomination committee; 
FamOwn% * NomInd% is the interaction between percentage of family ownership multiplied by percentage of independent directors on NC; NC_Factor is an eigenvalue obtained from five NC 
characteristics which includes  size of NC, independent of NC chairman, number of independent directors on NC members, number of NC meetings per year and qualification of NC members; 
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FamOwn%*NC_Factor is the interaction between percentage of family ownership multiplied by NC factor eigenvalue; Age(log)  is the firm age measure as the natural log of the number of years 
since the firm was established; BoardSize(log) is the log of the total number of directors on firm board; Size(log) is the firm size measure as the natural log of total assets; Sale_Growth is the sales 
growth measure as the Sales revenues in year t minus sales revenues in year t_1 divided by sales revenue in year t-1; OpMargin is operating margin is annual operating income standardized by 
total assets; DirOwnership is the number of  directors who own more than 5% of firm ownership scaled by board size. AC_Factor is an eigenvalue obtained from three audit committee 
characteristics including size of AC, independent of AC chairman and number of independent directors on audit committee members. Each regression is reported using robust t-statistics at the 
firm level, industry lever and country level. 
The notation *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance relation at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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2.6.3 Robustness Analysis 
We conduct several robustness checks of our results. First, to address the concern 
that our results are not specific to the measurement of multiple outside directorships, 
and motivated by the literature (Ferris, Jagannathan & Pritchard, 2003; Fich & 
Shivdasani, 2006; Jiraporn, Kim & Davidson, 2008), we include two alternative 
proxies for multiple outside directorship measures (Busy03 and Busy04). Panel A of 
Table 6 provides evidence consistent with family ownership increasing the number 
of multiple outside directorships. For example, models 1 to 8 results show a positive 
relationship between FamOwn% and several proxies of directorships (NoDir2_BS, 
NoDir2_LN, NoDir2, NoDir3_BS, NoDir3_LN, NoDir3, Busy03, and Busy04) at 
p<0.01 or better.1 We also test the association between (FamilTop10(log)) the second 
measure for family ownership and all outside directorships (NoDir2_BS, 
NoDir2_LN, NoDir2, NoDir3_BS, NoDir3_LN, NoDir3, Busy03, and Busy04) at 
(p<0.01 and better). These results provide consistent evidence that family ownership 
reduces board monitoring via the engagement of busy directors on the board. These 
results support our H1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 No.Dir2_BS is calculated as the number of directors in a firm that features two or more outside 
directorships scaled it by board size, NoDir3_LN natural logarithm of No.Dir2 and NoDir2 raw 
variable of the number of directors in a firm that features two or more outside directorships. We also 
repeated this for a firm that if the number of directors in a firm that features three or more outside 
directorships (No.Dir3_BS, NoDir3_LN, and NoDir3); Busy03 is dummy equal to 1 if a firm has 
more than 3 directorships, otherwise 0 and Busy04 is a dummy equal to 1 if a firm has more than 4 
directorships, otherwise 0. 
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Table 6: Robust analysis Panel A: Association between alternative measures of family ownership and busyness  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  NoDir2_BS NoDir2_LN NoDir2 NoDir3_BS NoDir3_LN NoDir3 Busy03  Busy04 
 Tobit OLS OLS Tobit OLS OLS  Logit Logit 
Intercept -0.0580 -0.6396*** -1.7393*** -0.1740*** -0.7437*** -2.6310*** -10.9888*** -3.9717*** 
(-0.96) (-3.37) (-3.31)    (-3.34) (-4.60) (-5.93)    (-8.18) (-2.64) 
FamOwn% 0.0576** 0.1711** 0.4994**  0.0800*** 0.1231* 0.6026*** 1.0922** 0.9895 
(2.04) (1.99) (2.01)    (3.15) (1.68) (3.05)    (2.08) (1.62) 
Age(log) -0.0068 -0.0196 -0.0524    0.0025 0.0253 0.0243    0.1439 -0.2124 
(-0.90) (-0.86) (-0.88)    (0.42) (1.30) (0.49)    (0.96) (-0.98) 
BoardSize(log) 0.0559** 0.4840*** 1.4062*** 0.0663*** 0.3797*** 1.3558*** 4.1385*** 1.1833* 
(2.45) (6.99) (7.75)    (3.18) (6.44) (8.47)    (8.16) (1.96) 
Size(log) 0.0100*** 0.0222** 0.0700*** 0.0129*** 0.0289*** 0.0943*** 0.3216*** 0.2277*** 
(3.11) (2.28) (2.92)    (4.56) (3.48) (4.41)    (4.79) (2.71) 
Sale_Growth 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000    -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000    0.0021 0.0061 
(0.11) (0.55) (0.22)    (-1.17) (0.08) (-1.18)    (0.55) (1.00) 
OpMargin 0.0190 0.1280 0.2500    0.0315 0.0327 0.2342    0.7104 1.4587 
(0.46) (1.02) (0.80)    (0.99) (0.31) (0.94)    (0.90) (1.38) 
DirOwnership 0.0079 0.0578 -0.0132    -0.0205 -0.0007 -0.2802    0.7286 0.64 
(0.21) (0.50) (-0.04)    (-0.62) (-0.01) (-1.11)    (0.96) (0.76) 
AC_Factor 0.0134** 0.0549*** 0.0955**  0.0080* 0.0103 0.0614*   0.2900*** 0.1822 
(2.54) (3.42) (2.40)    (1.69) (0.76) (1.66)    (2.88) (1.32) 
Firm Robust YES YES YES YES YES YES Yes Yes 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES Yes Yes 
IND Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES Yes Yes 
Country Dum. YES YES YES YES YES YES Yes Yes 
N 1091 1091 1091    1091 1091 1091    1083 1076 
R-sq (Pseudo R2) -0.0426 0.084 0.105  -0.088 .32362 0.1777 0.236 0.083 
sigma 0.1250*** - - 0.1107*** - - - 
   (46.71)      (34.91) - - -   
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Table 6 Panel A Cont. 
  Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
  NoDir2_BS NoDir2_LN NoDir2 NoDir3_BS NoDir3_LN NoDir3 Busy03 Busy04 
 Tobit OLS OLS Tobit OLS OLS  Logit Logit 
Intercept -0.0874 -0.5488*** -2.1291*** -0.0293 -0.6005*** -1.5499*** -9.0514*** -1.6058 
(-1.59) (-3.31) (-4.78)    (-0.46) (-3.05) (-2.90)    (-6.65) (-1.07)    
FamilTop10(log) 0.0357*** 0.0956*** 0.2667*** 0.0134* 0.0297 0.1202**  0.6272*** 0.8119*** 
(5.20) (4.86) (5.20)    (1.74) (1.27) (2.05)    (3.97) (3.66) 
Age(log) 0.0005 0.0163 0.0097    -0.0064 -0.0170 -0.0497    0.0554 -0.3486 
(0.09) (0.84) (0.20)    (-0.85) (-0.74) (-0.85)    (0.37) (-1.54)    
BoardSize(log) 0.0376* 0.3003*** 1.1414*** 0.0459* 0.4630*** 1.3159*** 3.6218*** 0.4901 
(1.71) (4.94) (6.99)    (1.93) (6.41) (7.02)    (7.03) (0.81) 
Size(log) 0.0105*** 0.0226*** 0.0760*** 0.0089*** 0.0198** 0.0610**  0.2515*** 0.1627**  
(3.68) (2.72) (3.50)    (2.76) (2.01) (2.52)    (3.93) (2.18) 
Sale_Growth -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000    0.0019 0.0051 
(-0.92) (0.14) (-0.94)    (0.13) (0.57) (0.25)    (0.51) (0.99) 
OpMargin 0.0126 -0.0122 0.0925    0.0101 0.1056 0.1717    0.6102 1.199 
(0.39) (-0.12) (0.37)    (0.25) (0.84) (0.55)    (0.75) (1.14) 
DirOwnership 0.0254 0.0705 0.0656    0.0408 0.1554 0.2720    1.1997 1.191 
(0.82) (0.79) (0.29)    (1.17) (1.47) (1.01)    (1.57) (1.39) 
AC_Factor 0.0071 0.0062 0.0541    0.0135** 0.0558*** 0.0960**  0.2577** 0.1516 
(1.47) (0.46) (1.47)    (2.55) (3.47) (2.43)    (2.54) (1.07) 
Firm Robust YES YES YES YES YES YES Yes Yes 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES Yes Yes 
IND Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES Yes Yes 
Country Dum. YES YES YES YES YES YES Yes Yes 
N 1091 1091 1091    1091 1091 1091    1083 1076 
R-sq (Pseudo R2) -0.099 0.1088 0.1902 -0.0418 0.082 0.104    0.245 0.1 
sigma 0.1098*** - - 0.1251*** - - - - 
  (35.85) - - (46.71) - - - - 
Notes: No.Dir2_BS is calculated as the number of directors in a firm that features two or more outside directorships scaled it by board size, NoDir3_LN natural logarithm of No.Dir2 and NoDir2 
raw variable of the number of directors in a firm that  features two or more outside directorships. We also repeated this for a firm that if the number of directors in a firm that features three or 
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more outside directorships (No.Dir3_BS, NoDir3_LN, and NoDir3); Busy03 is dummy equal to 1 if a firm has more than 3 directorships, otherwise 0 and Busy04 is a dummy equal to 1 if a firm 
has more than 4 directorships, otherwise 0; FamOwn% is the percentage of the shares own by family on firm capital structure; FamilTop10(log) is natural log of the big 10 family directors over 
the GCC listed firms (see appendix II); Age(log)  is the firm age measure as the natural log of the number of years since the firm was established; BoardSize(log) is the log of the total number of 
directors on firm board; Size(log) is the firm size measure as the natural log of total assets; Sale_Growth is the sales growth measure as the Sales revenues in year t minus sales revenues in year t_1 
divided by sales revenue in year t-1; OpMargin is operating margin is annual operating income standardized by total assets; DirOwnership is the number of  directors who own more than 5% of 
firm ownership scaled by board size. AC_Factor is an eigenvalue obtained from three audit committee characteristics including size of AC, independent of audit committee chairman and number 
of independent directors on AC members. Each regression is reported using robust t-statistics at the firm level, industry lever and country level. 
The notation ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Second, we also add two additional measures of family ownership (see Table 
6, Panel B). Following (e.g Jaggi & Leung, 2007; Ali, Chen & Radhakrishnan, 2007; 
Jaggi, Leung & Gul, 2009), we include a dummy variable (FamMem_D) equal to 1 if 
the firm has at least one family member on the board, and otherwise 0, and another 
(Fam_D) equal to 1 if the firm is controlled (or has shares held) by family 
shareholders, and 0 otherwise. In both models, the magnitudes and signs of the 
coefficients do not change compared to our baseline analysis in Table 4. For 
example, the coefficients of models 1 to 3 for the association between Fam_D and 
the three measures of busyness (Busy_BSize, Busy(log) and Busy02) are significant at p 
< 0.01. In addition, in models 4 to 6, the associations between family (FamMem_D) 
and the multiple outside directorship proxies (Busy_BSize, Busy(log) and Busy02) are 
also positive and significant at p < 0.01 (Model 4) and p <0 .05 (models 5 and 6).   
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Table 6 Panel B: Association between alternative measure of family ownership and busyness: 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Busy_BSize Busy(log) Busy02  Busy_BSize Busy(log) Busy02 
 Tobit OLS Logit  Tobit OLS Logit 
Intercept -0.1412 -1.2321*** -7.2676*** -0.1698 -1.3699*** 4.8967*** 
(-1.22) (-4.36) (-6.17) (-1.47) (-4.89) (2.89) 
Fam_D 0.0693*** 0.1748*** 0.7103*** 
(3.82) (4.03) (4.37) 
FamMem_D 0.0441*** 0.0847** 0.2788** 
(2.81) (2.20) (1.97) 
Age(log) 0.0049 -0.0493 -0.2154 0.0083 -0.0234 -0.0486 
(0.37) (-1.49) (-1.58) (0.63) (-0.70) (-0.38) 
BoardSize(log) 0.1595*** 1.1657*** 3.3650*** 0.1604*** 1.1828*** 3.4165*** 
(3.62) (11.39) (7.48) (3.58) (11.16) (7.79) 
Size(log) 0.0297*** 0.0697*** 0.2044*** 0.0304*** 0.0724*** 0.2189*** 
(5.59) (5.20) (3.65) (5.55) (5.22) (4.06) 
Sale_Growth -0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0054 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(-0.38) (-0.57) (-1.23) (-0.34) (-0.43) (-1.15) 
OpMargin 0.0299 0.2071 0.9989 0.0196 0.2958 1.0206 
(0.37) (1.04) (1.30) (0.25) (1.50) (1.42) 
DirOwnership 0.0316 -0.0537 -0.5090 0.0951 0.3128* 1.3247** 
(0.41) (-0.28) (-0.72) (1.32) (1.75) (2.08) 
AC_Factor 0.0251** 0.0528** 0.1011 0.0277*** 0.0601*** 0.1490* 
(2.51) (2.25) (1.05) (2.76) (2.58) (1.65) 
Firm Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IND Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1091 1091 1084 1091 1142 1173 
adj. R-sq 1.187 0.313 0.163 1.158 0.289 0.1591 
sigma 
 0.2293***    0.2303*** 
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 (41.38)    (42.00)   
Notes: Busy_BSize, Busy(log)  and  Busy02 are proxies for the multiple outside directorships of board members; Fam_D is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the family own a percentage of 
shares  on firm capital structure and 0 otherwise; FamMem_D a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if at least two director on the board represents same family ownership and 0 otherwise; 
Age(log)  is the firm age measure as the natural log of the number of years since the firm was established; BoardSize(log) is the log of the total number of directors on firm board; Size(log) is the firm size 
measure as the natural log of total assets; Sale_Growth is the sales growth measure as the Sales revenues in year t minus sales revenues in year t_1 divided by sales revenue in year t-1; OpMargin is 
operating margin is annual operating income standardized by total assets; DirOwnership is the number of  directors who own more than 5% of firm ownership scaled by board size. AC_Factor is an 
eigenvalue obtained from three AC characteristics including size of AC, independent of AC chairman and number of independent directors on audit committee members. Each regression is reported 
using robust t-statistics at the firm level, industry lever and country level. 
The notation ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Another possible way for families to maintain control is to employ less experienced 
directors. We follow prior literature (e.g., (Badolato, Donelson & Ege, 2014; 
Custódio & Metzger, 2014) to collect data on board experience. Eight variables 
pertaining to board experiences were hand collected from annual reports and 
categorized into two sets: a) monitoring experience comprising chairman and CEO 
experience (measured as the number of directors who was a chairman or a CEO prior 
to joining the current board); b) financial experience calculated as sum of directors 
that use to have a finance role (CFO, Treasurer, controller, head of accounting 
department, financial analyst, and banking) prior to joining the current board. In 
addition, we also sum total board experiences in firm i in year t.  
Following our main analysis presented in Table 4, we scaled monitoring 
experience and financial experience on board size. We also calculated the natural log 
of this variable. Results are tabulated in Table 7. We find consistent results with our 
hypothesis that families in the GCC are reluctant to promote or introduce high profile 
directors in the board. Specifically, we find a negative and statistically significant 
association between board experience and family ownership. We also find family 
ownership reduces the directors with the monitoring experiences in the board. This 
suggests that families in the GCC practices several ways to transfer the monitoring 
power to their hands, this not only is effected through employment of more directors 
with outside directorships, but also via reducing the appointment of experienced 
directors in the board.  
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Table 7: Experience (e.g., Total board experience, Mentoring Experience and Financial Experience) and Family Ownership  
   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Exp_BS Exp_LN Exp MonExp_BS MonExp_LN MonExp FinExpe_BS FinExp_LN FinExp 
 Tobit OLS OLS Tobit OLS OLS Tobit OLS OLS 
Intercept 0.2686 -0.6480*** -8.6851*** 0.3372* -0.3940 -4.1783*** -0.0565 -1.4570*** -2.4347*** 
(1.32) (-3.08) (-9.53) (1.81) (-1.57) (-5.14) (-0.38) (-5.98) (-4.27) 
FamOwn% -0.4274*** -0.8188*** -2.8870*** -0.3885*** -1.0420*** -2.8373*** 0.0078 0.1111 -0.0009 
(-9.55) (-9.02) (-6.80) (-9.54) (-8.98) (-7.61) (0.24) (1.05) (-0.00) 
Age(log) 0.0186 0.0855*** -0.0056 0.0066 -0.0526 0.0035 -0.0014 0.0104 0.0566 
(1.52) (3.34) (-0.05) (0.60) (-1.58) (0.03) (-0.15) (0.35) (0.82) 
BoardSize(log) -0.0402 0.8923*** 5.0396*** -0.0409 0.7463*** 3.0338*** 0.0465* 0.7829*** 2.0906*** 
(-1.08) (11.80) (13.40) (-1.21) (7.96) (9.26) (1.74) (8.42) (10.19) 
Size(log) 0.0168*** 0.0281*** 0.1708*** 0.0172*** 0.0546*** 0.1496*** 0.0007 0.0144 0.0255 
(3.21) (2.65) (4.08) (3.60) (4.17) (3.96) (0.18) (1.14) (0.89) 
Sale_Growth -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
(-0.30) (-0.28) (-0.40) (-0.45) (-0.36) (-0.68) (0.07) (-0.00) (0.11) 
OpMargin 0.1436** 0.1012 0.5061 0.0026 -0.0692 -0.4642 0.1637*** 0.4703*** 1.1021*** 
(2.12) (0.74) (0.93) (0.04) (-0.40) (-0.84) (3.36) (2.99) (2.97) 
DirOwnership -0.0771 -0.2428* -0.9276** -0.2113*** -0.2701* -1.8951*** 0.0544 -0.0275 0.0852 
(-1.29) (-1.91) (-2.02) (-3.90) (-1.65) (-4.23) (1.26) (-0.18) (0.25) 
AC_Factor 0.0130 0.0125 0.1189 0.0012 -0.0023 0.0739 0.0086 0.0127 0.0142 
(1.49) (0.71) (1.63) (0.15) (-0.11) (1.09) (1.37) (0.62) (0.30) 
Firm Robust YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IND Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 897 879 897 897 833 897 897 818 879 
R_squre - 0.397 0.488 0.426 0.417 0.178 0.195 
sigma 0.1781*** - - 0.1626*** - - 0.1291*** - - 
   (40.34) - - (42.36) - - (42.36) - - 
 Exp_BS: Number of board experience that calculated as sum of Mentoring experience (Chairman and CEO) experiences and Financial Experiences (CFO, Treasurer, controller, head of accounting department, 
financial analyst, and banking experience) scaled by the board size, Exp_LN: Natural Log. of total board experiences variable; Exp: Continuous variable of total experiences; MonExp_BS: Monitoring 
experience which consists of: Chairman and CEO experiences (Number of directors with or was chairman or was a CEO prior to join current board); scaled by board size; MonExp_LN; Natural log. of monitoring 
board experiences; MonExp: Centurions board monitoring experiences; FinExpe_BS: Financial experience that calculated as sum of directors that used to be in one of financial position prior to join the 
current board. Financial positions are CFO, treasurer, controller, head of accounting department, financial analyst, and banking experience) scaled by board size; FinExpe_LN: Natural log. of the board financial 
experiences; FinExpe: Continuous variable of the board financial experience. 
The notation ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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2.6.4 Endogeneity Test: Two-Stage Least Squares  
The results of the OLS estimations suggest a positive and significant association 
between the family ownership measures (FamOwn% and FamilTop10(log)) and the 
proxies of multiple outside directorships (Busy_BSize, Busy(log), Busy02). However, 
the sign, magnitude and/or statistical significance of these estimates may be biased 
owing to endogeneity issues. For example, family ownership and the error term in 
the first regression (Table 4) may be correlated. To address this potential problem, 
we use instrumental variable (IV) estimations (two-stage least squares) to re-test the 
OLS panel regression findings reported in Table 4. However, this approach is 
appropriate only if the IVs are correlated with the endogenous repressor (here, the 
family ownership measurements) but uncorrelated with the error term in the second-
stage regression. Following the literature using this IV approach (e.g., Larcker & 
Rusticus, 2010) and related empirical studies (Hasan, Hossain & Habib, 2015; Al-
Hadi, Hasan & Habib, 2015), we specified two firm-specific characteristics: a) a CSR 
Disclosure dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm discloses corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) activities, and 0 otherwise, and b) FamOwn_CI, 
measured as family ownership based on country and industry, as IVs. Several studies 
find CSR disclosures to be correlated with family ownership (Dyer & Whetten, 
2006) because of reputational concerns and a desire to protect family assets. We thus 
expect a positive association between CSR and family ownership. No study to date 
has shown an association between CSR and director busyness. The use of 
FamOwn_CI can be also justified by the premise that the industry level of family 
ownership in each year has a profound effect on the firm ownership level. For 
example, in GCC firms, family ownership is highly concentrated in the Materials 
industry sector (Arouri, Hossain & Muttakin, 2014).  
Table 8 shows a positive association between our IVs and family ownership. 
The coefficients of both CSR Disclosure and FamOwn_CI are positive at the 1% 
level of significance in models 1 and 2. In the second stage, the association between 
family ownership and busyness in both measures is positive and significant. For 
models 1 and 2, we find coefficients of 0.6510 and 1.2606 at p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, 
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respectively. Hence, even after controlling for endogeneity (2SLS), our results 
remain unchanged.1  
Table 8: Sensitivity analysis endogeneity test: 
  Model 1 Busy_BSize t 
Model 2 
Busy(og)t 
1st Stage  2nd Stage 1st Stage  2nd Stage 
Intercept -.1758***  -0.1331   -.1758***  -1.5396*** 
 (-2.87) (-1.20)  (-4.47) (-5.59) 
      
 Busy_BSize t  0.6510***     
  (2.87)    
 Busy(log)t     1.2606** 
     (2.35) 
All variables in Main Specification Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year & Industry & Country Dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Robust Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  1090 1090 1090 1090 
Instrumental Variables Coff. t-stat  Coff. t-stat 
CSR_Disclosed 0.0303 (3.32)  0.0303 (3.32) 
FamOwn_CI 0.7489 (5.97)  0.7489 (5.97) 
Post-estimations Test for Instrumental Variables:           
1-Predictive power partial R2           
Robust F-test  0.0574   0.0574 
P-value  0.000   0.000 
2- Underidentification test      
Kleibergen -paap rk LM statistic  37.817   37.817 
P-value  0.000   0.000 
3- Weak identification test      
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic  21.843   21.843 
 10% maximal IV size  19.93   19.93 
4- Overidentification test      
Hansen J statistic  0.84   2.316 
 Chi-sq(3) P-value  0.3595   0.1281 
5- Endogeneity test      
Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests 6.554   3.513  
 Chi-sq(1) P-value 0.0105     0.0609   
Notes: CSR_Disclosed is dummy variable take value of 1 if firm has disclosed about corporate social 
responsibility activities, 0 otherwise; FamOwn_CI is mean family ownership in country i in each industry. 
The notation ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
                                                     
1 We also conduct several post-estimation tests to further support our theoretical link using 2SLS. 
Weak instrument test results suggest that excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous 
regressors, as the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic is greater (21.84) than the (Stock and Yogo 2005) 
critical value (19.93) in models 1 and 2. The results of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions 
do not reject the null hypothesis (p > .10), suggesting that the instruments are uncorrelated with the 
error term but are correctly excluded from the second-stage regression, indicating the validity of the 
instruments used for 2SLS. In neither model can we reject the null hypothesis, with J-statistics of 0.84 
(Model 1) and 2.316 (Model 2). Finally, the (Hausman 1978) test results strongly (p < .01) reject the 
heterogeneity of family ownership, implying that the 2SLS estimates are preferable to the OLS 
estimates.  
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 Conclusion 
This study examines the association between family ownership and multiple outside 
directorships in the GCC, which provides us with an ideal environment for the study 
because the region’s public firms have high levels of concentrated family ownership. 
In addition, it is common for firms to have multiple directorships, and compliance 
with corporate governance codes is not mandatory in much of the GCC, although 
many firms recently began establishing NCs voluntarily. In this scenario, both wealth 
and control can be expected to transfer from minority to family shareholders. 
Specifically, we expect that concentrated family ownership will lead to an increase in 
the number of directors who hold multiple outside directorships to disseminate 
control among board constituents.  
Using data from six GCC countries, we find that the number of directors 
holding multiple outside directorships is significantly higher for firms with higher 
levels of family ownership. We also find that the formation of a separate NC to 
suppress the positive association between family ownership and the appointment of 
busy directors. Our results also reveal that NC characteristics (e.g., size, independent 
directors and NC_Factor) are significantly associated with a reduction in the number 
of busy directors on corporate boards. These results are robust to the use of various 
proxies of busyness and family ownership measures, and hold after controlling for 
endogeneity concerns.  
This study contributes to the growing literature on corporate governance in 
the GCC region. However, prior studies do not consider the influence of family 
ownership, and neither do they investigate the role of the NC as a corporate 
governance mechanism.2 We contribute to the family ownership literature by 
showing that families maintain their control over minority shareholders through the 
appointment of busy directors to their boards. Our findings strongly support the 
recommendation that NCs be formed to protect minority shareholders by reducing 
the number of outside directorships. Their formation may also promote the 
effectiveness of the monitoring, advising and control duties of board members. This 
                                                     
2 Prior research on the effect of family ownership concentration on multiple directorships has 
primarily been carried out in Western, predominantly Anglo-American, contexts. However, firms 
elsewhere, particularly in the GCC, operate with distinctive cultures and in distinct legal and 
institutional environments, which may have important effects on corporate governance. Hence, the 
applicability of Western models should be tested in different contextual environments.  
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study relied on Type II agency and institution-based theories to examine our main 
question concerning the association between family ownership and multiple outside 
directorships held by board members. 
Our empirical findings show that in firms with highly concentrated family 
ownership, family owners exert a significant influence over the appointment of busy 
directors. These findings may be useful to investors, assisting them in making 
informed decisions regarding investing in firms with concentrated family ownership.  
The study does, however, have some limitations that suggest a number of 
avenues for future research. First, the study focuses primarily on the effect of family 
ownership as a firm capital structure on director busyness. Many other types of 
ownership could also be considered, such as institutional, state or foreign ownership. 
Second, we encourage future researchers to consider such issues as whether the 
extent of managerial ownership influences the appointment of busy directors, in turn 
affecting monitoring quality in the firm. Our results may also have important 
implications for other emerging economies whose policymakers and regulators are 
likely to address the conflict between controlling and non-controlling shareholders 
than those in the GCC.  
In summary, we find that families in GCC firms maintain control over 
minority shareholders by appointing busy or less experienced directors to their 
boards. In addition, we find that the existence and quality of specialized board 
committees such as NCs improve board effectiveness. A key implication of these 
findings is that regulators should formulate laws that impose a strict limit on the 
number of multiple directorships that the board members of publicly listed 
companies can hold if they are to protect minority shareholders. In addition, 
regulators should require firms to disclose in their corporate governance reports such 
information as firm type (e.g., family or non-family), the kind of relationship ties 
(i.e., family or non-family) among owners, managers and directors, and affiliate and 
family relationships. The findings of this study also suggest that regulators should 
ensure greater transparency and a high level of disclosure to address agency 
problems if all shareholders are to influence firms’ decision-making process. These 
changes in corporate governance codes are essential if the GCC is to enhance its 
competitiveness and truly become a true regional financial and business hub.  
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Appendix I 
The GCC Corporate Governance Codes and Nomination & Remuneration 
Committee provisions. Source: the GCC Corporate Governance Codes. 
Description KSA OMN UAE QTR BAH KUW 
Year of issuance of 
corporate governance 
codes 
2006 2002 2007 2009 2011 2013 
Status of compliance with 
corporate governance 
codes 
Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory Comply/ 
Explain 
Comply/ 
Explain 
Mandator
y from 
2016  
Nomination committee  
statues  
Nomination 
and 
Remunerati
on 
committee 
- - Nomination Nomination Nominatio
n 
Corporate governance 
codes provide separate 
section for Nomination 
committee provisions   
Yes - - Yes Yes Yes 
Provision for an 
independent directors on 
the nomination committee  
- - - Majority Majority Majority 
Size of nomination 
committee 
- - - - ൒ 3 ൒ 3 
The provisions of the 
nominations committee has  
identified the number of 
external directorships for 
each member 
൑ 5 - - - ൑ 3 - 
N.C should regularly 
review the necessary time 
commitment from each 
member of boards 
Yes - - Yes Yes - 
Each member of board of 
directors should inform the 
N.C about the number of 
outside directorships or 
before taking any board 
appointments in another 
form. 
- - - - Yes - 
 
 
 
Nomination criteria should 
recommend by nomination 
committee for all 
candidates either by board 
or shareholders election 
Yes - - Yes Yes Yes 
The relation (experience)  
with the other board 
memberships  should 
evaluate by N.C 
- - - - Yes Yes 
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Appendix II 
 
GCC Big 10 families stock market 2008. 
Oman UAE Bahrain Kuwait Qatar KSA 
Al-Shanfari El-Nahyan Al-Mashani El-Kharafi El-Thani Al-Rajhi 
Al-Rawas El-Maktoum El-Khalifa El-Sabah Al-Mana El-Issa 
Al-Sultan Al-Qassimi Al-Mazrouq Al-Bahar Al-Attiya El-Mady 
Al-Lawati Al-Nuaimi Al-Meer Al-Rashed Al-Saad El-Saud 
Al-Mashani Al-Mualla Al-Faivre Al-Behbahani Al-Ali Al-Abanumay 
El-Busaidi Al-Dhaheri Al-Harthy Al-Fulaij Al-Naimi Al-Faris 
Al-Harthy Al-Mazrouei Al-Khalili Al-Ghanim Al-Mannai Al-Hakami 
Al-Saleh Al-Qubaisi Al-Murshidi Al-Marafi Al-Mohannadi Al-Husseini 
Al-Zawawi Al-Suwaidi Al-Razak Al-Sultan Al-Ansari Al-Omran 
Al-Hassan Al-Otaiba Al-Yahyai Al-Nafisi Al-Sulaiti Al-Rashid 
Source: TNI (2008) 
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Joint-audit, political connections and cost of debt 
capital  
 
 Introduction  
We investigate the effects of joint audit on firm-level cost of debt in Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Joint audit is an audit practice whereby two 
independent audit firms audit the financial statements with a shared audit effort, but a 
single report signed by both audit firms (Lesage et al. 2012). Unlike single audit 
which is the norm in most of the countries around the world, some countries require, 
while others permit, financial statements being audited by more than one audit firm. 
Despite the common understanding that joint audit should improve audit quality 
because of shared audit efforts, empirical evidence has so far provided inconclusive 
evidence (Ratzinger-Sakel et al. 2015). We attempt to extend this stream of research 
by examining the effects of joint audit on the cost of debt in the GCC region.  
Whether the provision of joint audit improves or deteriorates audit outcome 
has been debated. The conventional wisdom suggests that two heads are better than 
one, yet we see the prevalence of single audit around the world. Deng et al. (2012) 
demonstrate analytically that if two audit firms involved in joint audit have 
comparable technological efficiency, then the audit quality under a joint audit regime 
is equivalent to single audit quality. However, adding a firm with lower 
technological efficiency to form a joint audit will reduce the overall audit quality. 
Prior research on joint audit generally finds that (i) earnings management is lower in 
large audit firms than in firms audited by non-Big 4 auditors (Francis et al., 2009) 
but Bedard et al. (2012) find evidence of less earnings management in joint audits 
involving two big audit firms than in firms using one big and one small audit firm; 
(ii) lower reporting quality in joint audits involving two big audit firms than in firms 
using one big and one small audit firm (Marmousez, 2008); (iii) no discernible 
effects on financial reporting quality between joint and single audits (Lesage et al., 
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2012); and finally (iv) variation in audit fees (Audousset-Coulier, 2015; Zerni et al., 
2012; Holm & Thinggaard, 2016). 
Although the role of external auditing has been investigated in GCC countries 
(Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Al-Hadi et al., 2015 ), there is a paucity of research on 
the effectiveness of joint audit in GCC countries. While joint audit is a requirement 
in many jurisdictions such as France, Finland, and Hong Kong, joint audit is 
voluntary for non-financial firms in the GCC, except for Kuwait where joint audit is 
mandatory.1 This unique setting allows us to explore the use of joint audit in a 
number of politically and economically important developing countries which have 
similar characteristics in terms of business environment, but significant cultural 
differences, compared with many Western countries.  
Unlike prior studies that investigate the effects of joint audit on financial 
reporting quality and audit fees (e.g., Francis et al., 2009; Marmousez, 2008; 
Audousset-Coulier, 2015; Zerni et al., 2012), we choose cost of debt, an outcome of 
direct economic consequence for organizations.2 We argue that the provision of joint 
audit enhances the reliability of financial statements, reduces information asymmetry 
and, consequently, the cost of capital, including the cost of debt. If creditors perceive 
financial statements of firms being audited by joint auditors as being superior to 
single audits, then we should expect a reduction in the cost of debt. However, the 
composition of audit-pair will play a dominant role in the relationship. The cost of 
debt might vary depending on whether the joint audit has been performed by both big 
4 audit firms, or one big and one small audit firm.  
Using 1,378 firm year-observations from seven GCC stock markets, we 
document a 3.37 basis point decrease in the cost of debt for firms employing joint 
auditors. We further find that this effect is more pronounced when at least one of the 
joint auditors is a Big 4 audit firm. Our results are robust to potential endogeneity 
concerns emanating from the auditor self-selection problem. We then extend our 
analysis to examine the moderating role of royal family ownership, a form of 
political connection, on the association between joint audit and the cost of debt. Prior 
literature suggests that firms with political connections are perceived as higher risk 
                                                     
1 Three countries in the GCC region (UAE, KSA and Kuwait) mandate join-audit for the financial 
firms (Al-Shammari et al. 2008).  
2 Karjalainen (2011) examines the link between auditor choice [certified vs. uncertified, Big 4 vs. non 
Big 4, audits with one responsible auditor vs. audits with multiple responsible auditors], and the cost 
of debt financing for private SMEs in Finland. They find that privately held firms with Big 4 audits 
and those with multiple auditors have a lower cost of debt capital than other firms. 
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by creditors, who charge higher interest on their loans than they charge for non-
connected firms (Bliss & Gul, 2012). Houston et al. (2014), on the other hand, find 
the opposite. However, none of these studies examines the impact of joint audit in 
moderating the association between politically-connected firms and the cost of debt. 
We find that the cost of debt is significantly lower for firms with royal family 
connections, but only when they are joint audited. A plausible explanation for this 
finding relates to the fact that royal ownership may be conducive to expropriation, 
which increases firm risk and hence the cost of capital. A joint audit might be more 
effective in constraining such opportunistic behaviour through a more extensive audit 
practice made possible through shared audit efforts. 
Our paper is in spirit of Zerni et al. (2012), Karjalainen (2011) and 
Marmousez (2008). However our paper different in several way. First Zerni et al. 
(2012) investigate the impact of voluntarily joint audit on audit quality during 2001-
2007 in Swedish setting and their sample includes private firms. They find that joint 
audit improve conservatism, and lower abnormal accruals, better credit ratings and 
lower risk forecasts of becoming insolvent next year. However, this result is driven 
from the country high regulation quality and governance practices. For instance, the 
minority shareholders in Sweden are highly protected by law that stipulates the 
minority shareholders are able to allocate or choose second auditor (Zerni et al., 
2012). While in our paper, we investigate the impact of joint audit on the cost of debt 
in GCC, where all GCC countries have very less regulation quality and governance. 
Minority shareholders usually are not protected. Second our paper considers the 
public firms before, during and after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Zerni et al. 
(2012), evidence and sample alleviated the impact of GFC. It is suggested that during 
the GFC, all audit firms faced high pressure to reduce the audit fee, which eventually 
lead to reduce the audit efforts (e.g. Heyjung, Ahn and Cho 2016).  
This paper provides consistent evidence that joint audit provides better audit 
quality before, during and after the GFC, hence creditors still rely on joint audit. 
Second our paper different than (Marmousez 2008). She investigates the 
determinates and consequences of joint audit in France. She finds that presence of 
two joint audit (two big four) is associated with lower quality results. In other term, 
two auditor lets each to rely on other thus reduces the maximum effort. Her results is 
evidenced from France where joint audit is mandatory, and regulation and investor 
protection are considered high. While our paper provides evidence from voluntary 
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regime of joint audit, and provide inconsistent results with (Marmousez 2008), that 
we find joint audit improves the audit quality, thus reduces the cost of debt.  
Finally, Our paper very close to Karjalainen (2011). Karjalainen (2011) 
provides evidence that joint audit reduces the cost of debt in Finland. First Karjalinen 
(2011) documents this evidence from private firms, where the only source of finance 
is available is through the banks. Secondly, the unique feature of finish audit 
environment that beside the certified auditors, group of un-certified or unprofessional 
auditors operate in Finland (Karjalainen 2011). Further, in Finland firms are 
voluntary can employ one then one auditor who present the same or different audit 
firm (Karjalinene 2011, p.90). While, in the GCC, is considered bank-oriented 
system, but public firms’ still easier to raise capital through the capital market, 
compared to the private firms. The GCC countries have unique financing 
arrangements that are characterized by high leverage where the main source of debt 
is bank financing (Al-Yahyaee, 2006; Chowdhury and Maung, 2013). In fact, loans 
from commercial banks are a major source of financing for GCC companies. Agency 
theory advanced by Jensen and Meckling (1976) implies that agents may employ 
joint auditors to reduce information asymmetry and, thus, agency costs. Companies 
with high leverage can be expected to appoint joint auditors to reduce agency costs 
by reassuring debtholders that their interests are protected. Hence, it is possible that 
GCC companies use joint audit to reduce agency costs and information asymmetry 
and, consequently, the cost of debt. In addition, in the GCC all auditors should be 
professionally certified, and auditors should present different audit firms. 
 An overview of the GCC setting for joint audit and 
debt financing 
The GCC countries collectively constitute a rapidly growing group of 
developing countries that derive a considerable amount of their income from oil 
exports, hold 45% of the world oil reserves and have rapidly expanding equity 
markets (Al-Hadi et al., 2015; Al-Shammari et al., 2008). Economic development in 
the GCC has been accompanied by an increase in the number of listed firms, which 
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grew from 473 in 2005 to 705 in 2013.3 The GCC countries have strong economic 
and social ties and share a similar Islamic culture (Al-Shammari et al., 2008). 
Recently, the countries have witnessed strong economic growth with an increase in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from US$817 billion in 2006 to US$1,635 billion in 
2014.4 Similarly, the stock markets have experienced rapid growth where market 
capitalization increased from US$120 billion in 2002 to US$1,179 billion in 2014.5  
The GCC stock markets have recently attracted international investors in line 
with significant changes in the member states’ economic and financial environment. 
The liberalisation of GCC capital markets has taken place through several reforms in 
regulation and governance. The liberalization of capital markets along with pressure 
from multinational corporations has led the governments to adopt IASs in the hope 
that adoption would give assurances of comparable risk reporting and auditing to 
domestic and international investors (Azzam, 1998). The GCC governments are 
responsible for formulating and adopting accounting and auditing regulations, and 
for managing and running enforcement agencies to ensure adherence to these 
regulations (Shuaib, 1999).  
3.2.1 Audit Regulations 
 
The auditing profession in the GCC is organised and governed by commercial 
codes. Except for Saudi Arabia, all GCC countries still regulate the auditing 
profession through the codes of commercial laws (Al-Qahtani, 2005). For example, 
the setting of auditing regulations in Saudi Arabia rests on the Ministry of Trade, 
which has the power to set accounting and auditing standards besides licensing 
requirements. Article 14 of the Banking Control Law (BCL 1966) and Article 10 of 
the Cooperative Insurance Companies Control Law (CICCL 2003) require all firms 
listed in the banking and insurance sectors to appoint two independent auditors, who 
are jointly responsible for the audit opinion. On the other hand, Article 130 of the 
Saudi Companies' Law (CL 1965) indicates that other firms in different industries 
could voluntarily appoint two independent auditors. In Qatar, the Qatar Central Bank 
                                                     
3See Gulfbase website [Link: http://www.gulfbase.com/] 
4 See GCC-STAT website [link: https://gccstat.org/ar/elibrary/publications/gccstat] 
5 See GCC-STAT website [link: https://gccstat.org/ar/elibrary/publications/gccstat] 
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issued a Circular No. 33 of 1996 that requires the appointment of two auditors for 
banks operating in Qatar for a maximum period of five years, and the work is to be 
carried out in accordance with IASs.6 
For joint audit in non-financial firms, Kuwait is the only country in the GCC 
where listed companies must be audited by two auditing firms. The Commercial 
Companies Law requires that companies listed in the KSE be audited by at least two 
independent auditors. The two auditors became mandatory for first time in 1995, 
when the Ministry of Commerce and Industry issued Law No. 51/1994, amending 
some of the rules of Commercial Companies Law No. 15/1960 where a new 
paragraph is added to Article 161 of the said Law, effective from the beginning of 
1995, which states that companies listed on the KSE must designate at least two 
independent auditors who have no dependent link with each other.  
Form a corporate governance perspective, the audit committee plays an 
important role in improving the quality of financial reporting and risk management 
by overseeing the financial reporting process (Bédard & Gendron, 2010). In the GCC 
countries, Qatar is the only country that requires terms of reference of the audit 
committee to be publicly disclosed: a practice that is consistent with the international 
best practice. Establishment of an audit committee is mandatory in all the GCC 
countries although many differences exist regarding the composition of the audit 
committees. Except for Bahrain, all other GCC countries require the audit 
committees to be equipped with at least one financial experts while the Bahrain 
corporate governance code requires that majority of the members should have 
financial expertise. The corporate governance codes in Bahrain, Oman and Qatar 
mandate at least four meetings during a year while such a requirement is not 
explicitly stated in other countries.     
 
                                                     
6 With respect to general auditing regulation in other GCC countries, the following is noted. In Oman, 
the first law that regulates the auditing profession was passed in 1976 by the issuance of the Royal 
Decree No. 77 and then amended by the Royal Decree No. 20 in 1988. The requirements of these two 
decrees are similar to those in Qatar. In the UAE, the auditing profession was organized according to 
the Federal Law No. 22 which was issued in 1995. Similar to other GCC countries, this Commercial 
Law dictates the licensing and the duties and responsibilities of auditors. In Bahrain, Law No. 26 is 
similar to other GCC countries' laws in all material aspects. The first law that regulated the auditing 
profession in Kuwait was issued in 1962, No. 6, and amended by Law No. 3 of 1965. Under the 
Companies Law and Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE), audits are conducted by registered accountants 
though there is no defined set of generally accepted auditing standards. 
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3.2.2 Debt Financing in the GCC Countries 
 
The GCC countries have unique financing arrangements that are 
characterised by high leverage, where the main source of debt is bank financing (Al-
Yahyaee, 2006; Chowdhury & Maung, 2013). In fact, loans from commercial banks 
are a major source of financing for GCC companies. Banks’s interest rate in the GCC 
markets is higher than the U.S. and the European market(Al-Amri et al. 2015). The 
average annual interest rate for the GCC countries from 1999 to 2011 is 9% whereas 
it was 6.1% in the U.S. for the same period. Before the Gloable Financial Crisis 
(GFC), banks in all the GCC countries enjoyed a steady growth pattern. In particular, 
between 2006-2008, assets were increasing at a strong double-dgit rate in all the 
GCC countries, e.g., at a rate of 21% in Kuwait and and 46% in Qatar. However, 
after the crisis, growth across the GCC countries slowed down, e.g., about 3% in 
bahairn to 20% in Qatar. The passage of some prudent regulations after the crisis to 
ensure the regions' stability and a resilient banksing sector, is considred as one of the 
main reasons for the slow down of the bank growth. The stringent regulations 
increased non-performing loans(NPLs) in corporate and retail banking, forcing many 
banks in the region to tighten their lending policies.  For instance, the central bank of 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) introduced a cap on govement lending (ATKearney 
2013). The Dubai  authories purchased Dh 4bn (US$1.1bn) of securities from 
Emirates NBD in June 2009 to help boost its Tier 1 capital – the UAE Central Bank 
has been the source of most of the financial assistance. In October 2008, the Qatar 
Investment Authority announced plans to take a 10%–20% stake in the country’s 
main banks – effectively a capital injection worth around US$5bn – while the 
government also purchased the stock portfolios of banks in March 2009.7  
Commercial banks provide working capital loans, loans for equipment 
financing, and trade finance. GCC companies are able to obtain a line of credit at the 
rate of interest charged by the bank. The terms under which banks provide 
companies with loans are very similar to those in the US and other parts of the world. 
Reputation is the leading term, and the five C’s (Character, Capacity, Collateral, 
Capital, and Credit) are applicable in GCC as they are anywhere in the developed 
                                                     
7https://www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/4000436/The+New+Reality+of+GCC+Banking.pdf/b
1d598ca-2b1b-447f-acd4-cdde91d37cc5 
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countries. Although banks do not rely on market information when granting a loan, 
they require detailed studies of an applicant before making any loan. 
 Despite impressive economic development, the GCC countries have not yet 
developed a sophisticated bond market (Samaha & Azzam, 2015). Though primary 
bond issuance has increased over recent years, the bond markets of the GCC 
countries still lack important ingredients of a functioning debt capital market, such as 
bond rating, transparency, market making and institutional market participants. The 
limited bond market leaves room for banks to play an important role in financing 
GCC companies. Banks provide mainly short-term loans which explains the high 
reliance of GCC firms on this form of financing. The fact that GCC companies 
depend on banks to finance their activities adds further importance to the study. The 
literature has often described banks as being particularly good at investigating 
informationally-opaque firms, and deciding who the viable borrowers are. Banks 
have an advantage at collecting information, but are potentially more expensive 
sources of capital than public debt markets. The costs of monitoring, and imperfect 
financial contracting, should raise the costs of debt for firms borrowing from banks 
and, hence, lower their debt ratios (Faulkender & Petersen, 2006).  The fact that 
GCC firms are highly levered seems surprising, given the high costs of obtaining 
debt. The use of joint audit in the GCC countries could be a vehicle by which to 
reduce the cost of debt.  
3.2.3 Political Connections  
 
Ruling families and family directors are largely dominant in the GCC region 
(Al-Shammari et al., 2008). In particular, 60% of equity markets are dominated by 
firms with royal family members on the board of directors (TNI Survey, 2008). 
Appointment of ruling family members on the board in the GCC arises through their 
seniority amongst a monarchical group, as a founding member of the firms, through 
their large equity and controlling interest in the firm and through appointment by a 
nomination committee (Hawkamah, 2010; Hertog, 2012). Some firms are established 
through presidential decree or other special statutes that give them particular benefits 
including appointment of politically connected directors such as ruling family 
members.  
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It is “Socially” accepted that the “Sheik”8 directors in the GCC expect 
absolute obedience and are not willing to be questioned (Sidani & Al Ariss, 2013). 
Guedhami et al. (2014) suggests that firms with political connections have incentives 
to improve their transparency. In particular, politicians choose quality auditors to 
monitor financial reporting. Any discretion in financial reporting by managers will 
then be restricted, so politically connected firms choose a quality auditor to protect 
their reputation. However, Chaney et al. (2011) contradict this argument, as they find 
that political connectedness reduces corporate transparency. In the GCC countries, 
rulers actively incorporate royal family members into state institutions, manipulating 
newly reinforced family ties to penetrate and control the top origination positions, 
and centralizing decision-making (Hertog, 2012). This leads royal family members to 
become more cohesive and powerful compared to other elements of society. This 
argument is confirmed by Chaney et al. (2011) who show that the presence of strong 
politicians in the firm will in a sense make the management feel more relaxed when 
providing transparent information as politicians provide protection from regulators 
and authorities.  
Politically connected directors or major family shareholders enjoy substantial 
control because of their concentrated equity holding in firms, with their voting rights 
exceeding their cash flow rights.9 Ruling family members are able to exert significant 
power on the board owing to their ownership interests as major shareholders as well 
as via their political connections. Thus, ruling family directors are likely to have the 
power to obtain private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Ruling 
family directors may promote their interest at the expense of minority shareholders 
and, in doing so, collect more private benefits from their substantive control (Barclay 
& Holderness, 1989; Andres & Vallelado, 2008). Benefits  can be expropriated from 
other shareholders via a range of Type II agency mechanisms, including by 
partitioning minority shareholders to make them ineffective (Gilson & Gordon, 
2003), by engaging in related-party transactions (Anderson & Reeb, 2003), through 
                                                     
8  Sheik is a term used to entitle the front (leader or governor) of a tribe who inherits the title 
after his father. 
9 Expropriation theory suggests that a controlling director is entrenched due to his or her 
significant voting rights and frequent involvement in management and, hence, tends to abuse the 
power in extracting corporate resources for management’s own interests (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). 
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managerial entrenchment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) and via government risk-seeking 
(Xu et al. 2013).  
The relationships among government members, old trading families and royal 
families overlap and are interdependent (Kshetri & Ajami, 2008). These relationships 
can be strengthened by shared mutual interests between merchant and ruling 
families. Therefore, a large proportion of directors are affiliated with the largest 
shareholders or with government agencies. The governments of the GCC countries 
wield significant influence on firms’ investment. Governments are also heavily and 
significantly involved in controlling firms (Baydoun et al., 2013). With respect to 
CEO ownership, such ownership CEO ownership in the GCC countries is more 
likely obtained from share incentive-based dividend schemes. However, in high 
family and government ownership concentration, CEO have a sufficient incentive for 
rent-seeking and self-interest maximisation.  
 Literature review and hypotheses development  
The link between information quality and cost of capital is one of the most 
fundamental tenets in Finance and Accounting. Because of information asymmetries 
arising from dispersion of ownership, adverse selection costs arise between buyers 
and sellers of firm shares (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This should result in reduced 
levels of liquidity for firm shares. To overcome the reluctance of potential investors 
to hold firm shares in illiquid markets, firms must issue capital at a discount. 
Discounting results in fewer proceeds to the firm and, hence, higher costs of capital 
(Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). To reduce such a high 
cost of capital, managers could engage high quality auditors, among other 
mechanisms (Li et al., 2010; Almutairi et al., 2009). Appointing a single audit firm 
has been the norm globally despite the conventional wisdom that ‘two heads are 
better than one’.  
Prior research on the effects of audit quality on the cost of capital has 
exclusively used a single audit regime. Li et al. (2010) document a lower cost of both 
equity and debt capital for firms that use both national and city level industry 
specialists. Almutairi et al. (2009) test the information asymmetry proposition 
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directly and document that firms audited by short-tenured, yet industry specialist 
auditors have a lower bid-ask spread (a proxy for information asymmetry). Causholli 
and Knechel (2012) find that high audit quality lowers a company’s cost of debt at 
the IPO. We add to this stream of literature by examining a joint audit regime in the 
GCC, which also differs with respect to the debt financing environment.  
Joint audit can be defined “as an audit in which financial statements are 
audited by two independent auditors with shared audit effort, one single auditor’s 
report signed by both auditors and joint liability for both auditors” (Ratzinger-Sakel 
et al., 2015, p. 9). Under joint audit the audit planning and audit work are 
coordinated and the audit procedures are allocated between the two auditors. It 
involves cross reviews and joint quality controls, but the issuance of a single audit 
opinion. There is divergence of opinion with respect to the value of joint audit. 
Proponents argue that joint audits, as a corporate governance mechanism can 
enhance auditor independence in the event of a disagreement with clients. This is 
accomplished since under the joint audit regime the audit fees and more profitable 
non-audit fees emanating from consulting services are shared by two audit firms, 
hence reducing fee dependence: a threat to impairment of auditor independence.  
Furthermore the participation of at least two audit firms lessens the risk that “…both 
Big 4 firms (or one Big 4 firm and one non-Big 4 firm) would simultaneously 
acquiesce to client pressure and not report the discovered breach(s) [since such an 
act] would require three-party collusion [thereby increasing the chance that] the 
expected penalties of being caught for substandard reporting are more likely to 
exceed its expected benefits for at least one of the auditors in a joint audit setting…” 
(Zerni et al., 2012, p. 733-34). 
Opponents of mandating joint audits, on the other hand, argue that joint 
audits might allow one audit firm to ‘free ride’ on the work of the other audit firm, 
hence negatively affecting the incentives of the latter. Joint audit increases the cost of 
auditing but does not deliver commensurate benefits (Zerni et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, insufficient information exchange may result from a lack of 
cooperation between two competing audit firms. Although the sharing of audit fees 
and non-audit fees between two audit firms may lessen the competition, economic 
rationality may prevail and hinders cooperation between the audit parties. From an 
audit production perspective, it is possible that efficiency of manuals and procedures 
are lost when an audit is shared. Additionally, “some of the non-productive 
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overheads of planning, supervision and review would be doubled” (Thinggaard & 
Kiertzner, 2008, p.144).Taken together, opponents argue that the costs associated 
with the provision of joint audit does not deliver commensurate benefits.  
The European Commission (EC) issued the Green Paper ‘Audit Policy: 
Lessons from the Crisis’ (2010) mandating joint audit. This proposal was motivated 
by the understanding that the Big 4 audit firms dominate the European listed market, 
with the noticeable exception of France, which imposes mandatory joint audits 
(Huber, 2011). The EC joint audit proposal met with divergence of opinion regarding 
the costs of conducting joint audits and the potential benefits to be derived with 
respect to audit quality and encouraging audit market competition. After an open 
consultation process, the Green Paper culminated in a regulatory proposal, which 
was issued in November 2011. In September 2012, the Committee on Legal Affairs 
(JURI) of the European Parliament published a draft report on this regulatory 
proposal (European Parliament, 2012) (Ratzinger-Sakel et al., 2015).  
Prior research on joint audit has examined financial reporting and audit fees 
implications of joint audit using the European setting, where joint audit has been 
common. Using data from France, Francis et al. (2009) find lower abnormal accruals 
for companies with Big and Small (BS) audit regimes than for those using no Big 4 
auditors. Lobo et al. (2016) find that the combination of BS generates higher 
impairment-related disclosure levels than other combinations, likely because Big 4 
firms bear the reputation cost fully under joint audits using the BS setting. 
Marmousez (2008) reports a less timely recognition of economic losses for firms 
being audited by both Big 4 (BB) audit firms than for the combination of BS audit 
firms in France. This is contrary to the conventional wisdom that Big 4 audit firm 
provides better quality audits. However, given that two audit firms are more likely to 
incur comparable reputation risk in the effects of sub-standard auditing, they are 
more likely to rely on each other and, consequently, would exert less than the 
maximum effort. On the other hand, Lesage et al. (2012) do not find any evidence 
relating joint audits to audit quality. These findings highlight the importance of 
considering the pairing of auditors when comparing audit quality under these two 
regimes.  
With respect to the audit fee implications of joint audit, the audit fee in 
Regime BS is lower than that in Regime B if, and only if, the big firm and small firm 
have similar technological efficiency and/or the big firm bears a sufficiently large 
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proportion of misstatement cost (Deng et al., 2012). Francis et al. (2009) find that 
French audit fees are not higher under joint audits compared to other European 
countries that do not require joint audits. Thinggaard and Kiertzner (2008) examine 
audit fees for companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange in 2002, and find 
that joint audits reduce audit fees compared with audits where one auditor is 
dominant, albeit only for larger companies. In contrast, Zerni et al. (2012) show that 
in the Swedish voluntary joint audit environment, audit fees are substantially higher 
than for single audits. They argue that the fee premium may be considered an 
indication of the client firm’s willingness to pay more for a higher audit quality.  
Similarly, Gonthier-Besacier and Schatt (2007) find that, when two Big 4 
firms audit company accounts, the fees charged are significantly lower in comparison 
with those paid in joint audits where one or two small firms participate. The opposite 
result is documented in a different setting by Holm and Thinggaard (2016). They use 
the data for the whole population of nonfinancial Danish companies listed on the 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange in the five-year period surrounding the abolition of 
joint audits in 2005. They find discounts (of around 25%) in audit fees for companies 
under single audits. They did not separately consider joint audits performed by two 
big audit firms and those performed by one big and one small firm. Audousset-
Coulier (2015) shows that joint audits by two big auditors do not require a fee 
premium compared to joint audits by one big firm and one small firm. 
Creditors are concerned about audit quality for several reasons. First, reliable 
and transparent financial information emanating from higher audit quality (Balsam et 
al., 2003; Reichelt & Wang, 2010) helps creditors better predict borrowers’ future 
cash flows, reduces information risk by mitigating the uncertainty about future cash 
flows and, hence, cost of debt. In addition, the credibility associated with a reputable 
auditor reduces the monitoring costs of creditors (DeAngelo, 1981). Agency theory 
advanced by Jensen and Meckling (1976) implies that agents may employ joint 
auditors to reduce information asymmetry and, thus, agency costs. Companies with 
high leverage can be expected to appoint joint auditors to reduce agency costs by 
reassuring debtholders that their interests are protected. Joint audit plays an 
important role as a mechanism of corporate governance since it validates and verifies 
financial statements (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986), and enhances the credibility of 
financial statements (Fortin & Pittman, 2007) by improving the precision in firms’ 
earnings (Pittman & Fortin, 2004). In fact, the joint auditing process enables the 
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monitoring of managerial opportunistic behaviour and limits incentives for earnings 
management. Broye and Weill (2008) suggest that monitoring tends to increase with 
the importance of agency conflicts between insiders and debtholders. Following the 
argument that joint audit enhances audit effectiveness by accumulating audit 
experience from two auditors, we expect a greater degree of monitoring by 
independent auditors, a reduction in information asymmetry and, hence, a lower cost 
of debt financing. Therefore, we develop the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Joint audit reduces the cost of debt in the GCC countries  
 
Our second hypothesis is built on the political connections, audit quality, and 
cost of financing framework. Political connections can benefit firms in several ways, 
such as: preferential treatment to access credit in state-owned banks (Dinc, 2005), 
more government contracts (Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001), corporate assistance during 
crises (Polsiri & Jiraporn, 2012), lower tax burdens (Adhikari et al., 2006); greater 
allocation of government investment during financial crises  (Duchin & Sosyura, 
2012), and lower cost of equity (Bubakari et al. 2008; Al-Hadi et al. 2015). 
However, another perspective holds that political connections can also lead to 
value-destroying tunnelling by dominant insiders eager to at least recover the costs 
incurred in developing these ties (e.g., Randall et al., 2000). For instance, Bliss and 
Gul (2012) find that politically connected firms in Malaysia incur higher costs of 
debt compared to their non-connected counterparts. However, Houston et al. (2014) 
find the opposite. They explore two possible channels through which a negative 
association between political connections and cost of debt could manifest: 
a ‘Borrower Channel’ in which lenders charge lower rates because they recognize 
that connections enhance the borrower's credit worthiness, and a ‘Bank Channel’ in 
which banks assign greater value to connected loans to enhance their own 
relationships with key politicians.  
From an external auditing perspective, prior literature finds that audit firms 
charge higher audit fees for the politically connected firms compared to non-
connected firms, as auditors assessed a higher risk for connected firms and, as such, 
devoted greater audit efforts in auditing them (Gul, 2006). While reputation 
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incentives and litigation shape audit quality in developed markets such as the US10 
(Baber et al., 1995, Mansi et al., 2004), this becomes less of a concern for audit firms 
in other countries, for example, in emerging markets where it is harder for investors 
to recover damages in the event of audit failures (Guedhami et al., 2014).  Guedhami 
et al. (2014) find that politicians are likely to choose quality auditors for their firms 
to protect their reputations. On other hand, prior studies find that the politically 
connected firms may be reluctant to appoint Big 4 audit firms to improve financial 
reporting transparency, since connected-firms already have access to cheap loans 
from state-owned banks (Dinc¸ 2005, Claessens et al., 2008).  
Given the conflicting views on the nature of auditing for connected firms, it 
remains unclear whether GCC firms having political connections with Royal families 
will undertake joint audit practices to lower information asymmetry or to improve 
the legitimacy of the GCC firms, hence reducing the cost of debt. The power of 
ruling family members over the GCC’s economic and political regimes may 
undermine recent efforts by the region’s regulators to enforce and improve financial 
reporting transparency and compliance (Al-Yahyaee et al., 2011).  
Thus, two combing views can be illustrated. First, to the extent that board 
membership of ruling family members protects their personal interests and the 
interests of related companies, the management of firms characterized by ruling 
family memberships may not be forthcoming with adequate risk disclosures (Al-Hadi 
et al., 2016). Hence, creditors may consider these firms as more risky and charge 
higher interest costs. Such connected firms may therefore appoint joint auditors to 
reduce negative market perceptions and, hence, financing costs. This suggests that, 
the cost of debt will be lower for politically-connected firms employing joint 
auditors.   
Second view, the connected firms that extract private benefits may choose a 
single auditor/ lower quality auditors to hide their expropriation activities (Chaney et 
al. 2015). That because the rent-seeking behaviour and interests of politically 
connected firms of the royal family usually are protected by the monarchy 
(Mazaheri, 2013), and grant more opportunities to divert corporate resources, since 
they tend to be subject to fewer disciplinary constraints from regulators. In addition, 
                                                     
10 Weber et al. (2008) -German firms- and Skinner and Srinivasan (2012) -Japanese firms- 
support the reputation explanation for audit quality in countries that impose minimal discipline 
on auditors in the form of holding them liable for violating securities laws. 
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non-royal entrepreneurs “gain a major advantage in the market if they are able to get 
a royal patron on board with a project. Thus, royal private sector elites are not the 
only ones who have directly benefited and built up their business activities over time: 
a layer of non-royal entrepreneurs are also capitalizing on this branding of the ‘royal 
private sector’ through personal, familial, and business relationships.” (Mazaheri 
2013, p. 315).  This perspective suggests a higher cost of debt for connected firms 
without joint audit practices.   
 
H2: The negative association between joint audits and cost of debt is more 
pronounced for firms  having  political connections with Royal families than non-
connected firms.   
 Research design 
3.4.1 Data and Sample 
 
Panel A of Table 9 shows that our initial sample comprises 3,286 non-
financial firm-year observations from the Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and United Arab Emirates (UAE) stock markets over the 
2005 to 2013 period. We exclude 72 cross listed firm-years.11 Our final sample 
consists of 1,378 firm-year observations after deleting 1,688 firm-year observations 
with missing corporate governance data and 148 firm-year observations with missing 
key control variables. Corporate governance variables and ownership data were 
hand-collected from the sample firms’ annual reports, which are available from the 
six GCC stock markets and the firms’ websites.12 We used S&P Capital IQ to collect 
all financial statements items.  
                                                     
11 We excluded these firms due to heterogonous characteristics of cross-listed firms. For instance, 
many firms are cross-listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE): countries that are characterised by strong investor protection and enforcement 
regimes.   
12Furthermore, not all firms disclose the number of outside directorships held by board members 
owing to varying corporate governance code requirements (see Appendix III).  
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 Panel B of Table 9 shows the sample distribution based on the 
country. The KSA has the highest number of firm-year observations (32.66%) 
followed by Oman (25%). Bahrain has the least number of firm-year observations in 
our sample (2%).  
Panel C of Table 9 shows that 28% of our sample was derived from the 
Materials industry sector, followed by firms belonging to the Industrial (25%), 
Consumer Staples (17%), Consumer Discretionary (12%), Energy (4%), 
Telecommunications (3%) and the remaining firms are distributed to other industry 
sectors. Panel D, Table 9 also shows the distributions of joint audit firms among the 
GCC countries. KSA has about 248 joint audit firms, followed by Kuwait at 3413, 
and UAE at 9.  
 
Table 9 Panel A: Sample selection 
Number of Non-financial firms available in S & P Capital IQ for the GCC countries      3,286 
Less: 
Joint listed firms observation       -72 
Firms with an unavailable annual report for corporate governance data -1,688 
Key control variables              -148 
Total Observations 1,378 
 
Table 9 Panel B: Sample Distribution by Country (frequency) 
 
Country Freq. Percent 
Number of joint 
audit firms 
KSA 450 32.66  248 
OMN 344 24.96      0 
KUW 251 18.21    34 
UAE 228 16.55      9 
QAT   84 6.10     0 
BAH   21 1.52     0 
Total 1,378 100.00 291 
 
Table 9 Panel C: Sample Distribution by industry (frequency) 
Industries Freq. Percent 
Materials 385 27.94 
                                                     
13Although joint-audit has been mandatory in Kuwait since 1995, practically we only find 34 
observations that used joint auditors. This is because, first, many firms in Kuwait stock market 
are closed firms, not required to fully comply with the stock market regulation. Second, many 
firms in Kuwait provide financial statements but do not provide annual reports, therefore making 
it difficult for us to determine the identity of the auditors.   
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Industrials 350 25.40 
Consumer Staples 240 17.42 
Consumer Discretionary 170 12.34 
Energy   51 3.70 
Telecommunication Services   35 2.54 
Utilities   56 4.06 
Healthcare   31 2.25 
Information Technology    8 0.58 
Total 1,378 100.00 
 
3.4.2 Measurement of the dependent and independent variables 
 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable (COD) is calculated as Interest Expense (IR), 
measured as the interest expense of the firm divided by short-term and long-term 
debts during the year, following Bliss and Gul (2012) and Karjalainen (2011). The 
interest expense for the year is disclosed in the income statement and the short-term 
and long-term debt is disclosed in the balance sheet of the financial statements 
incorporated in the annual reports. If one of the two items is not disclosed in annual 
report or Capital IQ, we omit the full observation for that particular firm in that year. 
 
 Independent variables 
 
The main independent variable of interest in this study is joint-audit firms 
(JA). Firms are identified as being JA firms if they are identified as such by annual 
reports and/or audit reports signed by two auditors. For regression analysis, we create 
an indicator variable, JA, coded 1 for firm-year observations with joint audit 
practices, and zero otherwise. Data on the composition of the auditor choice, the 
board and audit committee (AC) composition, and the data on ownership structure 
(e.g., CEO and government ownership) were manually collected from the published 
annual reports of the sample companies. We then create a series of indicator 
variables to capture different JA specifications. JA_Big4, coded 1 if one of the joint 
auditors is a Big 4 audit firm, and zero otherwise. Audit1_Big4, an indicator variable 
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coded 1 if the firm is audited by a single Big 4 audit firm, and zero otherwise. 
Audit_Both_Big is an indicator variable coded 1 if both audit firms are Big firms, and 
zero otherwise. Finally Audit_Both_Local  is an indicator variable coded 1 if both 
audit firms are local firms, and zero otherwise.  
 Control variables 
Based on prior research on the cost of debt studies (Bliss & Gul, 2012; 
Petersen & Rajan, 1994, Pittman & Fortin, 2004, Francis et al., 2005, Qiu & Yu, 
2009; Badertscher et al., 2015), we include a set of control variables in our 
regression models: firm size (SIZE) measured as the natural logarithm of market 
value of equity at year-end (a negative coefficient is expected as larger firms are 
perceived as less risky by virtue of their having more assets in place and greater 
opportunities for economies of scale (Carey et al., 1993); working capital (current 
assets minus current liabilities) scaled by total assets (WC) (a negative coefficient is 
expected as firms with higher WC are more likely to service their debts); firm 
leverage measured as total debt scaled by market value of equity (LEV) (a positive 
coefficient is expected because of additional risks) (Petersen & Rajan, 1994)]; cash 
flow from operations scaled by total assets (CF) (a negative coefficient is expected as 
larger cash flows reduce a lenders’ perceived risk); capital intensity measured as the 
gross PPE scaled by total assets (PPE) (expected to be negative as borrowers with 
more PPE are in a better position to provide security on their loans (Bliss & Gul, 
2012); firm profitability proxied by ROE (net income divided by shareholders’ 
equity) and OP (annual operating income scaled by total assets) (a negative 
coefficient is expected for profitable firms); growth opportunities measured as 
market capitalization value of firms divided by book value of equity (GROWTH) (a 
negative coefficient is expected as firms experiencing growth would be considered 
less likely to default on their loans). 
We also include a set of corporate governance variables. Debtors are 
potentially concerned with board of director characteristics. Anderson et al., (2004) 
find that the audit committee characteristics are associated with cost of debt. We, 
therefore include AC in our regression. AC is a dummy variable coded 1 if the 
company has established an AC, and zero otherwise. We also follow Lin et al. (2013) 
to include insider CEO and government ownership: percentage CEO equity 
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ownership (CEO_OWN), and percentage government equity ownership 
(GOV_OWN). We also include country level measures to control for country 
specification. Firms domiciled in countries with strong legal rights enjoy debt 
financing at a lower cost and, hence, we expect a negative coefficient. We use the 
Strength of legal rights (LEGAL_Rights) which measures the degree to which 
collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and, thus, 
facilitate lending. The index ranges from 0 to 12, with higher scores indicating 
stronger protections. Lenders also value firms that are located in highly transparent 
jurisdictions, thus lowering the cost of debt of the borrowers. We include level of 
country disclosure (DISC_Country) that measures the internal, immediate and 
periodic disclosure requirements for related-party transactions (La Porta et al., 1998; 
Djankov et al., 2008). 
 
 Regression models 
We estimate the following regression equation to examine the association 
between joint audit and cost of debt.  
  (1)                                          . + FE Year + FE Firm +ryDISC_Count 
 + tsLEGAL_Righ +GOV_OWN+ CEO_OWN + AC + OP
 + GROWTH+ ROE+ PPE + CF + LEV +WC + SIZE +JA + = COD
14
131211109
876543210
 

 
Where: COD is the cost of debt and JA is an indicator variable coded 1 if the 
firm-year are joint audit firms, and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in the 
Appendix III. We expect a negative coefficient on 1  to suggest that the cost of debt 
will be lower for such firms compared to single audit firms.    
 We develop the following regression specification to test H2 which 
posits the moderating role of firms’ political connections with Royal families.  
 
(2)      + FE Year + FE Firm +ryDISC_Count  + tsLEGAL_Righ+GOV_OWN
+ CEO_OWN + AC + OP + GROWTH+ ROE+ PPE + CF + LEV 
+WC + SIZE(RDIR_D) / ROWN* JA(RDIR_D) / ROWN JA + = COD
161514
131211109876
543210
 
 
 
 
Where ROWN is a dummy if a firm has royal family ownership, otherwise 0, 
and RDIR_D is a dummy variable coded 1 if a firm has more than two royal family 
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directors on the board of directors14, otherwise 0. If joint audit constrains the private 
benefits of control enjoyed by Royal directors, then we should expect a negative and 
significant coefficient on the interactive variable (γ3).   
 
 Descriptive statistics  
 
Table 10 (Panel A) reports the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable 
(COD), independent variables (JA), and (ROWN/RDIR_D) and control variables 
(SIZE, WC, LEV, CF, PPE, ROE, GROWTH, OP, AC, CEO_OWN, GOV_OWN, 
LEGAL_Rights, DISC_Country). The mean (median) of COD is 5.3% (4.1%). The 
independent variable, JA, has a mean of 0.21, indicating that about 21% of our firm-
year observations are joint audit firms. The comparable figure in Andre et al. (2015) 
is 28%. Only 1% of the firm-year observations employ both Big 4 audit firms as the 
joint auditors. The comparable figure for both local (small) audit firms is 19%. For 
single audit setting, Big 4 auditor audits about 50% of the firm-year observations. 
About 9% firm-year observations have at least two Royal family owners and 39% of 
the board of directors are attended by Royal family members in the whole sample. 
The values of the control variables are generally consistent with prior research on 
GCC countries (e.g., Al-Hadi et al., 2016).  
Table 10 (Panel B) presents univariate statistics (mean, t-statistic) of the 
difference in means for the regression variables between firms with and without joint 
audit practices. We find that the mean difference (t-statistic) of COD between JA and 
non-JA firms is significant at (p<.01), indicating JA firms enjoy lower cost of debt 
financing than their non-JA counterparts. Royal family ownership (directors) is also 
greater (lower) in JA (non-JA) firms than non-JA (JA) firms, and this result is 
significant at (p<0.05). We also find that JA firms are more profitable, are more 
                                                     
14 A firm is politically connected if it has a large shareholder with political links who controls at 
least 10% of the firm’s stocks; the firm is state owned; a founder of the firm is involved in 
management (Ding et al., 2014); or at least one of the executives or members of the board is also 
a member of parliament, the state government (Faccio, 2006; Chaney et al., 2011), a municipal 
council (Amore & Bennedsen, 2013), or is a high-ranking member of the military (Fan et al., 
2007), a member of royalty or a ruling family member (Polsiri & Jiraporn, 2012). Connections 
with ruling family members include situations in which the politician or ruler himself is a large 
shareholder or a top director, and where a politician who is a close relative (e.g. brother, son or 
daughter) holds such a position.  
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capital-intensive, and have higher growth than non-JA firms. Finally, we find that 
firms with greater CEO and government ownership are less likely to employ joint 
auditors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 10 Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean S.D. 0.25 Mdn 0.75 
COD 1,378 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.06 
JA 1,378 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 
JA_Big4 1,378 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Audit1_Big4 1,378 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Audit_Both_Big4 1,378 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Audit_Both_Local 1,378 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ROWN 1,378 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 
RDIR_D 1,378 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
SIZE 1,378 5.86 1.90 4.66 5.88 7.05 
WC 1,378 0.13 0.19 0.02 0.11 0.23 
LEV 1,378 0.56 0.87 0.07 0.24 0.68 
CF 1,378 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.12 
PPE 1,378 0.66 0.41 0.35 0.67 0.91 
ROE 1,378 12.15 17.21 4.36 11.40 21.80 
BVMV 1,378 2.14 1.79 1.01 1.61 2.66 
OP 1,378 0.93 0.26 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AC 1,378 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.11 
CEO_OWN 1,372 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GOV_OWN 1,372 0.08 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.06 
LEGAL_Rights 1,378 3.76 0.73 3.00 4.00 4.00 
DISC_Country 1,378 6.35 1.86 4.00 8.00 8.00 
 
TABLE 10 Panel B: Univariate analysis 
   
 
Joint-Audit t-value YES==1 No==0 
COD 0.036 0.064 -3.00*** 
ROWN 0.041 0.015 4.16*** 
RDIR_D 0.079 .4607 -12.47*** 
SIZE  6.756 5.480 15.38*** 
WC 0.154 -0.721 -0.77 
LEV  0.392 0.402  -0.16 
CF 0.099 -0.229   1.04 
PPE  0.622 0.449   7.10*** 
ROE  11.148 8.669   1.59 
GROWTH 2.557 2.232   2.93*** 
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OP  0.077 0.057   3.87*** 
AC 0.870 0.952  -6.28*** 
CEO_OWN 0.015 0.009   2.16** 
GOV_OWN 0.117 0.087  2.19** 
LEGAL_Rights 3.786 3.475  7.59*** 
DISC Country 7.175 5.27*** -20.93*** 
 
 
 Correlation results 
 
The correlation results are presented in Table 11. A significant and negative 
correlation is found between COD and the main independent variable, JA (p< 0.01), 
supporting our primary hypothesis that firms employing joint auditors enjoy lower 
cost of debt financing. RDIR_D and COD is positively correlated (at p<.01), while 
ROWN (RDIR_D) is positively (negatively) associated with JA firms (at p<.01). We 
also find a negative and significant correlation between COD and SIZE, LEV, PPE, 
GROWTH, and DISC_Country (p< 0.10). We find positive and significant 
correlations between JA and SIZE, PPE, GROWTH, and the country level variables.  
We also find a positive correlation between RDIRD_D and COD, which is consistent 
with Bliss and Gul (2006). However, the correlation between COD and ROWN is 
insignificant.  
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TABLE 11: Correlation analysis 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 COD 1 
2 ROWN 0.0077 1 
3 RDIR_D 0.10*** 0.0002 1 
4 JA -0.113*** 0.09*** -0.363*** 1 
5 SIZE -0.107*** 0.05*** -0.0093 0.377*** 1 
6 WA_TA 0.137*** 0.006 -0.0272 -0.034 -0.120*** 1 
7 LEV -0.052* 0.07*** -0.06*** -0.042 -0.191*** -0.318*** 1 
8 CF 0.047* 0.009 -0.0369* 0.023 0.277*** 0.242*** -0.241*** 1 
9 PPE_TA -0.158*** 0.026 -0.24*** 0.043 -0.058** -0.182*** 0.04 0.102*** 1 
10 ROE 0.043 -0.009 -0.10*** -0.011 0.273*** 0 211*** -0 227*** 0.692*** -0.003 1 
11 BVMV -0.028 0.017 -0.06*** 0.087*** 0.299*** 0.041 -0 198*** 0.337*** 0.048*   0.380*** 1 
12 AC 0.018 -0.003 -0.04** -0.069** -0.122*** 0.024 -0.012 -0.032 0.116*** -0.062** -0.036 1 
13 OP -0.008 -0.015 0.13*** 0.033 0.250*** 0.241*** -0.282*** 0.659*** 0.038 0.727*** 0.296*** -0.027 1 
14 CEO_OWN 0.031 -0.17*** 0.71*** 0.007 -0.023 -0.053** -0.017 0.046* -0.015 0.081*** 0.083*** -0.085*** 0.037 1 
15 GOV_OWN -0.061** -0.14*** 0.55*** 0.090*** 0.249*** -0.017 -0.005 0.119*** 0.276*** 0.084*** -0.005 0.001 0.070*** -0.085*** 1 
16 LEGAL_Rights -0.051* 0.13*** -0.33 0.133*** -0.011 0.068** -0.012 0.074*** 0.239*** 0.028 0.049* 0.166*** 0.041 0.082*** 0.094*** 1 
17 DISC_Country -0.123*** 0.005 -0.5 0.247*** -0.090*** 0.056** -0.065** 0.179*** 0.362*** 0.133*** 0.216*** 0.177*** 0.136*** -0.012 0.119*** 0.442*** 
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Variable definitions are provided in the AppendixIII. 
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 Regression results 
3.5.1  Joint audit and the cost of debt 
The regression results are reported in Table 12. We estimate the regression specification 
at the firm level with firm robust standard errors (Petersen, 2009; Gow et al., Taylor, 2010). The 
coefficient on JA, our main variable of interest in Panel A is negative and significant (Model 1) 
providing support for H1 (coefficient -0.0337, t-statistic -2.47, significant at p<0.05). This result 
is consistent with our theoretical prediction that joint audit provides an additional layer of 
assurance to mitigate the information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, hence, 
reducing the cost of raising debt financing. In terms of economic significance, the estimated 
coefficient suggests a 3.37 basis point decrease in interest cost for firms employing joint 
auditors. The magnitude and significance of the coefficient becomes a little stronger when we 
include country-level variables to alleviate the country-effects (coefficient -0.037, t-stat -2.63, 
significant at p<0.01) (Model 2).  Model (3) extends the baseline model by introducing a variable 
JA_Big4, an indicator variable coded 1 if one of the joint auditor is a Big 4 audit firm, and zero 
otherwise, to infer the incremental benefits of employing Big 4 audit firms. We find a negative 
and significant coefficient on JA_Big4 (coefficient -0.034, t-statistic -2.37, significant at p<0.05). 
In Model (4) we run the main regression but replace JA with Audit1_Big4 variable. Result is 
consistent with the proposition that high quality audit reduces the cost of debt (Pittman & Fortin, 
2004; Karjalainen & Jukka, 2011). However, the coefficient is much smaller than the joint audit 
model with full set of control variables (-0.037 versus -0.019). In Model (5) we find the 
coefficient on Audit_Both_Big to be insignificant (only about 1% of firm-year observations being 
audited by both Big 4 audit firms). However, the coefficient on Audit_Both_Local becomes 
positive and significant if the joint audit firms are both local firms (coefficient 0.027, t-statistic 
2.28, p<0.05) (Model 6). Thus creditors likely consider firms that are being audited by low 
quality auditor as risky firms and accordingly charge higher interest rates.  
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   Table 12 Panel A: Joint audit and cost of debt: Pooled sample   
 
  (1)                                                      + FE Year + FE Firm +ryDISC_Count 
 + tsLEGAL_Righ +GOV_OWN+ CEO_OWN + AC + OP
 + GROWTH+ ROE+ PPE + CF + LEV +WC + SIZE +JA + = COD
14
131211109
876543210
 

 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Intercept 0.0019 -0.0547 -0.0508 0.0623 -0.0242 -0.0638    
(-0.04) (-0.64) (-0.60) -0.67 (-0.21) (-0.59)    
JA -0.0337** -0.0367*** - - 
(-2.43) (-2.62) 
JA_Big4 - - -0.0309** -              - - 
(-2.16)                 
Audit1_Big4 - - - -0.0168*   - - 
(-1.70)    
Audit_Both_Big - - - 0.0391    - 
(0.48)    
Audit_Both_Local - - - - - 0.0267**  
(2.28)    
SIZE 0.0099 0.0082 0.0081 0.0016 0.0088    0.0119    
(1.35) (1.12) (1.09) (0.20) (1.20)    (0.85)    
WC 0.0473** 0.0450* 0.0442* 0.1017*** 0.0403*   0.0451    
(2.03) (1.93) (1.89) (3.84) (1.73)    (1.05)    
LEV 0.0013 0.0006 0.0004 0.0005 0.0009    0.0019    
(0.21) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.14)    (0.30)    
CF 0.0409 0.0408 0.0394 0.0044 0.0291    0.0349    
(0.86) (0.86) (0.83) (0.07) (0.61)    (0.53)    
PPE 0.0061 0.0045 0.0044 0.0248*   0.0063    0.0054    
(0.46) (0.33) (0.33) (1.70) (0.47)    (0.44)    
ROE 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0002    0.0002    
(0.99) (0.86) (0.86) (-0.42)    (0.81)    (0.55)    
GROWTH -0.0069*** -0.0065** -0.0064** -0.0053*   -0.0061**  -0.0065    
(-2.66) (-2.50) (-2.45) (-1.96)    (-2.36)    (-1.44)    
OP 0.0206 0.0177 0.0181 0.0029 -0.0560    -0.0580    
(1.55) (1.31) (1.34) (0.20) (-1.48)    (-1.41)    
AC -0.0677* -0.0661* -0.0653* 0.0772 0.0049    0.0251    
(-1.79) (-1.75) (-1.72) (1.30) (0.78)    (1.63)    
CEO_OWN 0.0493 0.0537 0.0528 0.1042 0.0091    0.0281    
(0.58) (0.64) (0.63) (1.13) (0.65)  (0.48)    
GOV_OWN 0.0338 0.0324 0.0318 0.0412 0.0088    -0.0007    
(1.00) (0.96) (0.94) (0.99) (1.20)    (-0.05)    
LEGAL_Rights - 0.006 0.006 0.0058 0.0403*   0.0059    
- (0.96) (0.95) (0.98) (1.73)    (1.15)    
DISC_Country - 0.0082 0.0075 -0.0039 0.0009    0.0042    
- (0.58) (0.53) (-0.29)    (0.14)    (0.37)    
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1372 1372 1372 993 1372 1372    
Adjusted R2 0.264 0.264 0.264 0.266 0.281 0.283  
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Table 12 Panel B: Country-wise regression results  
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
  
Without OMA, 
QAT, and BAH KSA KUW UAE 
Intercept 0.0582 0.1764 0.0312 0.2689    
(0.69) (1.48) (0.23) (1.28)    
JA -0.0364*** -0.0192* -0.1095** -0.0424    
(-2.64) (-1.71) (-2.08) (-1.03)    
SIZE 0.0063 -0.0109 0.0238 -0.0273    
(0.51) (-0.94) (0.90) (-0.76)    
WC 0.0033 0.0828** -0.1628 0.0861**  
(0.08) (2.05) (-1.51) (2.41)    
LEV 0.0042 0.0075 0.0186 -0.0109    
(0.54) (0.89) (1.10) (-0.72)    
CF 0.0856 0.1826** 0.0621 0.1581    
(1.04) (2.44) (0.39) (0.65)    
PPE -0.0070 0.0085 -0.0874 -0.0213    
(-0.46) (0.81) (-1.01) (-0.62)    
ROE 0.0004 -0.0008* 0.0013** -0.0008    
(0.94) (-1.83) (2.00) (-1.36)    
GROWTH -0.0083 -0.0085 -0.0246* 0.0051    
(-1.60) (-1.35) (-1.84) (0.36)    
OP 0.0149 -0.0001 0.0142 -0.0104    
(1.00) (-0.01) (0.25) (-0.53)    
AC -0.1102** 0.0297 -0.1948*** -0.0187    
(-2.47) (0.30) (-3.18) (-0.08)    
CEO_OWN -0.0237* -0.0369 -0.0521* -0.0074    
(-1.65) (-1.58) (-1.69) (-0.53)    
GOV_OWN 0.0012 0.0039 0.0035 -0.0429    
(0.07) (0.39) (0.08) (-0.90)    
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 929 450 251 228    
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.102 0.121 0.027    
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Variable definitions are provided in the AppendixIII. 
 
In panel B Table 12 we report the regression results of equation (1) for 
respective countries in the sample. Because most of the GCC countries, except 
Kuwait, do not mandate joint audit for non-financial firms, a pooled regression 
analysis may reduce the power of the test Model 1 presents the results after 
excluding countries that do not have joint audit firms (Oman, Qatar and Bahrain). 
We find consistent results with the base-line regression, i.e., the coefficient on JA is 
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negative and significant (coefficient -0.036, t-stat -2.64, p<0.05).  In Models 2, 3 and 
4 we regress COD on JA for all countries with JA practices (KSA, Kuwait and UAE 
respectively). Model 2 finds a negative and significant coefficient of 0.017 at t-stat -
1.71 for the KSA firms, and for Model 3 we find a negative and significant 
association between COD and JA for Kuwait. Finally, we find the COD’s coefficient 
is negative but insignificant for the UAE firms. 
 Next, we examine the COD between JA firms and JA peers matched 
according to propensity scores. This is justified since many of the variables are 
significantly different between firm-year observations with joint audit versus 
observations with single audit. The propensity score matching (PSM) is performed as 
follows. First, we require that the candidate firm for the matching sample to have 
joint-audit. Second based on Zerni et al. (2010) we use (logit model) four variables 
that determine the joint audit firms (Profitability, Book-To-Market, Leverage, and 
Directors ownership).1 Third, among the potential control sample firms, we select the 
optimal match, based on the nearest neighbor technique of the propensity score 
matching (PSM) procedure, in an attempt to control for differences in characteristics 
between joint audited and non-joint audited firms (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; 
Heckman et al., 1997, 1998). To calculate the propensity score, we analyse a 
comprehensive set of firm characteristics that should capture the likelihood that a 
given firm will be joint audited according to prior research. This matching procedure 
translates into a sample of 253 firm-year observations, equally into JA firms and non-
JA firms. Despite the major data attrition that accompanies constructing a matched 
sample using propensity scores in our setting, an upside of applying this technique 
here is the large number of potential matches with non-JA observations, ensuring that 
the joint audited and non-joint audited samples have extremely close propensity 
scores.  
 Model 1, Table 13 reveals that JA firms enjoy significantly lower cost 
of debt than their propensity score matched peers (coefficient on JA is -0.0200, t-
statistic -2.23, p<0.05). In Models (2), (3), and (4) we also report our analysis using 
                                                     
1 Following Austin (2011) and Jameson et al.  (2014) we then test the difference using univariate 
t-statistic for the matched and unmatched samples. In particular, we try to check if there is any 
significant difference between the Control sample (non- JA) and treated sample (JA).Un-
tabulated results show that none of the included covariate is significantly different between JA 
versus non-JA sub-samples, providing strong support for our estimation. 
91 
 
four additional propensity score techniques (Calliper 1%, Calliper 5%, and Kernal). 
All provide consistent results that have been documented in our main regressions.  
Table 13 Propensity Match Scoring (PSM) 
 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
  Matching using Matching using 
Matching 
using 
Matching 
using 
Nearest -
neighbour calliper(0.01) calliper(.05) Kernel 
  Cost of Debt (COD) 
Intercept 0.2218 0.0517 0.1540 0.1540 
(0.91) (0.25) (0.68) (0.68) 
JA -0.0200** -0.0280*** -0.0225**  -0.0225** 
(-2.23) (-2.66) (-2.38)    (-2.38) 
SIZE -0.0135 0.0165 -0.0050    -0.0050 
(-0.53) (0.71) (-0.20)    (-0.20) 
WC 0.1561** 0.1946** 0.1437*   0.1437* 
(2.03) (2.29) (1.93)    (1.93) 
LEV -0.0067 0.0136 -0.0014    -0.0014 
(-0.33) (0.64) (-0.07)    (-0.07) 
CF 0.1518 0.1502 0.1995    0.1995 
(0.91) (0.94) (1.18)    (1.18) 
PPE 0.0030 -0.0243 0.0050    0.0050 
(0.11) (-0.94) (0.17)    (0.17) 
ROE -0.0012 -0.0006 -0.0011    -0.0011 
(-1.64) (-0.83) (-1.51)    (-1.51) 
GROWTH -0.0120 -0.0244 -0.0172    -0.0172 
(-1.10) (-1.67) (-1.44)    (-1.44) 
OP 0.0493 -0.0123 0.0599    0.0599 
(0.36) (-0.10) (0.45)    (0.45) 
AC -0.0245 -0.0227 -0.0240    -0.0240 
(-1.54) (-1.19) (-1.43)    (-1.43) 
CEO_OWN 0.0138 0.0030 0.0044    0.0044 
(0.10) (0.02) (0.03)    (0.03) 
GOV_OWN 0.9621** 0.8355 0.9518*   0.9518* 
(2.06) (1.02) (1.95)    (1.95) 
Year 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 253 245 252 252 
Adjusted R2 0.256 0.304 0.274 0.274 
 
 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Variable definitions are provided in the AppendixIII. 
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3.5.2  Joint audit, royal family political connections, and cost of debt  
We now discuss the results for H2. We hypothesised that the association 
between joint audit and cost of debt is moderated by political connections with Royal 
families (PCR). We use Royal Family Ownership (ROWN) and Royal family director 
(RDIR_D) as proxies for political connections.  Table 14 Panel A shows the 
regression models for the interaction term between (ROWN / RDIR_D) and JA and 
their impact on the cost of debt. Models (1) and (2) in Panel A, Table 14 presents the 
augmented regression results where we incorporate the interactive variable (JA* 
ROWN) without (with) country-level factors, while Models (3) and (4) report results 
of the interacted term (JA* RDIR_D) without (with) country-level factors. In all 
models we find consistent evidence that joint audit reduces cost of debt, and this 
beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with political connections to Royal 
family members as is evident from the negative and significant coefficient on the 
interactive variable (coefficient -0.038, t-stat -2.18, p<0.05 in Model 1).  We also 
find robust evidence for having a Royal family director on the board (RDIR_D). For 
instance, in Table 14, Panel A, Model (3), the coefficient of the interacted term is -
0.038 (t-stat -1.92, significant at p<0.1).  
We then as a robustness check use a sub-sampling technique to test the 
impact of JA on the relationship between PCR using royal family ownership and cost 
of debt in Table 14, Panel B. Models 1-4 present our results for the association 
between ROWN and COD. For Models 5-8 results are provided for the association 
between RDIR_D and COD. Our results do not change from our main inference that 
we find the coefficient of Model 1 Panel B in Table 14 is -0.37 for the (ROWN) royal 
family sub-sample, the coefficient is -0.38 for Model 2 Panel B both negative and 
significant (at p< 1%). In both Models 3 and 4 for non-JA, we find the coefficient for 
ROWN is not significant and much smaller than in Models 1 & 2. We then test this 
regression with (RDIR_D) for the sub-sample of JA versus non-JA firms. We find the 
coefficients on both RWON and RDIR_D to be negative and significant only for 
JA=1 but not for JA=0 firm-year observations. For example, in models (5) and (6), 
the coefficient on RDIR_D are negative and significant [coefficients of -0.0267 (-
0.0269), p<.10)] for the JA sub-sample.  
In Panel C, we also report prior analysis using high (low) royal ownership 
and royal directors. In all regressions, we find robust results that in high royal 
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ownership concentration firms with JA enjoy less cost of debt, compared to lower 
royal ownership and directors. Taken together, we find evidence consistent with H2 
which suggest that firms’ political connections with Royal Families affect its cost of 
debt.  
 
Table 14 Joint audit and cost of debt: Impact of political connections with Royal 
families (PCR) 
 
(2)      + FE Year + FE Firm +ryDISC_Count  + tsLEGAL_Righ+GOV_OWN
+ CEO_OWN + AC + OP + GROWTH+ ROE+ PPE + CF + LEV 
+WC + SIZE(RDIR_D) / ROWN* JA(RDIR_D) / ROWN JA + = COD
161514
131211109876
543210
 
 
 
 
Table 14 Panel A: JA, political connection and cost of debt  
  Model (1) Model (2)  Model (3) Model (4) 
Intercept 0.0452**  -0.0175 0.0376 -0.0139 
-2.41 (-0.49) -0.58 (-0.12) 
JA -0.0120*   -0.0142** -0.0286** -0.0314** 
(-1.96)    (-2.32) (-2.13) (-2.33) 
ROWN 0.0077 0.0081 - - 
(-0.90) (-0.96) 
JA * ROWN -0.0380**  -0.0429** - - 
(-2.18)    (-2.47) 
RDIR_D - - -0.0064 -0.007 
- - (-0.55) (-0.61) 
JA * RDIR_D - - -0.0381* -0.0404* 
- - (-1.92) (-1.96) 
SIZE 0.0025 0.001 0.009 0.0072 
(-0.85) (-0.33) (-0.65) (-0.52) 
WC 0.0212**  0.0192** 0.0392 0.0378 
(-2.24) (-2.04) (-0.88) (-0.84) 
LEV 0.0004 0.0001 0.0006 0.001 
(-0.36) (-0.08) (-0.10) 0 
CF 0.0272 0.0262 0.0393 0.0392 
(-1.28) (-1.24) (-0.58) (-0.58) 
PPE 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0231 -0.0217 
(-0.04) (-0.11) (-0.73) (-0.69) 
ROE -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 
(-0.47)    (-0.74) (-0.83) (-0.73) 
GROWTH -0.0024**  -0.0020* (-0.0066) (-0.0062) 
(-2.18)    (-1.85) (-1.52) (-1.38) 
OP 0.0043 0.0014 0.0213 0.0186 
(-0.77) (-0.24) (-1.52) (-1.36) 
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AC -0.0079 -0.004 -0.067 -0.0651 
(-0.27)    (-0.14) (-1.59) (-1.56) 
CEO_OWN -0.0100**  -0.0098** -0.0210** -0.0209** 
(-2.07)    (-2.03) (-2.15) (-2.11) 
GOV_OWN 0.002 0.002 0.0095 0.0097 
(-0.41) (-0.40) (-0.78) (-0.80) 
LEGAL_Rights - 0.0045* - 0.0066 
- (-1.75) - (-0.56) 
DISC_Country - 0.0097* - -0.0139 
- (-1.66) - (-0.12) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,378 1,378 1,378 1,378 
Adjusted R2 0.219 0.206 0.035 0.036 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix III. 
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Table 14 Panel B:Sub-sampling JA vs non-JA using Royal family Ownership and Royal family 
directors in the board 
  JA=1 JA=1 JA=0 JA=0 JA=1 JA=1 JA=0 JA=0 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
Intercept 0.2033*** 0.0999* 0.0509    0.2325 0.2064*** 0.1325    0.1503 0.2535    
(3.65) (1.73) (0.87)    (0.86) (2.66) (1.12)    (1.46) (1.50)    
Royal Family Ownership (ROWN) -0.37*** -0.38*** 0.0753    0.0539    - - - - 
(-2.78) (-7.58) (0.78)    (0.59)    
Royal Family Director (RDIR_D) - - - - -0.0267* -0.0269*   -0.0055 -0.0059    
(-1.77) (-1.78)    (-0.19) (-0.21)    
SIZE -0.0182** -0.0192** 0.0078    0.0089    -0.0258** -0.0256**  -0.0311* -0.0306*   
(-2.43) (-2.53) (0.87)    (1.00)    (-2.36) (-2.34)    (-1.81) (-1.78)    
WC 0.0337 0.0363 0.0673**  0.0539*   0.0492 0.0510    0.2270*** 0.2254*** 
(1.62) (0.83) (2.20)    (1.75)    (1.58) (1.63)    (4.85) (4.74)    
LEV -0.0126* -0.0122 -0.0052    -0.0008    0.0089 0.0107    0.1428** 0.1418**  
(-1.88) (-1.64) (-0.74)    (-0.11)    (0.19) (0.23)    (2.44) (2.41)    
CF 0.1166* 0.1324 0.0189    0.0175    0.1110 0.1136    -0.1257 -0.1237    
(1.79) (1.57) (0.32)    (0.30)    (1.40) (1.42)    (-1.52) (-1.49)    
PPE -0.0354 -0.0359 0.0230    -0.0199    0.0086 0.0087    -0.0040 -0.0046    
(-1.56) (-1.09) (0.62)    (-0.54)    (0.74) (0.75)    (-0.25) (-0.28)    
ROE -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0002    0.0003    -0.0003 -0.0003    0.0010** 0.0010**  
(-1.32) (-1.44) (0.51)    (0.75)    (-0.81) (-0.80)    (2.09) (2.02)    
GROWTH 0.0018 0.0019 -0.0054    -0.0085**  -0.0000 -0.0000    0.0000 0.0000    
(0.85) (0.99) (-1.52)    (-2.47)    (-0.23) (-0.24)    (0.24) (0.24)    
OP -0.0079 -0.0098 0.0127    0.0040    -0.0064 -0.0065    0.0222 0.0243    
(-0.58) (-1.32) (0.73)    (0.23)    (-0.34) (-0.35)    (1.12) (1.21)    
AC -0.0823 -0.0865 -0.0519    -0.0688    -0.0947 -0.0986    0.0015 0.0044    
(-0.96) (-0.80) (-1.05)    (-1.45)    (-0.98) (-1.01)    (0.02) (0.06)    
CEO_OWN -0.0216** -0.0202*** -0.0227    -0.0195    -0.0199* -0.0198*   -0.0031 -0.0053    
(-2.27) (-3.09) (-1.47)    (-1.31)    (-1.97) (-1.95)    (-0.15) (-0.26)    
GOV_OWN 0.0120 0.0107 -0.0076    -0.0030    0.0194* 0.0191*   0.0129 0.0128    
(1.21) (1.41) (-0.48)    (-0.20)    (1.76) (1.71)    (0.70) (0.69)    
LEGAL_Rights - -0.0054 - 0.0139    - -0.0032    0.0138    
- (-1.00) - (1.30)    - (-0.49)    (1.28)    
DISC_Country - 0.0195*** - -0.0086    - 0.0125    -0.0232    
- (3.04) - (-0.37)    - (0.83)    (-0.97)    
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 297 291 623    1,086    289 289    740 740    
Adjusted R2 0.158 0.114 623    -0.294      -0.214 -0.222    -0.208 -0.209    
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Table 14 Panel C: Sub-sampling High Royal Ownership (Royal Directors) vs Low Royal Ownership (Royal Directors) using JA 
  Cost of Debt (COD)  
  Model 1 Model 2   Model 3 Model 4   Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  High 
RoyalOwn 
Low 
RoyalOwn 
  High 
RoyalOwn 
Low 
RoyalOwn 
  High Royal 
Dir 
Low Royal 
Dir 
 High Royal 
Dir 
Low Royal 
Dir 
Intercept 0.0545 -0.0374 -0.0363 -0.0289      0.0345 -0.0283 -0.1244 0.1150    
(0.43) (-0.61) (-0.22) (-0.22)    (0.36) (-0.38) (-0.77) (0.67)    
Joint-Audit -0.0263* -0.0254 -0.0346** -0.0264    -0.0235* -0.0289 -0.0287* -0.0316    
(-1.87) (-1.31) (-2.19) (-1.26)    (-1.72) (-1.08) (-1.88) (-1.19)    
SIZE 0.0004 0.0074 -0.0045 0.0068    0.0007 0.0168 0.0021 0.0081    
(0.02) (0.53) (-0.28) (0.82)    (0.05) (1.62) (0.17) (0.76)    
WC 0.0376 0.1019 0.0193 0.1022*** 0.0662* 0.0688** 0.0605** 0.0627*   
(1.01) (1.47) (0.59) (3.24)    (1.87) (1.98) (2.03) (1.78)    
LEV 0.0011 0.0016 -0.0021 0.0015    -0.0017 0.0018 0.0043 -0.0004    
(0.09) (0.26) (-0.18) (0.20)    (-0.16) (0.21) (0.42) (-0.04)    
CF 0.1277 0.0436 0.1208 0.0443    -0.0180 0.0117 -0.0010 0.0609    
(1.17) (0.51) (1.11) (0.74)    (-0.13) (0.16) (-0.01) (0.81)    
PPE -0.0189 0.0288** -0.0317 0.0293    0.0084 0.0309 -0.0046 0.0224    
(-0.79) (1.99) (-1.24) (1.63)    (0.58) (1.18) (-0.30) (0.84)    
ROE 0.0009* -0.0001 0.0007 -0.0001    0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000    
(1.87) (-1.03) (1.62) (-0.80)    (0.42) (0.03) (0.16) (-0.13)    
GROWTH -0.0000* 0.0000** -0.0000 0.0000    0.0000*** -0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000    
(-1.81) (2.22) (-1.48) (0.57)    (3.82) (-0.08) (3.96) (0.00)    
OP 0.0041 0.0609* 0.0037 0.0596**  0.0154 0.0530 -0.0001 0.0466    
(0.50) (1.87) (0.45) (2.40)    (1.00) (1.51) (-0.01) (1.32)    
AC -0.3062 -0.0305 -0.2717 -0.0303    -0.0767 -0.0393 -0.0922 -0.0404    
(-1.45) (-0.70) (-1.33) (-0.83)    (-0.62) (-0.87) (-0.73) (-0.92)    
CEO_OWN -0.0054 0.0773 0.0185 0.0790    -0.0030 0.1059 0.0198 0.1100    
(-0.09) (0.93) (0.26) (0.67)    (-0.07) (0.55) (0.35) (0.58)    
GOV_OWN -0.0168 0.0025 -0.0233 0.0035    -0.0259 0.0017 -0.0251 0.0090    
(-0.76) (0.15) (-1.02) (0.18)    (-1.37) (0.07) (-1.29) (0.38)    
LEGAL_Rights - - 0.0155* 0.0037    - - 0.0023 0.0116    
- - (1.82) (0.43)    - - (0.46) (1.00)    
DISC_Country - - 0.0174 -0.0027    - - 0.0282* -0.0238    
- - (1.10) (-0.13)    - - (1.79) (-0.84)    
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 542 831 542 831    658 796 619 754    
SIZE 0.277 0.292   0.285 0.290    0.258 0.253   0.294 0.253  
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3.5.3 Sensitivity tests 
 Size partition: In our first sensitivity test we investigate whether firm size plays a 
moderating role on the association between joint audit and cost of debt. We follow Francis 
et al. (2005) and rank firms into quintiles. Firms in the top quintile consist of the largest 
firms whilst firms in the bottom quintile consist of the smallest firms. Quintile ranks rather 
than raw values alleviates the effects of extreme observations and allows us to interpret the 
resulting coefficient estimates as the incremental risk premium associated with adjacent 
quintiles. The quintile-based result reveals that the coefficient on JA is negative and 
significant in quintiles 3 and 4 only whilst insignificant in other quintiles.  
The coefficients are negative in small size firms, and negative and significant for 
middle size firms, and found no association between JA and COE for bigger firms. Our 
results, consistent with the view that large firms are more visible and, therefore, may be 
more likely to comply with accounting standards and disclosures requirements. Research in 
developed markets (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Holthausen and Leftwich 1983) 
argue that larger companies act to protect their reputation and avoid government 
intervention. While in the GCC countries where large companies are politically visible and 
economically important and most likely bigger firms are government and privatized firms. 
In addition, larger companies have more resources to spend on compliance and are less 
likely to be affected by disclosure of proprietary information than smaller companies, more 
likely to hire qualified accounting and better internal control system. Another relevant 
point is that larger companies may be older, with more established reporting systems, 
meaning that compliance is less costly for them. This suggested larger firms are less likely 
to employ two auditors compared to middle size (growth) firms. While prior research such 
as Al-Hadi et al. 2016 find the growth (middle partition firms) more likely to have 
conservative auditors. Consistent with this view, middle size firms more likely to have 
conservative audit and employ two auditors. 
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Table 15 Joint audit and cost of debt: Size partition  
 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)  Model (4) Model (5)  Model (6) 
  
All variables 
with 5 quintiles  
Quintile (1) Quintile (2) Quintile (3) Quintile (4) Quintile (5) 
  Cost of Debt 
Intercept 4.1492*** 0.0672*** -0.1829 -0.1225 -0.0108 0.0538    
(6.48)    (3.55) (-0.81) (-1.24) (-0.17) (1.23)    
JA -0.0906*   -0.0207 -0.0272 -0.0680*** -0.0219** 0.0033    
(-1.92)    (-0.44) (-0.45) (-3.17) (-2.09) (0.47)    
WC 0.0349    0.0271 -0.0445 0.1058*** -0.0263 0.0458**  
(0.82)    (1.11) (-1.39) (3.65) (-1.04) (2.29)    
LEV -0.2547*** -0.0041 -0.0120 0.0101 -0.0173** 0.0005    
(-4.08)    (-1.31) (-1.05) (0.97) (-2.04) (0.15)    
CF 0.0335    -0.0344 -0.0414 0.1707*** 0.1240* -0.0024    
(0.64)    (-0.84) (-0.42) (2.81) (1.90) (-0.06)    
PPE 0.1046**  -0.0206** -0.0060 -0.0239 0.0099 0.0174**  
(2.06)    (-2.55) (-0.21) (-1.13) (0.72) (2.04)    
ROE 0.0122    -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0006 0.0002 -0.0000    
(0.24)    (-1.08) (-0.19) (-1.52) (0.63) (-0.04)    
GROWTH -0.0641    0.0034 -0.0060 0.0066* -0.0006 -0.0021    
(-1.46)    (1.05) (-1.30) (1.73) (-0.23) (-1.20)    
AC -0.0805    0.0000 0.0047 0.0030 -0.0283* 0.0062    
(-1.42)    (0.00) (0.17) (0.21) (-1.91) (0.87)    
OP 0.0167    0.0792 0.0549 -0.0598 -0.1853*** 0.0277    
(0.43)    (1.39) (0.53) (-0.75) (-3.04) (0.40)    
CEO_OWN -0.2719*   0.2079** -0.0529 -0.0468 -0.0762 1.9168*** 
(-1.77)    (2.03) (-0.35) (-0.40) (-1.22) (4.50)    
GOV_OWN -0.1778    -0.0124 -0.0260 0.0015 -0.0223* -0.0101    
(-1.15)    (-0.38) (-1.35) (0.10) (-1.69) (-1.31)    
LEGAL_Rights 0.0599    0.0000 0.0228 0.0202*** -0.0043 -0.0031    
(1.43)    (0.00) (1.41) (2.74) (-0.86) (-0.81)    
DISC_Country 0.2561    0.0000 0.0365 0.0121 0.0190 -0.0040    
(1.37)    (0.00) (0.91) (0.71) (1.63) (-0.51)    
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1372    247 229 268 298 330    
0.479 0.394 0.325 0.400 0.461 0.590 
 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix III. 
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3.5.4 Joint audit and cost of debt with corporate governance variables excluded:  
      In all our regression specifications we included three corporate governance variables, 
namely AC, CEO_OWN and GOV_OWN: a choice that reduced the sample size 
substantially. We rerun our analysis excluding these variables. Our sample size increases to 
2,269 firm-year observations. We find negative and significant coefficients on JA and 
JA_Big4 (un-tabulated).  
3.5.5 Joint audit and cost of debt with earning management interaction: 
      We follow the established literature (e.g., Karjalainen 2011) that high quality audit 
improves information environment (e g., Becker et al., 1998; Balsam et al., 2003). We use 
John accruals quality, in particular discretionary accruals. Consistent with the view that joint 
audit enhances the firm’s accruals quality, Table 16 provides evidence that joint audit 
reduces the cost of debt via reducing the firm’s earning management. For instance, in model 
1 and Model 2 in Table 16, we find the joint audit coefficient (a1) has negative and 
significant with cost of debt, coefficient of John model is positive and significant with the 
cost of debt, while the interaction coefficient (JA X John_EM) is negative and significant. 
From model 3 to 6, we re-test our analysis using sub-sampling technique. We divide our 
sample based on John 1991 Model that firms higher than the mean of industry and year are 
considered lower accrual quality, and firms with lower than mean of industry and country 
John 1991 model are considered as higher accrual quality. We find in Model 4 and 6 firms 
with high accrual quality sub-sample that JA reduces the cost of debt. This suggests that 
joint audit reduces the cost of debt via reducing the accrual quality.  
 
 
Table 16 Effect of JA, Earning Management on the Cost of Debt: 
 
  
Model  
(1) 
Model  
(2)    
Model  
(3) 
Model 
(4)  
Model 
 (5) 
Model 
(6)  
  Cost of Debt   Cost of Debt 
    
Low 
Accrual 
Quality 
High 
Accrual 
Quality 
Low 
Accrual 
Quality 
High 
Accrual 
Quality 
Intercept -0.0287 -0.0106    Intercept -0.1183 0.0550 0.6805** -0.0189    
(-0.61) (-0.10)    (-0.67) (0.98) (2.39) (-0.19)    
JA -0.0194** -0.0212**  JA 0.0183 -0.0293* 0.0938* -0.0335*   
(-1.97) (-2.13)    (0.23) (-1.74) (1.83) (-1.93)    
John_EM 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 
(3.98) (3.95)    
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JA * John_EM -0.0894** -0.0852**  
(-2.44) (-2.38)    
SIZE 0.0008 0.0009    SIZE 0.0501 -0.0011 0.0492 -0.0046    
(0.23) (0.25)    (1.51) (-0.12) (1.46) (-0.54)    
WC 0.1417** 0.1382**  WC -0.1257 0.0282 -0.1171 0.0207    
(2.10) (2.04)    (-0.82) (0.33) (-0.75) (0.24)    
LEV 0.1004* 0.0957*   LEV -0.0041 -0.1139 -0.0154 -0.1243    
(1.74) (1.69)    (-0.02) (-1.18) (-0.07) (-1.28)    
CF -0.0099** -0.0099**  CF 0.7054 0.0195 0.6895 0.0196    
(-2.04) (-2.03)    (1.34) (1.01) (1.25) (1.01)    
PPE 0.0176 0.0154    PPE -0.0128 -0.0034 -0.0121 -0.0079    
(1.42) (1.26)    (-0.95) (-0.21) (-0.77) (-0.47)    
ROE -0.0008 -0.0009    ROE 0.0037 0.0000 0.0036 0.0000    
(-0.68) (-0.74)    (0.74) (0.02) (0.72) (0.02)    
GROWTH -0.0038 -0.0037    GROWTH -0.0112 0.0022 -0.0118 0.0027    
(-1.15) (-1.13)    (-1.23) (0.36) (-1.26) (0.44)    
OP 0.0058 0.0058    OP -0.0099 0.0231 -0.0133 0.0193    
(0.72) (0.70)    (-0.31) (1.27) (-0.38) (1.10)    
AC 0.0167 0.0172    AC -1.0924 -0.0470 -1.1197 -0.0478    
(1.25) (1.28)    (-1.62) (-0.79) (-1.62) (-0.80)    
CEO_OWN 0.0426 0.0460    CEO_OWN 0.2719** 0.0206 0.2702* 0.0308    
(0.77) (0.83)    (2.17) (0.28) (1.97) (0.41)    
GOV_OWN -0.0234 -0.0236    GOV_OWN -0.0216 0.0004 -0.0237 0.0009    
(-1.40) (-1.39)    (-0.54) (0.02) (-0.58) (0.05)    
LEGAL_Rights - 0.0070*   LEGAL_Rights - - 0.0972** 0.0092**  
- (1.74)    - - (2.59) (2.15)    
DISC_Country - -0.0067    DISC_Country - - -0.1763*** 0.0106    
- (-0.48)    - - (-4.07) (0.86)    
Year Dummies Yes Yes Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1323 1323    N 202 1214 202 1214 
Adjusted R2 0.228 0.228  Adjusted R2 0.518 0.267 0.518 0.269 
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 Conclusion 
The objective of this study is to build on and extend the scope of recent and ongoing 
research on join-audit (Francis et al. 2009; Bedard et al., 2012). While old wisdom suggests that 
two heads are better than one, empirical evidence on the impact of joint audit is inconclusive. We 
shed new insights into the joint audit literature by investigating the effects of joint versus single-
audit on firm-level cost of debt in GCC countries, and whether this association is moderated by 
political connections. We find that joint audit reduces the cost of debt by 3.37 basis points, 
compared to single-audit practices. We further document that the beneficial effect of joint audit in 
terms of lower cost of debt is greater for firms with political connections to Royal families in the 
GCC region.  
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we enrich the scant 
literature on the audit quality implications of joint audit by examining the effects of joint audit on 
the cost of debt, given the significance of the debt markets in the GCC. Second, we contribute to 
the literature on the contracting role of accounting from both the external auditing and debt 
financing perspectives. Agency theory, as advanced by Jensen and Meckling (1976), implies that 
agents may employ joint auditors to reduce information asymmetry and, thus, agency costs. 
Companies with high leverage can be expected to appoint joint auditors to reduce agency costs by 
reassuring debtholders that their interests are protected. Finally, we enrich the research on 
corporate governance in GCC countries by documenting a beneficial role of external auditor, a 
key governance mechanism.    
Like other cross-country empirical studies, our study has limitations. In particular, JA 
practices and regulations are mixed. For instance, in Kuwait It is mandatory by law, and voluntary 
for other countries. Therefore, we conducted country-wise analysis to alleviate this limitation. 
This study is also limited by number of observations and time frame, we consider 10 years period 
is sufficient period as most the GCC firms start publishing their annual reports from 2007-2008. 
The findings of this study have important implications for regulators. In particular, joint audit is 
voluntary for non-financial firms in all GCC countries except Kuwait. The finding that joint audit 
reduces the cost of debt is likely to encourage regulators to generalize this requirement to all GCC 
countries that have not yet mandated it. The adoption of this suggestion could be expected to 
improve the information environment in the GCC. It is expected that the findings of this study will 
be instructive and applicable to other countries in the Middle East region, due to their social, 
political, and economic similarities. Regarding the international convergence of audit practice and 
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standards, this study can inform global regulators’ deliberations on the desirability of joint audits. 
Future research may investigate effects of JA on the financial policy and cost of equity capital.  
Appendix III 
Variables definition 
 
COD Cost of debt calculated as total interest expenses scaled by total interest-
bearing liabilities. 
JA An indicator variable coded 1 if the firm is by two auditors, and 0 
otherwise  
JA_Big4 An indicator variable coded 1 if one of the joint auditors is a Big 4 audit 
firm, and 0 otherwise.  
Audit1_Big4 an indicator variable coded 1 if the firm is audited by a single Big 4 audit 
firm, and zero 0 otherwise  
Audit_Both_Big An indicator variable coded 1 if Both Auditor are Big 4 audit firms, and 
0 otherwise. 
Audit_Both_Local An indicator variable coded 1 if Both Auditor are local firms, and 0 
otherwise. 
ROWN Royal family ownership % 
RDIR_D Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has more than two royal family 
directors in the board, otherwise 0. 
SIZE Natural Logarithm of market capitalization of the firm end of the year.  
WC Total current assets less total current liability scaled by total asset end of 
the year. 
LEV Total short-long term debt scaled by market capitalization end of the 
year. 
CF Cash flow from operation scaled by total asset. 
PPE Gross Property Plant, and Equipment scaled by total assets end of the 
year. 
ROE Return on Equity. 
GROWTH Market capitalization value of the firm divided by book value. 
OP Operating margin is annual operating income standardized by total 
assets. 
AC A firm adopted audit committee equal to 1, otherwise 0-. 
CEO_OWN Percentage of CEO shareholdings  
GOV_OWN Percentage of government shareholdings  
LEGAL_Rights Strength of legal rights index measures the degree to which collateral 
and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus 
facilitate lending. The index ranges from 0 to 12, with higher scores 
indicating that these laws are better designed to expand access to credit 
(La porta et al. 2002)  
DISC_Country Review and approval requirement for related-party transactions, internal, 
immediate and periodic disclosure requirement for related-party 
transactions (La Porta et al. 2002). 
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Investment Committee Characteristics and Investment Efficiency 
 Introduction 
The investment committee (thereafter IC) is one of the most important committees of 
a company’s board (Yoder, 2011). ICs play a key role in the deployment of $18 
trillion in institutional assets in the USA (Collie, 2014). Such committees establish 
their firms’ investment strategies and oversee critical asset allocation decisions. The 
expertise of IC members constitute a valuable resource that may greatly affect a 
firm’s level of investment efficiency. Studies of investment efficiency (Collie, 2014; 
Ellis, 2011; Helgers, 2011) and numerous professional reports (e.g Kearney, 2014) 
have highlighted the importance of ICs,56 as they are expected to provide oversight 
and expertise in firms’ investment decision-making processes (Ellis, 2011; Kearney, 
2014). However, despite the importance of ICs and their role in investment decision 
making, the relationship between the existence, composition, and characteristics of 
ICs have not been extensively examined. Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright (2000) call 
for further research into the role of ICs in order to better understand how they can 
enhance investment-related decision making in emerging markets. Hence, the 
objective of this study is to investigate the association between the existence of 
specialized ICs and the level of investment efficiency among firms listed in six Gulf 
Corporation Council (GCC) countries. The study also assesses how the characteristics 
of ICs influence investment efficiency.  
A specialized IC allows its members to focus on monitoring managerial 
investment decisions and to provide better quality reporting on investment projects 
(Ellis, 2011). These responsibilities are performed more competently in firms that 
have ICs than in firms in which such tasks are handled by individual managers 
(Garmaise & Liu, 2005). IC members are expected to oversee managerial investment 
risks and to be actively involved in investment decision making and other related 
board oversight functions. Prior research (e.g Ellis, 2011; Helgers, 2011; Payne, 2009; 
                                                     
56 See Wood (2006) and Ellis (2011) for detailed information on the effective role of ICs. 
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Yoder, 2011) provides evidence that ICs are essential in order to make prudent 
investment decisions and for ensuring the successful control and management of 
investment risks that may arise from agency conflicts or information asymmetry. As 
ICs are primarily responsible for improving investment decisions and for controlling 
risks from moral hazard and information asymmetry, we argue that firms with an IC 
are associated with higher-quality investment decisions than other firms. Hence, we 
expect that firms with an established IC have reduced under- and overinvestment 
effects and an overall greater level of investment efficiency. We also investigate how 
the characteristics of an IC, particularly its level of expertise, are related to investment 
efficiency. We evaluate several characteristics of IC member to ascertain how each 
characteristic influences firms’ level of investment efficiency.  
Agency conflicts and information asymmetry may give rise to both over- and 
underinvestment (Biddle, Hilary & Verdi, 2009). Prior research (e.g., Grabowski & 
Mueller, 1972; Jensen, 1986; Mueller & Peev, 2007) has posited that agency costs 
between managers and other shareholders arise because of managerial investment 
decisions that involve the pursuit of benefits for firm managers, which leads to 
overinvestment. This assumption is supported by Fama & Jensen (1983) and Wang & 
Barney (2006), who suggest that managers have a propensity to overinvest to obtain 
self-benefits. Furthermore, information asymmetry between managers and capital 
providers may affect future investment opportunities. Fund providers may lack the 
knowledge held by managers; this asymmetry can lead to underinvestment. Prior 
research also provides evidence that government regulation can increase financial 
constraints, thereby limiting underinvestment (Bøhren, Cooper & Priestley, 2007).  
We are motivated to assess the role of the IC and its effect on investment 
efficiency in the GCC because it is likely that the agency and information asymmetry 
problems are more severe in such emerging markets (Al-Hadi, Taylor & Hossain, 
2015; Al-Hadi, Hasan & Habib, 2016). GCC countries follow Western-based 
regulations in managing and protecting investments (Al-Hadi et al., 2015; Al-Hadi, 
Hasan & Habib, 2016), and all GCC countries have established equity markets. 
However, these markets are less sophisticated and less liquid than better developed 
markets (Bley & Saad, 2012). Moreover, corporate governance in the GCC is still at 
an early stage of development, so investor protection may be limited (Al-Shammari, 
Brown & Tarca, 2008; Al-Hadi, Hasan & Habib, 2016). In markets characterized by 
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weak market regulation and poor corporate governance, managers may be 
incentivized to invest in projects that benefit them at the expense of other 
shareholders. Such managers may thus rely on internal funding to finance negative net 
present value (NPV) projects. GCC countries are also likely to have entrenched 
underinvestment issues, as information asymmetry and transparency issues have been 
considered significant impediments to liquidity and trading in the GCC stock markets 
(Al-Hadi, Hasan & Habib, 2016; Bley, 2011; Hassan Al-Tamimi, 2012; Woertz, 
2008).  
This study is motivated by a growing interest in the role of ICs, investment 
efficiency, and the relationship between them. ICs have important governance 
responsibilities for ensuring the successful management of capital assets (Yoder, 
2011) and are responsible for reviewing and approving the long-term investment 
strategies of their firms and individual investment projects (Klein, 1998). ICs have 
also been shown to assist with efficient asset allocation (Yoder, 2011), the effective 
choice of investment vehicles (Klein, 1998), making reasonable judgments 
concerning future market conditions (Payne, 2009), and implementing effective 
policies for hiring (and firing) investment managers (Helgers, 2011). We complement 
prior studies conducted in this area by showing that ICs assist firms with mitigating 
under- and overinvestment and thereby improving their level of investment efficiency. 
Our research provides important evidence of the association between IC 
characteristics and investment efficiency in the GCC. First, we find that the existence 
of a standalone IC reduces both over- and underinvestment. Economically, based on 
the Biddle et al. (2009) multinomial logit model, the odds of under-investment and 
over-investment relative to the benchmark groups are 61% and 65% lower 
respectively with adoption of an IC. Second, we find that IC members’ level of 
expertise in the areas of monitoring and finance affect the degree of over- and 
underinvestment. These results are consistent with the view that an IC provides 
independent monitoring and expertise with respect to a firm’s investment decisions. 
Furthermore, the association between existence of ICs and investment efficiency is 
moderated by the level of foreign ownership concentration, suggesting that foreign 
directors transfer different professional governance practices that empower ICs 
leading to enhanced corporate investment efficiency. 
 
 106 
 
 Establishment of ICs of GCC firms 
The formation of an IC is not mandatory in GCC countries based on current 
governance codes and regulations. Oman’s new code of corporate governance 
encourages boards to form various subcommittees, including audit, risk, 
compensation and internal control committees, but is silent with respect to the 
formation of ICs.57 Kuwait’s code of corporate governance also suggests the 
establishment of a number of board subcommittees (e.g., audit, risk, compensation, 
internal control, and corporate governance compliance subcommittees) but does not 
suggest inclusion of an IC. The United Arab Emirates’ governance codes do not 
mandate the establishment of an IC despite their request that boards form a number of 
subcommittees.58 A similar mandate is found in the codes of corporate governance for 
Bahrain,59 Qatar,60 and Saudi Arabia.61  
Prior research has examined the role of investment committees in the context 
of a single country (e.g. U.S.). Hence, we make an important contribution by 
examining the role of investment committees and their characteristics in a cross-
country context by providing empirical evidence on the association between 
establishment of an investment committee and efficiency across six emerging GCC 
capital markets. This is important considering development of governance structures 
and supporting regulations differs across each of the GCC countries.  
Despite a lack of regulatory guidance on the formation of ICs, a significant 
proportion of firms across all GCC countries and across different industries have 
established ICs. Panel C of Table 17 shows that the number of firms that have 
established ICs in the GCC increased from 10 in 2005 to 46 in 2013. Firms in Saudi 
Arabia and Oman formed 104 and 64 ICs, respectively, between 2005 and 2013. In 
addition, firms that have adopted ICs have established common standards concerning 
the duties of ICs in relation to investment decision making. For example, the Bahrain 
Duty Free Corporation stated in its 2013 annual report that its IC was established to 
“formulate the investment policy and guidelines subject to Board approval and review 
                                                     
57 https://www.cma.gov.om/documents/En/Charter2014.pdf 
58 file:///C:/Users/Ahmed/Downloads/UAECorporateGovernanceRegime.pdf 
59http://www.moic.gov.bh/En/Commerce/DomesticTrade/Corporate%20Governance/Documents/bb990
3e050a24fc6b65190cfcd637cd1BahrainCGCodeEN.pdf 
60 http://www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?code_id=327 
61 http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Documents/CORPORATE%20GOVERNANCE%20REGULATIONS-
2011.pdf 
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and monitor the investment portfolio” of the firm. GASCO in Saudi Arabia also 
established an IC to develop its investment policies and to evaluate and maintain the 
risk limits for its investments. Some firms in the GCC specify ceilings for the 
amounts of investment to be made in terms of their countries’ currencies. For 
instance, the Qatar-based Al Meera Consumer Company states in its 2012 annual 
report that the IC “can make investment decisions up to QAR10 million for one 
investment, and anything exceeding the same will be referred to the Board.” Although 
some firms designate the general duties and responsibilities of their ICs in some 
detail, the Oman-based Al-Jazeera Services Company simply states in its 2012 annual 
report that the “investment committee is to review, monitor and guide the investment 
of the company.” Clearly, recognition of the importance of ICs in enhancing their 
investments has led numerous GCC-based firms to voluntarily establish their own 
ICs.  
The composition of IC membership varies considerably among GCC member 
countries and across industries. For instance, in Saudi Arabia, the Al-Ahsa 
Development Company’s 2009 annual report explains that the firm’s IC includes 40% 
independent directors, while the Filing & Packing Materials Manufacturing 
Company’s 2009 annual report states that its IC includes in excess of 60% 
independent directors. 
 
 Theory and hypotheses development 
4.3.1 ICs and investment efficiency 
Studies investigating the relationship between corporate governance and investment 
efficiency, such as those using the Gompers G-index (such as using G-index of 
Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003), have been based on data from developed countries 
(e.g., Biddle et al., 2009; Richardson, 2006). These studies have provided mixed 
results (Albuquerue & Wang, 2008; Biddle et al., 2009; Billett, Garfinkel, & Jiang, 
2011) and have not examined the relationships between corporate governance 
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structure or the particular roles or specific characteristics of board committees and 
firms’ investment efficiency. 
We argue that the voluntary creation of an IC provides evidence of board 
effort to ensure that the firm plans and monitors its investment portfolios effectively 
and efficiently (Ellis, 2011; Klein, 1998). Several studies have suggested that agency 
theory is a major driver of a firm’s investment efficiency (Biddle et al., 2009; Billett 
et al., 2011; C. Chen, Young, & Zhuang, 2012; Gomariz & Ballesta, 2014). For 
instance, firms may over- or underinvest, which can lead to the diversion of 
investment resources into lower-value projects, causing a decrease in firm value 
(Biddle et al., 2009).  
In a perfect market, firms would depend on internal funding for their 
investments (e.g.,  Modigliani & Miller, 1958) and all positive NPV projects would be 
self-financed (Biddle & Hilary, 2006). External funding for positive NPV projects has 
two main impediments: moral hazard (Fama & Jensen, 1983) and adverse selection 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984). These market imperfections may constrain establishment of 
an investment committee or may impede rigid governance practices by members of an 
investment committee should one exist. Information asymmetry between firm 
managers and outside investors can lead to these forms of market frictions if firm 
management possess superior information about the resources and investment 
capacity of a firm and use this information to opportunistically obtain outside funding, 
which they then could potentially over-invest (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Consequent 
investment distortions may allow managers to pursue an agenda whereby they obtain 
self-benefits at the expense of shareholders, regulators and capital providers. 
Moral hazard arises when firm managers make use of the superior information 
they possess as compared to that available to outsiders as a means to obtain self-
benefits (Jensen, 1986). Information asymmetry then makes monitoring of 
investments costly if this form of market friction is to be mitigated (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Moral hazard suggests that firm management may make 
investments that in some way maximizes their own interests and departs from industry 
norms around investment efficiency (Fama & Jensen, 1983). As an example, firm 
management may overinvest through empire building rather than by choosing projects 
that maximize shareholders’ welfare. Moral hazard may also lead to under-investment 
when firm managers do not invest in positive NPV projects when they clearly have 
the resources to do so as they prefer a quiet life devoid of any form of material risk. 
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Ellis (2011) conjectures that the central role of a specialized IC is to provide policies 
and procedures around investments, to monitor firms’ investments and to make 
recommendations to managers to efficiently fund positive NPV projects. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) and Lan & Wang (2004) argue that moral hazard may collectively lead 
to both over- and under-investment which can lead to a reduction in firm value.  
Adverse selection theory contends that as insiders, firm managers possess 
private information about the ability of their firms’ investments to generate future 
cash flows. Managers may use this information selectively to enhance their own 
welfare or for example, by choosing the most appropriate time to sell stocks based on 
the firm’s investment portfolio (Biddle et al., 2009). Managers may be inclined to 
overinvest if they believe it will enhance their own welfare regardless of the efficacy 
of the investments. However, investors and other capital market participants may 
recognize the propensity of a firm’s managers to overinvest, which may limit the 
provision of capital to that firm, leading to an increase in the cost of capital (Biddle et 
al., 2009). Faced with a constrained ability to raise capital and a potentially higher 
cost of capital, the firm’s managers may be forced to underinvest, even in the 
presence of positive NPV projects (Myers & Majluf, 1984).62  
Both resource-based theory and agency theory appear to offer important 
insights into investment efficiency in the GCC (Al-Hadi, Hasan, Taylor, Hossain, & 
Richardson, 2016). The accounting and management literature (e.g., Barney, 1997; 
Cabedo & Tirado, 2004; Lee & Stone, 1997) further suggests that some firms are 
much more skilled in implementing governance devices and that this skill may be 
heterogeneously distributed across firms. Governance choices also have significant 
effects on the ways in which any rents created through the use of valuable and non-
substitutable resources are appropriated in the GCC (Al-Hadi, Hasan & Habib, 2016). 
Coff (1999) suggests that the bargaining power of managers means that stakeholders 
are able to appropriate a disproportionate share of the rents a firm is able to generate, 
                                                     
62 Previous research has demonstrated that the quality of corporate governance affects corporation 
information and disclosures (Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Whalen, 2007). These disclosures, in turn, affect 
the levels of information asymmetry in equity markets. The market microstructure literature (Copeland 
& Galai, 1983; Glosten & Milgrom, 1985) suggests that a positive bid-ask spread enables the equity 
specialist to profit from trades with uninformed traders and thereby to offset losses incurred from 
trades with informed traders. Al-Hadi et al. (2015) and Al-Hadi, Hasan, and Habib (2016) show that 
specialized corporate governance committees, such as teams of risk managers, improve the risk 
reporting of firms in the GCC region, hence reducing information asymmetry and in turn the implied 
cost of equity capital. 
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and managers thus may overinvest a firm’s capital (Jensen, 1986). Alternatively, such 
payments to managers may simply reflect compensation for the substantial firm-
specific investments that these stakeholders make in a firm compared with the 
investments made by other stakeholders (Wang & Barney, 2006).63  
The formation of an IC may also be understood in terms of resource-based 
theory, which posits that the existence and use of resources generates a competitive 
advantage for a firm and gives rise to heterogeneity in organizational capabilities 
(Rumelt, 1997). Firms with more resources may have the required capacity to form 
separate ICs to improve their investment opportunities and decision making (Al-Hadi, 
Hasan, & Habib, 2016; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Resourcing can include director 
experience and capabilities (e.g., Lee & Stone, 1997). The combined effort of IC 
members can also enable the committee to oversee and monitor managerial 
investment risks, to be actively involved in investment decision making, and to 
perform related board oversight functions.  
The establishment of a specialized IC allows committee members to 
concentrate on their firm’s ability to monitor managerial investment decisions and to 
provide better quality reporting on investment projects (Ellis, 2011). ICs can perform 
these roles better than would be possible in firms that receive their information on 
investment projects through the reports of individual managers (Garmaise & Liu, 
2005). The information content provided by a standalone specialized committee is 
better than that provided by a series of counterparties (Hill, 1982; Laughlin & Barth, 
1981). Thus, an IC with sufficient specialized resources is primarily responsible for 
both improving investment decisions and controlling the hazards and risks related to 
information asymmetry.  
We also utilize board-signaling theory which suggests that firms voluntarily 
create board internal committees and select its directors to signal its legitimacy and 
quality (Certo, 2003; Spence, 1974). Certo (2003) demonstrates that a signal such as 
the appointment of a prestigious member of the board is important as it allows 
managers to influence the perceptions of customers, suppliers, and investors. On the 
other hand, directors (that is independent directors) accept the board’s membership to 
signal their talent as decision makers (Fama & Jensen, 1983). From a signaling 
                                                     
63 Manigart and Beuselinck (2001) extend this conclusion to venture capital firms and, consistent with 
resource-based theory, find that venture capital firms with specialist skills can both add value and 
become better placed to control risks. This finding suggests the need for monitors with special 
monitoring expertise in an initial risk-management process (Al-Hadi, Hasan, & Habib, 2016). 
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perspective, in the presence of asymmetric information, firms voluntarily form IC and 
assign membership to signal firm value (Certo, 2003). When a firm voluntarily forms 
an additional oversight committee (e.g., IC), they disclose it in the corporate 
governance section of their annual reports, hence, readers are able to observe the 
signal. Choosing prestigious directors as members of an IC (for example, those who 
are qualified and independent) will make this signal costly to imitate (Certo, 2003). 
Stakeholders value the unobserved attributes of a voluntarily adopted committee such 
as an IC.   
In summary, firms’ choice of not establishing an investment committee may 
exacerbate problems around information asymmetry and agency related conflicts and 
costs. Inefficiencies in investment decision making, monitoring or risk taking may 
then arise due to the lack of controls around investment management and the 
increased opportunities afforded to management to act opportunistically in such an 
environment.  Lack of governance around investments may also restrict firms’ ability 
to raise or obtain sufficient capital to ensure that all positive NPV projects be invested 
in. We therefore posit that firms with a specialized IC are associated with higher-
quality investment decisions and a higher level of investment efficiency than firms 
without specialized ICs. Thus, we hypothesize the following. 
H1a. All else being equal, firms that establish a specialized investment committee 
better mitigate the risk of underinvestment. 
 
H1b. All else being equal, firms that establish a specialized investment committee 
better mitigate the risk of overinvestment. 
 
4.3.2 Experience of IC members and investment efficiency 
Prior research shows that directors on board subcommittees who have financial or 
monitoring expertise tend to perform their investing or monitoring duties more 
effectively (e.g., Lee & Stone, 1997). For instance, DeZoort and Salterio (2001) argue 
that audit committee directors with sufficient knowledge of auditing practices make 
better judgments than others. Al-Hadi, Hasan, and Habib (2016) also find that 
qualified directors on risk committees are more likely to enhance the quality of the 
market risk disclosures of GCC firms.  
 112 
 
Custódio and Metzger (2014) find that CEOs with financial experience tend to 
use company-wide discount rates rather than project-specific rates to evaluate 
investment projects. They also find that financial experts react consistently to 
financial shocks or events.64 Güner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) find that financial 
experts on boards have easy access to capital markets. Firms with bankers on their 
boards use more external financing and have lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
Ellis (2011) asserts that less qualified and less experienced directors have more 
difficulty achieving positive NPV projects. In addition, the agency and information 
asymmetry risks that are related to investment policy can be better detected by 
financially literate directors (Ellis, 2011). Financially literate directors on board 
subcommittees may perform better than other directors during periods of high 
uncertainty. For example, Hill (1982) suggests that complex financial issues can be 
overcome through an aggregation of opinions from experienced and proficient board 
members. Financial experts can benefit from their personal links to the financial 
sector. Custódio and Metzger (2014) find that a fraction of a firm’s loan facilities is 
typically provided by former employers of the CEO. Given the roles played by 
directors who are financial and monitoring experts in improving their firms’ 
investment decisions, it is reasonable to assert that the presence of expert directors on 
an IC can enhance a firm’s investment efficiency. 
Resource dependency theory suggests that qualified and financially literate 
directors help to obtain valuable resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Moreover, 
agency theory indicates that financially qualified boards help to improve managerial 
monitoring (Cabedo & Tirado, 2004), thus enhancing stakeholder wealth. In support 
of these assertions, prior studies (e.g., Al-Hadi, Hasan, & Habib, 2016; Lee & Stone, 
1997) have found that directors of board subcommittees who have relevant experience 
and qualifications tend to carry out their monitoring functions more efficiently. 
However, the GCC Board Directors Institute (BDI, 2011)65 regards the shortage of 
qualified and financially skilled directors as one of the main barriers to board 
effectiveness. Corporate governance codes that fail to mandate ICs are another 
potential impediment to the appointment of suitably qualified and experienced 
                                                     
64 They analyze the 2003 cuts to dividend and capital gains taxes, known as the “Bush tax cuts,” and 
find that financial experts are more responsive as measured by increases in total payouts to 
shareholders. 
65 For more information, please visit [http://gccbdi.org/insights]. 
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members to ICs. Overall, we expect that having financially literate directors on an IC 
helps to improve investment efficiency. Thus, we hypothesize the following. 
H2a. All else being equal, having financial experts on a specialized investment 
committee better mitigates the risk of underinvestment. 
 
H2b. All else being equal, having financial experts on a specialized investment 
committee better mitigates the risk of overinvestment. 
 Research design 
4.4.1 Data and sample 
We draw our sample from the population of non-financial firms listed in the six GCC 
capital markets for the 2005–2013 period. Data on ICs and corporate governance are 
hand-collected from annual reports, and data on the control variables are collected 
from Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Capital IQ database.66 As our IC variable is found in 
the corporate governance reports, firms lacking corporate governance sections in their 
annual reports are excluded from our dataset. All of the continuous disclosure 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the influence of 
outliers. We also control for heteroscedasticity using the White test.67  
 
Table 17 Panel A: Sample Selection 
Total Observations  
                                                     
66 We used 2005 as base year for our analysis as that 5 countries start adopting the corporate 
governance (voluntary & mandatory) after 2005 and 2006. 
67 The sharp drop in share prices witnessed in Muscat Stock Market (1998 Collapse). Many major and 
minor firms collapsed due to management dishonesty and dis-integrity, led to loss of investor 
confidence (Dry, 2003) and the significant improvement in advancing corporate governance systems in 
Saudi Arabia have been driven by some financial scandals involving Al-Gosaibi-Saad group, which is 
one of the listed conglomerate firms in Saudi Arabia stock market (Ramady, 2012), have compelled 
policy makers to push for the adoption of corporate governance standards.  For example, Oman was the 
first country in the GCC region to issue a code of corporate governance in 2002, followed by KSA in 
2006 and UAE in 2007 (Eulaiwi et al., 2016). In Oman and KSA, the Code of Corporate Governance 
have clearly specifies the role and responsibilities of formation specialized board committees 
(Investment, Risk and corporate governance committees. These include provision in term of duties, 
rights and obligations. Many financial and investment analysts have attributed the stock market crash 
and corporate scandals in the GCC to mismanagement and board monitoring inefficiencies 
(Koldertsova, 2011).  
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Number of Non-financial firms available in S & P Capital IQ for the GCC 
countries               
167
0 
Less 
Joint listed firms observation       -72 
Key control variables              -467  
Lead omitted observations  -142 
Total Observations 989 
 
Table 17 Panel B: Sample selection based on industry 
INDUSTRY 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total % Percent 
CONSD 5 9 12 18 23 26 28 29 150 0.15 
CONSS 6 13 19 23 27 29 32 36 185 0.19 
ENERG 2 3 3 6 8 7 8 9 46 0.05 
HEALT 0 1 2 3 4 4 6 6 26 0.03 
INDUS 6 12 25 30 36 40 43 43 235 0.24 
INFOR 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 3 10 0.01 
MATER 9 16 22 29 32 42 47 52 249 0.25 
TELEC 3 4 3 3 3 3 8 7 34 0.03 
UTILI 2 4 6 8 8 8 9 9 54 0.05 
Total  33 62 93 121 142 161 183 194 989 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17 Panel C: Sample distribution based on country 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total Difference* 
Bahrain 0 1 1 1 3 6 9 9 30 0 
Saudi Arabia 4 11 25 45 54 60 67 71 337 -32 
Kuwait 0 0 1 1 5 8 10 14 39 0 
Oman 27 47 54 58 63 63 65 67 444 69 
Qatar 1 1 1 2 2 4 5 5 21 3 
Emirates  1 2 11 14 15 20 27 28 118 -11 
 Total 33 62 93 121 142 161 183 194 989   
*Number of observations missing in Model 1 and Model 2. 
 
Table 17, Panel A shows that there are initially 1,670 firm-year observations. The 
exclusion of joint-listed firms (72 firm-years), firms with missing control variables 
(467 firm-years), and observations omitted due to the use of lead values in the 
regression models (142 firm-years) yields a final sample of 989 firm-year 
observations. Panel B shows that material sector firms represent about 25% of our 
sample, followed by industrial firms at 24% and consumer products firms at 19%. 
Panel C shows that Oman (OMN) represents the highest number of observations 
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(44%), followed by Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which 
together represent 46% of the observations.  
4.4.2 Variable measurement 
 Dependent variable: Proxy for investment efficiency 
We investigate how the existence and characteristics of an IC in a current year affect 
the investment efficiency of that firm in a subsequent year. We measure investment 
efficiency using two models. In our first model, we use the model adopted by (Biddle 
et al., 2009) by first estimating a firm-specific model of investment as a function of 
growth opportunities (as measured by sales growth) and use the residuals as a firm-
specific proxy for deviations from expected investment.68 
Investmenti, t+1  = β0 + β1  Sales Growthi,t +  ei, t+1          Equation (1) 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡௜,௧  is measured as the sum of a firm’s new investment in 
Machineryt, Equipmentt, Vehiclest, Landt, and Buildingst minus Depreciation, 
Amortizationt, and the sales of Net PPEt. The total investment in each year is divided 
by Total Assetst-1 and RevGrowth%i,t-1 is a firm’s sales growth at yeart-1 calculated as 
the difference between sales in yeart and sales in yeart-1. 
We then classify firms based on the magnitude of the residuals (i.e., deviations 
from predicted investment) and use these groups as the dependent variables. 
Specifically, we sort firms based on the residuals from Equation (1) into quartiles. 
Firm-year observations in the bottom quartile (i.e., the most negative residuals) are 
classified as underinvesting, observations in the top quartile (i.e., the most positive 
residuals) are classified as overinvesting, and observations in the middle two quartiles 
are classified as the benchmark group. We estimate a multinomial logit model that 
predicts the likelihood that a firm will be in one of the extreme quartiles as opposed to 
the middle quartiles.  
In the second model, we use the (C. Chen et al., 2012) model, estimated from 
Biddle et al. (2009). C. Chen et al. (2012) used the average of cash and leverage to 
rank firms on their likelihood to over- or underinvest. Jensen (1986) and Blanchard, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994) assert that firms with higher free cash balances 
                                                     
68 Biddle et al. (2009) also used the book value scaled by the market value in the growth model.   
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are likely to overinvest their cash but that highly leveraged firms are more likely to 
underinvest by giving up positive NPV projects (Myers, 1977).  
The investment models employed in this study have been extensively and 
successfully used in both a developed (e.g., U.S.) (see e.g. Biddle & Hilary, 2006; 
Billett et al., 2011; Cheng, Dhaliwal, & Zhang, 2013) and emerging market (e.g., 
GCC) (e.g. Al-Hadi, Hasan, & Habib, 2016; Bøhren et al., 2007; R. Chen, El Ghoul, 
Guedhami, & Wang, 2014) context.  
 Independent variables  
This study’s independent variable of interest is denoted by the existence of an IC 
(IC_D). IC_D is a dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has a 
dedicated IC in year t and 0 otherwise. To estimate the effects of IC characteristics on 
investment efficiency, we regress the individual IC characteristics with respect to 
investment efficiency. The individual IC characteristics are denoted in terms of IC 
experience (IC_EXP).69 
The main premise underlying the governance code recommendations on board 
committee members is that the members must have the ability to carry out their 
functions effectively. Members must possess sufficient financial acumen and 
knowledge of the business environment to understand a firm’s investment decisions. 
We follow a number of researchers (Badolato, Donelson, & Ege, 2014; DeZoort, 
Hermanson, Archambeault, & Reed, 2002; DeZoort, Hermanson, & Houston, 2003; 
Lee & Stone, 1997) in measuring IC_EXP based on the number of directors who have 
financial and monitoring experience. Specifically, we measure IC_EXP as the natural 
                                                     
69 Our regression results are robust to alternative measures of IC (e.g., the proportion of independent 
directors on an IC). These results are not provided for brevity. We follow the various GCC codes of 
corporate governance in defining the independence of IC members. The GCC corporate governance 
codes consider several aspects of independence (e.g., the directors’ prior roles in the firm, substantial 
relationships, remuneration, family relationships, director relationships, ownership, and long-term 
board tenure) in determining the degrees of director independence. For example, in Oman, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, independent directors should not have been employees or senior 
executives of the firm during the preceding two years. In Qatar, the limit is the preceding three years, 
and in Bahrain it is the preceding year. In terms of substantial business relationships, a director is 
considered independent in Bahrain if he or she does not have a financial relationship with the firm 
exceeding 31,000 Bahrain dinars. Corporate governance codes in all of the GCC countries restrict 
independent directors from having any close family ties with any of the company’s advisors, directors, 
or employees. In Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, independent directors 
should not represent a significant shareholding (of more than 10%). Hence, in this study, directors are 
considered independent if they meet the criteria of independence stated in their country’s codes of 
corporate governance.  
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logarithm of number of directors with CFO or investment or chairman or CEO 
experience. If an IC director has any of these experience categories, that director is 
scored as 1. We then sum the number of IC directors with experience in any of these 
categories and then take the natural log of that value (IC_EXP). As an example, 
OOMS (Oman Oil marketing Company) has an IC comprising four directors with 1 
director with CEO experience, 0 directors with CFO experience, 1 director with 
investment experience, and 1 director with chairman experience in the 2009 year. The 
scoring of experience for each director is mutually exclusive-in other words a director 
is scored as 1 if it has experience in at least one of the four categories of experience, 
otherwise 0. We then sum the items as: 1 + 0 + 1 + 1= 3 and the natural log of that 
value (IC_EXP) is 1.0986. 
 Control variables 
We include firm-specific control variables that influence investment efficiency. 
Following Biddle et al. (2009), C. Chen et al. (2012) and F. Chen, Hope, Li, and 
Wang (2011), we introduce several control variables in all of our models.70 We use 
SIZE to control for firm size, measured as the natural log of total assets, and BM to 
control for firms’ growth, measured as the ratio of the market value to the book value 
of total assets. We include total cash from operations scaled by total sales (CFO) to 
control for firm liquidity. Institutional ownership (InstitOwn) is measured as the 
percentage of firm shares held by institutional investors. SLACK is measured as the 
total cash balance divided by total assets and LOSS is measured as a dummy variable 
that takes a value of one if the net income before extraordinary items is negative and 
zero otherwise. We control for a firm’s profitability by using return on assets (ROA) 
measured as pretax income divided by total assets. Leverage (LEV) is measured as 
total short- and long-term liabilities divided by total assets. Lang and Lundholm 
(1993), Biddle et al. (2009) and C. Chen et al. (2012) show that tangible assets, 
dividend payout ratio, and corporate governance attributes have important effects on 
firm-level investment efficiency. Hence, we control for a firm’s property, plant, and 
equipment scaled by total assets (TANG) as a measure of tangibility. Dividend payout 
takes a value of one if the firm paid a dividend during a year and zero otherwise 
                                                     
70 For more details about why we choose these types of control variables, please review the studies by 
Biddle et al. (2009), C. Chen et al. (2012), and Al-Hadi, Hasan, and Habib (2016). 
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(DIV). We control for strength of governance structure by including a corporate 
governance index (Firm_CG) in our models. This governance index uses the approach 
employed by (Al-Hadi, Hasan, & Habib, 2016).71 Consistent with Biddle et al. (2009) 
and Biddle and Hilary (2006), we also include firm age (Age) in our models which is 
measured as the natural log of the number of years since incorporation. 
4.4.3 Empirical model 
To test H1, we use the following ordinary least squares (OLS) model: 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ௜,௧ାଵ,⌈𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 ⌉𝑜𝑟 ⌈𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟⌉ ൌ 𝑎଴ ൅ 𝑎ଵ𝐼𝐶_𝐷௜,௧ ൅ 𝑎ଶ𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸௜,௧ ൅ 𝑎ଷ𝐵𝑀௜,௧ ൅
𝑎ସ𝐶𝐹𝑂௜,௧ ൅ 𝑎ହ𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛௜,௧ ൅ 𝑎଺𝑆𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐾௜,௧ ൅  𝑎଻𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆௜,௧ ൅ 𝑎଼𝑅𝑂𝐴௜,௧ ൅ 𝑎ଽ𝐿𝐸𝑉௜,௧ ൅ 𝑎ଵ଴𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺௜,௧ ൅ 𝑎ଵଵ𝐷𝐼𝑉௜,௧ ൅ 𝑎ଵଶ𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐶𝐺௜,௧ ൅ 𝑎ଵଷ𝐴𝐺𝐸௜,௧ ൅
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 ൅  𝑒௜,௧      
                                                                      Equation (2) 
 Using Equation (2), we regress under- and overinvestment on IC_D and the control 
variables. Under- and overinvestment are measured using two models. 
 
4.4.4 Empirical results and discussion 
 Descriptive statistics 
Table 18 reports the summary statistics for the variables included in the regression 
models. Using Model 1, the mean (median) for the multinomial logistic regression is 
2.215 (2.00), with a standard deviation of 1.117. The mean (median) values for under- 
and overinvestment, as determined using Model 2, are 0.848 (0.866) and 0.731 
(0.745), respectively. The mean (median) IC is 0.166 (0.00), with a standard deviation 
of 0.372. About 16% of the non-financial firms in the GCC have an IC (IC_D). The 
mean (median) value of IC_EXP is 0.183 (0.00). We find that the ICs in the sample 
usually are comprised of four directors. We also find that the mean and median values 
                                                     
71 Al-Hadi, Hasan, and Habib (2016) calculate the firm-level corporate governance index (Firm_CG) of 
three dichotomous items that cover the independence of the board of directors, the duality of the 
CEO/chairman, and the firm’s directors with outside directorships. 
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of the control variables are consistent with the GCC literature (Al-Hadi, Hasan, & 
Habib, 2016; Eulaiwi et al., 2016). 
 
 
Table 18: Descriptive statistics  
Dependent Variables 
Variable N        Mean       S.D.        25%      Mdn       75% 
Model 1 960 2.215 1.117 1.000 2.000 4.000 
Model 1_ABS 960 1.77 4.30 0.17 0.46 1.33 
Model 2 989 0.785 0.462 0.473 0.800 1.079 
Under-Investment 455 0.848 0.468 0.514 0.866 1.146 
Over-Investment 534 0.731 0.450 0.426 0.745 1.026 
Independent Variables 
Variable N        Mean       S.D.        25%       Mdn        75% 
IC_D 989 0.166 0.372 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IC_Exp 989 0.183 0.485 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIZE 989 5.244 1.927 3.932 5.120 6.394 
BM 989 1.918 1.953 0.583 1.460 2.582 
CFO 989 0.161 0.351 0.044 0.151 0.311 
InstitOwn 989 0.246 0.270 0.000 0.150 0.438 
SLACK 989 11.782 12.747 2.980 6.924 16.525 
LOSS 989 0.068 0.251 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ROA 989 5.270 5.308 2.110 4.840 8.310 
LEV 989 23.677 22.618 2.914 18.848 38.053 
TANG 989 2.117 4.359 0.034 0.264 1.584 
TANG(mm) 989 956.25 4651.63 14.3 58.5 233.4 
DIV 989 0.629 0.483 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Firm_CG 989 0.638 0.246 0.333 0.667 0.667 
AGE 989 2.838 0.743 2.485 2.944 3.401 
 
4.4.5 Regression analysis 
 Multinomial logistic regression  
We follow Biddle et al. (2009) in estimating a multinomial logistic regression using 
the regression residuals to test the likelihood that a firm is in the extreme investment 
residual quartiles as a function of IC presence. Thus, the first cohort is considered to 
engage in underinvestment while the fourth cohort is considered to engage in 
overinvestment. This specification considers the middle quartiles to be the model 
benchmark. In particular, we follow Biddle & Hilary (2006), Richardson (2006), 
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Biddle et al. (2009), and F. Chen et al. (2011) in measuring investment efficiency 
based on the degree to which it deviates from an expected investment level (see 
Equation 1). 
 
Table 19 reports the OLS estimates on the association between the existence of an IC 
and investment efficiency. We test whether a firm’s investment efficiency is 
associated with the existence of an IC using two models of investment efficiency. 
Table 19 shows that the coefficient of IC_D is negative and statistically significant for 
all investment efficiency estimates. These results provide support for H1. In Model 1 
that deals with under-investment, we find that the coefficient of 0.9459 is negative 
and significant at p<0.05. Similarly, in Model 1 that deals with overinvestment, we 
find that the coefficient of 1.0502 is negative and significant p<0.01. Economically, 
with use of Model 1 that employs a multinomial logit model, the odds of under-
investment and over-investment relative to the benchmark groups are 61% and 65% 
lower respectively with adoption of an IC.72 In Model 2 which employs a logistic 
model, we find that the coefficient for both under- and over- investment are negative 
and significant at p<0.01. Economically, the odds of under-investment and over-
investment using Model 2 are 24% and 12% lower respectively on adoption of an IC. 
Using Model 2 of investment efficiency, we can also explain the economic effect as 
one where we find a 0.222 million per firm-year reduction in underinvestment for 
firms with an IC and a 0.940 million per firm-year reduction in overinvestment for 
firms with an IC73. 
Several of our control variables are significantly associated with each of the 
models of investment efficiency including SIZE, BM, InstitOwn, LOSS, TANG, 
Firm_CG, and AGE. These control variables are negatively associated with both over- 
and underinvestment. Firm leverage and dividend payout are positively and 
significantly associated with both over- and underinvestment which is consistent with 
our expectations and the findings of prior research (Biddle et al., 2009; F. Chen et al., 
2011; R. Chen et al., 2014; Xu, Xu, & Yuan, 2013). We also find that the adjusted R-
squares in all models range from 31% to 61%.  
                                                     
72 Calculated as the exponential of the regression coefficients -0.9459 and -1.052 minus 1 in both cases. 
For an interpretation of logistic regression coefficients, see Taplin (2016). 
73 The economic effect is calculated as the mean value of under (over) investment 0.848 (0.731) x 
mean of PPE $ 956.25 million x IC coefficient-0.2746(-0.1350). This is equal to .222 (0.94) million per 
firm-year.  
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In summary, our regression results are consistent with the argument that the 
existence of an IC reduces information asymmetry and limits managerial 
opportunistic behavior related to participation in value-destroying investments. In 
particular, ICs appear to align firms’ investment activities with best practice policies 
and the monitoring of firms’ investments. Specifically, ICs’ are likely to provide 
expert advice regarding which investments firms’ should pursue and will monitor the 
quantum and types of investments of those firms. The results reflect that the existence 
of an IC is likely to reduce the likelihood of both under- and overinvestment. 
 
 
Table 19: Association between ICs and Investment Efficiency 
  Model 1   Model 2 
  
Under-
Investment 
Over-
Investment 
Under-
Investment 
Over-
Investment 
IC_D -0.9459    -1.0502    -0.2746 -0.1350 
(-2.03)**  (-2.93)*** (-3.77)*** (-3.04)*** 
SIZE -1.0475    1.1945    0.0235 0.0281 
(-5.74)*** (6.85)*** (0.87) (1.40) 
BM -0.1549    0.0233    0.0025 -0.0145 
(-1.39)    (0.25)    (0.23) (-1.35) 
CFO 0.3078    0.1707    0.1933 0.2451 
(0.66)    (0.37)    (2.90)*** (2.92)*** 
InstitOwn -1.1954    -0.4298    0.2971 0.0039 
(-1.41)    (-0.94)    (3.75)*** (0.05) 
SLACK 0.0153    0.0208    -0.0048 -0.0079 
(1.06)    (1.70)*   (-2.60)*** (-5.71)*** 
LOSS -0.3400    0.8431    0.0146 0.2635 
(-0.34)    (1.60)    (0.14) (2.31)** 
ROA 0.0394    0.0604    -0.0183 0.0074 
(0.93)    (1.57)    (-3.35)*** (1.46) 
LEV 0.0318    0.0226    -0.0029 -0.0003 
(3.54)*** (2.86)*** (-2.34)** (-0.19) 
TANG -0.1845    0.1004    0.0379 0.0156 
(-3.38)*** (1.56)    (5.25)*** (1.46) 
DIV 0.7691    0.4667    0.0914 0.1465 
(1.89)*   (1.75)*   (2.04)** (3.31)*** 
Firm_CG -0.2773    -0.1647    0.1411 -0.0878 
(-0.36)    (-0.29)    (1.56) (-1.16) 
AGE -0.2184    -0.2352    -0.0018 0.0010 
(-0.76)    (-1.40)    (-0.04) (0.04) 
Intercept -0.1226    -7.6604    0.3806 0.6163 
(-0.06)    (-5.38)*** (1.92)* (3.46)*** 
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
IND YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY YES YES YES YES 
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N 960 455 534 
Adj-R   0.612      0.310 0.339 
 
 
 IC characteristics and investment efficiency 
We then examine the association between IC experience (IC_EXP) and firm 
investment efficiency. The results are provided in Table 20. The coefficients of the 
association between IC_ EXP and under- and overinvestment are negative and 
statistically significant at p<0.01. Similarly, in Model 1 that deals with 
overinvestment, we find that the coefficient of 0.6403 is negative and significant at 
p<0.01. Economically, the odds of under-investment and over-investment relative to 
the benchmark groups using Model 1 are 71% and 47% lower respectively with 
existence of an experienced member in the investment committee (IC_EXP). In 
Model 2, we also find both the coefficient for under and over-investment are negative 
and significant at p<0.01. Economically, the odds of under-investment and over-
investment using Model 2 are 22% and 10% lower respectively with the existence of 
an experienced member on the investment committee (IC_EXP). Alternatively, the 
regression coefficients in Model 2 indicate that a 0.201 million per firm-year 
reduction in underinvestment for the firm with IC_ EXP and a 0.71 million per firm-
year reduction in overinvestment for the firm with IC_ EXP at p< 0.05 or better. 
These results provide support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b and are consistent with the 
findings of Biddle et al. (2009) and Cheng et al. (2013). The presence of more expert 
and qualified directors on an IC reduces managerial opportunistic behavior relating to 
firms’ investments.  
We also disaggregate IC_EXP into its four components: a) the natural 
logarithm of the number of directors in the IC with CFO experience; b) the natural 
logarithm of the number of directors with investment experience; c) the natural 
logarithm of the number of directors in the IC with experience as a chairperson; and 
d) the natural logarithm of the number of directors with experience as a CEO. We 
incorporate each of these four governance items in Models 1 and 2. In both models, 
we find results (untabulated for the sake of brevity) that are consistent with our main 
model results in that each of these IC governance items reduces under- and 
overinvestment at p < 0.10 or better. 
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We also assess whether other characteristics of ICs, such as membership with 
CPA, CFA, CIM, ACCA, IC size (IC_Size) and the frequency of IC meetings per 
year, affect investment efficiency. Untabulated results provide evidence that each of 
these additional IC characteristics reduces a firm’s levels of under- and 
overinvestment. For example, for IC size, we find74 negative coefficients for Model 1, 
with over- and underinvestment coefficients being 0.612 and 0.792, respectively. The 
coefficients for Model 2 for over- and underinvestment are 0.0886 and 0.2582, 
respectively. All of these coefficient figures are significant at p<0.01.75 Untabulated 
results also show consistent effects for IC member qualification. For instance, the 
coefficient values from Model 1 for over- and underinvestment are 0.2531 and 
2.7939, respectively, and those for Model 2 are 0.2146 and 0.2927, respectively. This 
pattern of results suggests that higher numbers of qualified directors on an IC provide 
better monitoring with flow-on implications in terms of protecting firms’ investments 
and ultimately shareholders’ wealth.  
Table 20: Association between ICs Experience and Investment Efficiency 
  Model 1   Model 2 
  Under-Investment 
Over-
Investment   
Under-
Investment 
Over-
Investment 
IC_EXP -1.2561 -0.6403 -0.2482 -0.1021 
(-3.62)*** (-2.72)*** (-3.72)*** (-3.26)*** 
SIZE -1.1478 1.1728 0.02 0.0235 
(-5.83)*** (6.98)*** -0.74 -1.17 
BM -0.1626 0.0362 0.0019 -0.015 
(-1.46)    -0.39 -0.17 (-1.42) 
CFO 0.1353 0.0843 0.1805 0.2417 
-0.26 -0.19 (2.70)*** (2.84)*** 
InstitOwn -1.638 -0.4775 0.2428 0.0076 
(-1.87)*   (-1.04)    (3.00)*** -0.1 
SLACK 0.0231 0.0221 -0.0039 -0.0079 
(1.67)*   (1.85)*   (-1.85)* (-5.70)*** 
LOSS -0.5001 0.8306 0.0064 0.2679 
(-0.45)    -1.6 -0.06 (2.37)** 
ROA 0.0518 0.0644 -0.0182 0.0085 
-1.19 (1.70)*   (-3.22)*** (1.68)* 
                                                     
74 Results are not provided for brevity. 
75 We also run a dummy variable for the number of directors on an IC and find that the results are 
convex. From one to five directors, our results are consistent, with negative and significant coefficients. 
With six to seven directors, the coefficients are not significant, and with eight or more directors, the 
underinvestment coefficient becomes positive. These results confirm the findings of the literature on 
optimal committee sizes (Petra & Dorata, 2008; Sun & Cahan, 2009; Yermak, 1996). 
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LEV 0.0327 0.0235 -0.0031 0 
(3.54)*** (2.99)*** (-2.52)** -0.01 
TANG -0.2156 0.0979 0.0349 0.0153 
(-3.75)*** -1.52 (4.83)*** -1.43 
DIV 0.7009 0.498 0.0852 0.1476 
(1.71)*   (1.89)*   (1.91)* (3.33)*** 
Firm_CG -0.637 -0.1703 0.096 -0.1087 
(-0.81)    (-0.30)    -1.06 (-1.44) 
AGE -0.2498 -0.2892 -0.0155 0.0003 
(-0.82)    (-1.72)*   (-0.34) -0.01 
Intercept 0.9127 -7.5026 0.4859 0.6583 
-0.45 (-5.33)*** (2.40)** (3.66)*** 
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
IND YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY YES YES YES YES 
N 960 455 534 
Adj-R 0.614   0.309 0.341 
4.4.6 Additional analysis 
 Effects of foreign ownership on investment efficiency 
ICs help to establish firms’ investment policies and objectives (Ellis, 2011). 
Governance around firm investment strategies is affected by foreign ownership, as 
foreign owners are likely to ensure that practices are consistent with international 
norms and standards (Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, & Matos, 2011). Aggarwal et al. 
(2011) find that foreign investors are more likely to insist on higher standards of 
governance and protection of minority rights. Foreign investors also contribute to 
strategic decision making and assist in monitoring and disciplining management (e.g., 
G. Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006; Desender, Aguilera, Lópezpuertas-Lamy, & 
Crespi, 2014). Accordingly, foreign ownership in a firm can give investors the 
opportunity to monitor firms’ investment processes (Ellis, 2011; Hayes, Mehran, & 
Schaefer, 2004).  
Consistent with our expectations, regression results reported in Table 21 show 
that the existence of an IC significantly (at p < 0.01) reduces both under- and 
overinvestment when controlling for foreign ownership. These results also suggest 
that the effect of an IC in suppressing under- and overinvestment is more pronounced 
in firms with high foreign ownership concentrations (Desender et al., 2014). Foreign 
 125 
 
ownership appears to assist in monitoring boards and their committee activities, 
alleviating issues concerning moral hazard or adverse selection that can lead to 
investment inefficiency (Jensen, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). An IC can thus 
mitigate the risk of under- and overinvestment by firms with high foreign ownership 
concentrations compared with firms with lower levels of foreign ownership 
concentration (Desender et al., 2014).  
 
Table 21: Moderation effect of Foreign Ownership on the relation of IC_D and 
Investment Efficiency 
  Model 1   Mode 2 
  Under-Investment 
Over-
Investment   
Under-
Investment 
Over-
Investment 
IC_D -0.9237 -0.9857 -0.2364 -0.1291 
(-1.94)* (-2.77)*** (-3.23)*** (-2.70)*** 
ForOwn -0.0018 -0.2697 0.1792 0.0001 
(-0.16) (-0.80) -1.09 0.001 
IC_D * ForOwn -2.11 -3.9752 -0.8979 -4.3221 
(-9.09)*** (-12.57)*** (-3.53)*** (-2.25)** 
SIZE -1.05 1.1913 0.0176 0.0182 
(-5.76)*** (7.09)*** -0.65 -0.82 
BM -0.1504 0.0567 0.0009 -0.0146 
(-1.21) -0.59 -0.08 (-1.19) 
CFO 0.2922 0.1558 0.1848 0.2929 
-0.62 -0.34 (2.73)*** (2.07)** 
InstitOwn -1.1992 -0.4029 0.328 -0.0108 
(-1.40) (-0.89) (4.00)*** (-0.13) 
SLACK 0.0173 0.0235 -0.003 -0.0077 
-1.15 (1.90)* (-1.39) (-5.18)*** 
LOSS -0.3803 0.7547 0.0122 0.3264 
(-0.39) -1.46 -0.12 (1.85)* 
ROA 0.0371 0.0557 -0.0184 0.0052 
-0.86 -1.49 (-3.26)*** -0.88 
LEV 0.0324 0.0235 -0.0028 0.0002 
(3.57)*** (2.98)*** (-2.36)** -0.1 
TANG -0.1853 0.0905 0.0355 0.0095 
(-3.33)*** -1.3 (4.88)*** -0.79 
DIV 0.7723 0.4725 0.0943 0.1352 
(1.90)* (1.79)* (2.11)** (2.88)*** 
Firm_CG -0.3235 -0.2465 0.1301 -0.1435 
(-0.42) (-0.42) -1.42 (-1.69)* 
AGE -0.2198 -0.2623 -0.0029 -0.0031 
(-0.75) (-1.55) (-0.07) (-0.12) 
Intercept 0.0862 -7.1726 0.4293 0.795 
-0.04 (-4.80)*** (2.17)** (3.70)*** 
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
IND YES YES YES YES 
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COUNTRY YES YES YES YES 
N 960 455 534 
Adj-R 0.615   0.317 0.302 
 
 
4.4.7 Sensitivity analysis 
 Propensity score matching 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Armstrong, Blouin, & Larcker, 2012; Lennox, 
Lisowsky, & Pittman, 2013), we also use the propensity score matching (PSM) 
procedure as an additional endogeneity check of our baseline regression results (see 
Table 22). The PSM procedure comprises a logistic regression model with a set of 
firm characteristics from prior studies (e.g., Hines & Peters, 2015). We include board 
size (natural log of board size), leverage (total debt scaled by total assets), CEO tenure 
(natural log of number of years as a CEO), audit quality (which has a value of one if a 
firm is audited by at least one of the Big 4 and zero otherwise), and duality (if the 
firm’s CEO and chairman positions are combined) as independent variables in our 
logistic regression model.76 Importantly, the use of these variables ensures a proper 
balance between the treated and untreated subjects in the matched sample, which is 
one of the key elements of PSM (Austin, 2011).  
One important aspect of propensity score matching is to examine the 
distribution of measured baseline covariates between treated and untreated subjects 
within the propensity score matched sample. If, after conditioning on the propensity 
score, no systematic differences exist in the baseline covariates between treated and 
untreated subjects, the propensity score model has not been correctly specified 
(Austin, 2011). In Table 22, Panel A, none of the included covariates are significantly 
different between IC versus non-IC sub-samples, providing strong support for our 
estimation. 
We also use our main independent dummy variable, IC (coded as one if firms 
have adopted IC and zero otherwise), as the dependent variable in the logistic 
regression model to calculate the propensity scores. Using the predicted propensity 
                                                     
76 These variables are defined in Appendix IV. 
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scores from this logistic regression, we then match the observations in the treatment 
subjects (firm-year observations with IC equal to one) to the control subjects (firm-
year observations with IC equal to zero). We then combine the matched pairs into 
pooled samples (see Table 22) and perform our OLS regression analysis. 
The regression results for the PSM procedure are presented in Table 22. We 
find that the regression coefficient for IC is negatively and significantly associated 
with both under- and overinvestment across all regression model specifications (p < 
0.1 and better), so H1 is again supported by the empirical results. Finally, we find that 
the regression coefficients for almost all of the variables are statistically significant (p 
< 0.10 or better with predicted signs) in some of our regression models.77 
 
 
Table 22: Panel A: T-test for first stage Logit Model- Propensity Match Scoring 
(PSM). 
  Means test        
  IC D IC D Difference  t-value 
Board Size 7.8149 7.922 -0.1071  -0.889 
Leverage  .27956 .1624 0.11716  1.0569 
CEO Tenure 3.0937 3.223 -0.1293 -0.9514 
Audit Q .6955 .6525 0.043 1.3723 
Duality .0554 .06425 -0.00885 -0.5474 
 
 
Table 22 Panel B: Association between ICs and Investment Efficiency using PSM 
based on Nearest Neighbor   
  Model 1   Model 2 
  
Under-
Investment 
Over-
Investment   
Under-
Investment 
Over-
Investment 
IC_D -0.8764    -1.0011    -0.1411 -0.1422 
(-2.53)**  (-2.11)**  (-1.60) (-2.62)*** 
SIZE 1.2092    -1.0600    0.0640 0.0317 
(6.83)*** (-5.64)*** (2.05)** (1.27) 
BM 0.0471    -0.1695    0.0291 -0.0075 
(0.50)    (-1.49)    (1.72)* (-0.63) 
CFO 0.0734    0.0750    0.2529 0.2008 
(0.16)    (0.14)    (3.47)*** (2.23)** 
InstitOwn -0.1852    -0.7241    0.3666 -0.0853 
(-0.38)    (-0.85)    (4.24)*** (-1.08) 
                                                     
77 We follow prior research (e.g., Austin, 2011; Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1997) and rely on the 
nearest-neighbor approach (with replacement) to perform the matching process. This approach 
specifically matches a single control firm according to the closest propensity score (Austin, 2011; 
Heckman et al., 1997). In untabulated results, we also use the kernel and radius (at the 1% level) 
matching methods, which provide qualitatively similar results. 
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SLACK 0.0224    0.0143    -0.0056 -0.0077 
(1.78)*   (1.01)    (-1.97)** (-4.66)*** 
LOSS 0.8069    -0.4051    0.1172 0.1573 
(1.45)    (-0.42)    (1.10) (1.36) 
ROA 0.0543    0.0481    -0.0203 0.0037 
(1.39)    (1.09)    (-3.19)*** (0.63) 
LEV 0.0247    0.0332    -0.0055 0.0003 
(3.16)*** (3.59)*** (-4.28)*** (0.12) 
TANG 0.1060    -0.1912    0.0524 0.0227 
(1.62)    (-3.37)*** (5.91)*** (1.21) 
DIV 0.4876    0.7293    0.0415 0.1178 
(1.77)*   (1.85)*   (0.81) (2.27)** 
Firm_CG -0.4423    -0.6306    0.1299 -0.1493 
(-0.74)    (-0.79)    (1.26) (-1.85)* 
AGE 0.1556    0.0476    0.0609 0.0409 
(0.63)    (0.14)  (1.37) (1.04) 
Intercept  -1.4294   -9.0623    0.1615 0.2465 
     (-0.63)    (-5.30)*** (0.65) (1.20) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
IND YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY YES YES YES YES 
N 920 319 374 
Adj-R   0.608     0.403 0.360 
 
 Blundel–Bond general methods of moments (GMM) regression analysis 
As another endogeneity check of our baseline regression results reported in Table 23, 
we use the Blundell–Bond general methods of moments (GMM) regression analysis 
to more accurately control for potential time-invariant correlated omitted variables in 
our study (Kubick & Masli, 2016; Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012). To estimate the 
system GMM, we treat the lagged dependent variable and the under- and 
overinvestment as endogenous variables. The results of the Blundell–Bond GMM 
regression analysis are reported in Table 23. 
Table 23 shows that the regression coefficient for IC is negatively and 
significantly associated with the under- and overinvestment proxies across all of the 
regression model specifications (p<0.1 and better). Hence, these particular sets of 
results provide additional support for H1. We also observe that some of the regression 
coefficients for the control variables are significantly associated with under- and 
overinvestment in our regression models, including SIZE, CFO, IO, SLACK, LOSS, 
ROA, LEV, TANG, DIV, and Firm_CG (p < 0.10 or better with predicted signs). We 
conduct several post-estimation tests, as shown in Table 23, and the results indicate 
 129 
 
that the measures of autocorrelations (1) and (2) confirm the existence of first-order 
but not second-order autocorrelations. The Hansen test confirms that the relations are 
not endogenous and that the instruments used are valid. 
 
 
 
Table 23: Association between ICs and Investment Efficiency using (GMM) 
  Model 1   Model 2 
  Under-Investment 
Over-
Investment   
Under-
Investment 
Over-
Investment 
L. Investment -0.4968 -0.328 -0.1849 -0.0536 
(-2.83)*** (-2.50)**  (-2.52)** (-1.80)*   
IC_D -0.4176 -0.2881 -0.5026 -0.1478 
(-2.25)**  (-1.82)*   (-4.54)*** (-2.21)**  
SIZE 0.2169 0.161 -0.0285 0.03 
(2.85)*** (2.52)**  (-0.67) -1.56 
BM -0.0102 -0.0021 0.008 -0.0066 
(-0.36)    (-0.08)    -0.87 (-0.77)    
CFO 0.3793 0.3533 0.1736 0.1587 
(2.94)*** (2.87)*** (4.01)*** (4.40)*** 
InstitOwn 0.1077 0.0779 0.458 0.0486 
-0.79 -0.63 (4.59)*** -0.57 
SLACK -0.0055 -0.004 -0.0029 -0.0074 
(-0.89)    (-0.79)    (-1.54) (-7.41)*** 
LOSS 0.2877 0.3768 0.0628 0.1151 
(1.75)*   (2.60)*** -1.07 -1.63 
ROA -0.0163 -0.011 -0.0179 0.0074 
(-1.15)    (-0.88)    (-3.19)*** (1.78)*   
LEV -0.0028 -0.0017 -0.0016 0.0007 
(-0.66)    (-0.49)    (-1.11) -0.45 
TANG 0.1176 0.0561 0.0414 0.0161 
-1.11 -0.64 (4.05)*** (3.71)*** 
DIV -0.012 0.0122 0.0764 0.0695 
(-0.14)    -0.15 (2.35)** (2.62)*** 
Firm_CG -0.2606 -0.0194 0.1663 -0.1651 
(-1.04)    (-0.08)    (1.90)* (-2.96)*** 
AGE -0.0543 -0.0296 0.0532 0.0298 
(-1.08)    (-0.72)    -0.75 -1.2 
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
IND YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY YES YES YES YES 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 0.016 0.103 0.034 0.095 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.298 0.424 0.125 0.375 
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Hansen test of overid. restrictions: 0.152 0.106   0.37 0.097 
System GMM regressions of investment efficiency, over- and under-investment on the IC_D. All 
variables are measured as defined in APPENDIX IV . w use lags ** to ** of the changes in investment 
efficiency, and lags *** and *** of the changes in the IC_D. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for the first and 
second order autocorrelations under the null of no autocorrelation. The ‘Hansen test ’ is a test of the 
validity of the instruments used under the null that the instruments used are exogenous and valid.  All 
functions include eyear, industry and country dummies. t-statistics are reported in parentheses next to 
each coefficient.  
 
 Fama–MacBeth (1973) two-step procedure 
Another robustness check of our baseline regression results (see Table 19) considers 
the issue of serial dependence in our data, as IC and under- and overinvestment may 
remain fairly constant over the 2005–2013 period. We estimate our regression model 
in Equation (2) using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) two-step procedure. In particular, 
we drop the year dummy variables from our regression model and estimate the 
revised regression model by year and then test the statistical significance of the 
averaged coefficients using a t-test.78 
Untabulated regression results for the Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimation 
method show that the regression coefficient for IC is negatively and significantly 
associated with under- and overinvestment across all regression model specifications 
(p<0.01), so H1 is again supported by the empirical results. Finally, we observe that 
the regression coefficients for most of the control variables are statistically significant 
(p<0.10 or better with predicted signs) in a number of our regression models. 
 Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression analysis 
Our baseline regression results (see Table 19) may be affected by endogeneity (i.e., 
simultaneity and/or reverse causality), leading to biased regression coefficient 
estimates. Thus, as our first robustness check, we perform an instrumental variable 
(2SLS) regression analysis (e.g.,  Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Wooldridge, 2010). In 
the first-stage regression model, we include two instrumental variables (IVs) to 
capture IC formation: mean ICs based on the country, industry, and size of the board’s 
executive committee. In accordance with prior research (e.g., Al-Hadi, Hasan, Taylor, 
                                                     
78 As Fama and French (2001), we estimate the regression models year by year and report the average 
coefficients for the independent and control variables. The t-statistics are computed based on the time-
series standard deviations of the regression coefficients. 
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et al., 2016; Hasan, Hossain, & Habib, 2015; Jha & Cox, 2015), country and industry 
are likely to be determinants of whether firms adopt an IC, while firms that establish 
board executive committees are less likely to adopt ICs. Executive committees are 
usually formed to control and monitor a firm’s investment process and decisions and 
are typically involved in the firm’s daily operations (Aurell, 1964; Sherman, Kashlak, 
& Joshi, 1998). Thus, we expect a negative association between the size of the 
executive committee and ICs. 
The first-stage regression model used to predict investment committee use is 
estimated as follows: 
IC_D it = α0it + β1 ICCIMeanit + β2 ExCom_Size it + β3-11 CONTROLS + β12-21 
INDit + β22-30 YEAR it + β30-36 Countryit + εit                                         
Equation                                                                                                                    (3) 
where ICCIMean is the mean value of the ICs in each country and industry, 
ExCom_Size is the natural log of the number of directors on the executive committee, 
and CONTROLS is a vector of the control variables from Equation (2).  
Consistent with our expectations, the results of the first-stage regression model 
reported in Table 24 (Panel A) show that the regression coefficients for ICCIMean 
and IC are positively and significantly associated (p < 0.01) and that those between 
ExCom_Size and IC are negative and insignificant. We also test the suitability of our 
IVs by computing several post-estimation tests (see Table 24, Panel B). First, we 
compute the under-identification test. We find that the Anderson LM statistic is 
significant (p < 0.01) in all of the regression model specifications (Models 1 and 2), 
so our IVs (ICCIMean and ExCom_Size) are relevant. Second, we calculate the weak 
identification test and observe that the Cragg–Donald Wald F statistic for each 
regression model specification (Models 1 and 2) is above the (Stock & Yogo, 2002) 
critical value of 19.93 (based on a 10% maximal IV size), so weak IVs are not a 
concern for our regression estimates. Third, we compute the over-identification test 
and find that the Sargan statistic is not significant, which indicates that our IVs are not 
over-identified and are thus satisfactory. Finally, we conduct the (Hausman, 1978) test 
for endogeneity and find that it generally rejects the exogeneity of the IVs (p < 0.10 or 
less with the exception of overinvestment in Model 2), indicating that the 2SLS 
regression estimates are essentially preferable to the OLS regression estimates. 
Overall, we conclude that ICCIMean and ExCom_Size are plausible IVs that enhance 
the validity of the inferences in the second-stage regression specifications. 
 132 
 
For the second-stage regression model reported in Table 24 (Panel C), we find 
that the regression coefficient for ICs is negatively and significantly associated with 
investment efficiency across all of the regression model specifications (p < 0.05 or 
better), so H1 is again supported by our empirical results. Finally, we observe that the 
regression coefficients for most of the control variables are statistically significant (p 
< 0.10 or better with predicted signs) in a number of our regression models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 24: Association between ICs and Investment Efficiency using 2SLS. 
Panel A: First-stage regression model 
Model 1   Model 2 
Variables Pred. sign 
Under-
Investment 
Over-
Investment 
Under-
Investment 
Over-
Investment 
Intercept ? -0.0999 -3.2660***   0.4518 0.4785**  
(-0.20) (-5.32) (1.03) (2.33)    
ICCIMean + .7077*** .92633*** 1.3109***  2.4075*** 
(3.37) (3.90) (6.50) (2.94) 
ExCom_Size - - - -.0575 .129011 
- - (-0.57) (1.00) 
CONTROLS ? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IND ? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes 
COUNTRY ? Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Panel B: Post-
estimation tests   Model 1   Model 2 
Description   
Under-
Investment 
Over-
Investment   
Under-
Investment 
Over-
Investment 
1.Under-
identification test      
Anderson LM statistic - - 38.54 42.498 
p-value - - 0 0.000 
2. Weak 
identification test      
Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic - -  19.443 21.601 
Stock-Yogo (2005) 
critical value - -  19.93 19.93 
Wald-p-value 
(ivprobit)   0.0008 0.0447       
3.Over-             
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identification test 
Sargan statistic 
[Amemiya-Lee-
Newey] 4.03 0.000  
0.74 0.059 
Chi-square p-value   [0.1184] [  0.2020]   0.3897 0.8088 
4. Hausman 
(1978) test      
Hausman statistic - - 26.458 1.214 
Chi-square p-value - - 0.000 0.2705 
Wald-test for ivprobit  17.88      2.99 - - 
 Prob > chi2   (0.000) (0.0880)   - - 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Panel C: Second-stage regression model 
Variables Pred. sign 
Under-
Investment 
Over-
Investment   
Under-
Investment 
Over-
Investment 
    
IC_D + -2.5716*** -1.5149*** -1.4908*** -0.2897**  
(-3.36) (-3.72)    (-4.87) (-1.99)    
SIZE – -0.1221* 0.3542*** -0.0325 0.0175    
(-1.76) (9.72)    (-0.91) (0.89)    
BM + -0.1275** 0.0029    -0.0022 -0.0095    
(-2.13) (0.10)    (-0.16) (-0.77)    
CFO + 0.2289 -0.2803*   0.2119*** 0.2972*** 
(1.00) (-1.82)    (3.05) (4.16)    
InstitOwn + -0.7349** 0.1108    0.2422** -0.0269    
(-2.09) (0.57)    (2.48) (-0.34)    
SLACK + 0.0101 0.0086*   0.0085** -0.0073*** 
(1.33) (1.82)    (2.08) (-4.78)    
LOSS – -0.4639 -0.1447    -0.0844 0.1742*   
(-1.19) (-0.58)    (-0.76) (1.71)    
ROA + 0.0066 -0.0016    -0.0318*** 0.0042    
(0.31) (-0.11)    (-4.21) (0.92)    
LEV + -0.0104** -0.0044    -0.0041*** 0.0012    
(-2.04) (-1.52)    (-2.85) (0.73)    
TANG + -0.0285 -0.0155    0.0259*** 0.0145**  
(-1.20) (-0.64)    (3.19) (2.00)    
DIV + 1.4755*** 0.2655    0.0543 0.1319*** 
(3.09) (0.89)    (0.93) (3.14)    
Firm_CG ? -0.1506 -0.3192*   0.1425 -0.1029    
? (-0.40) (-1.68)    (1.17) (-1.28)    
AGE -0.3521** -0.0523    0.0853 0.0589*   
(-2.10) (-0.88)    (1.57) (1.91)    
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Intercept 1.8949** -2.3177*** 0.4518 0.4785**  
    (2.05) (-6.20)      (1.03) (2.33)    
 
 
 Alternative models of investment efficiency 
To mitigate possible concerns over measurement error, we use two other models for 
the investment efficiency shown in Table 25. In Model 3, we follow Eisdorfer, 
Giaccotto, and White (2013) and categorize firms into an underinvestment group if 
their investment is lower than the median industry investment in year t and into an 
overinvestment group if their investment is higher than the median industry 
investment in year t. Under-Invest_D is equal to one if the firm underinvests and zero 
otherwise, while Over -Invest_D is equal to one if the firm overinvests and zero 
otherwise.79 Second, we follow a model adopted by (Al-Hadi, Hasan, Taylor, et al., 
2016) that uses the absolute value of the residual model of (Biddle et al., 2009) in 
Equation (1). The results in Table 25 show consistent evidence that ICs reduce both 
under- and overinvestment by firms, which is consistent with our results in Table 19. 
 
Table 25: Alternative measures of investment efficiency  
  Model 3 Model 4 
  
Under- 
Investment 
Over- 
Investment Absolute 
IC_D -0.0957 -0.0864 -0.6296    
(-2.13)** (-2.00)** (-3.39)*** 
SIZE 0.0341 0.0000 1.4552    
(1.90)* (0.00) (6.12)*** 
BM -0.0029 0.0018 -0.0891    
(-0.29) (0.20) (-2.00)**  
CFO -0.0547 0.2600 0.3792    
(-0.97) (4.29)*** (1.30)    
InstitOwn -0.0459 0.1143 -0.4335    
(-0.56) (1.97)** (-1.29)    
SLACK -0.0041 -0.0066 0.0179    
(-3.06)*** (-4.97)*** (2.02)**  
LOSS 0.0210 0.2175 0.0633    
(0.21) (2.40)** (0.15)    
ROA 0.0009 -0.0036 -0.0730    
(0.19) (-0.84) (-2.99)*** 
                                                     
79 We follow the procedure from a study by (Eisdorfer et al., 2013) to determine whether firms’ 
investment levels deviate from their industry medians in a given year. Firms are considered to 
overinvest if their investment levels are higher than their industry median values and to underinvest if 
their investment levels are lower than their industry median values. 
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LEV -0.0019 -0.0030 -0.0143    
(-1.19) (-3.51)*** (-2.22)**  
TANG 0.0102 0.0262 0.2526    
(1.17) (4.84)*** (5.60)*** 
DIV 0.0160 0.0869 -0.0657    
(0.40) (2.31)** (-0.30)    
Firm_CG -0.1450 0.0701 -0.4542    
(-1.77)* (1.05) (-1.26)    
AGE -0.0716 0.0517 -0.0818    
(-2.56)** (2.33)** (-0.52)    
Intercept 0.5364 0.6270 -5.4897    
(3.05)*** (3.76)*** (-3.82)*** 
YEAR YES YES YES 
IND YES YES YES 
COUNTRY YES YES YES 
N 351 624 960    
Adj-R 0.258 0.339 0.509   
 Additional analysis  
Although we conduct several tests to show that our results are not generated based on 
inconsistent or bias estimators or endogeneity, there is a potential endogeneity 
problem in our use of the independent variables. For instance, we use CFO, SLACK, 
TANG, and LEV to calculate the investment efficiency, and CFO may also affect the 
cash balance in the firms’ SLACK. We repeat our main analysis (Table 19) without 
these four variables, and un-tabulated results show that our results are consistent with 
our H1.80 
Finally, we also observe that our sample is concentrated on firms in Oman and 
Saudi Arabia (KSA). This can create sample bias. Although we explain in section 2.1 
how corporate governance characteristics differ among the GCC counties, we 
empirically repeat our main regression analysis by separating our sample into two 
groups: the first sample (sample 1) comprises only Oman and KSA firms while the 
second sample (sample 2) comprises firm sonly from the remaining countries (UAE, 
Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain). In both samples, we provide consistent results that 
demonstrate that an IC reduces both under-over investment. For instance, un-tabulated 
results using Model 1 show that an IC of KSA and Oman firms (sample 1) reduces 
under (over)- investment by 0.9334 (0.9697) relative to the benchmark groups, 
significant at p<0.05. Using sample 2, the presence of an IC reduces under (over)- 
                                                     
80 The results are not included for brevity. 
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investment by 1.1384 (0.9613) relative to the benchmark groups, significant at p<0.1 
or better, using Model 1.  
 Conclusions 
We find that the existence of an IC reduces information asymmetry and suppresses 
the risk of managerial opportunistic behavior that may lead to value-destroying 
investment decisions. We add to the literature on investment management and 
corporate governance by examining how IC characteristics affect investment 
efficiency among GCC-based firms. We show that the financial experience of IC 
members significantly reduces over- and underinvestment. 
The GCC countries provide an ideal setting in which to examine the role of 
ICs and their effects on investment efficiency, as it is likely that agency and 
information asymmetry problems are entrenched in these countries. In particular, the 
GCC countries have experienced the rapid development of corporate governance 
codes, regulations, capital markets, and international trade over the past 15 years, 
which has affected the establishment and reliance on specialized committees such as 
ICs. Recent regulations of GCC firms have enabled significant progress toward the 
establishment of more independent boards of directors and the formation of 
specialized committees to provide firm oversight. We contribute to the investment 
decision and governance literature by showing that ICs assist firms with mitigating 
the risks of both under- and overinvestment, thereby improving investment efficiency. 
Our findings can be extend to other emerging markets and to Middle East, and North 
Africa. They also share similar features such as their political regimes and that follow 
the application of similar governance structure of OECD. Further work could examine 
the relations between investment efficiency, information asymmetry, and firm value 
in the GCC. Additionally, the roles of ruling family directors and government 
ownership could be examined in relation to the establishment of specialized board 
committees, including ICs and committees on risk, remuneration, and CSR. Such 
studies would be important in the context of the GCC given the rapid evolution of 
governance structures and capital markets in those countries. 
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Appendix IV  
  Variable Definitions and Measurement 
Variables  Definition and Measurement 
Dependent Variable 
Investment 
Models  
Model 1 
 
 
= 
  
We follow Biddle et al. 2009 by first estimating a firm specific 
model of investment as a function of growth opportunities (as 
measured by sales growth) and use the residuals as a firm 
specific proxy for deviations from expected investment. 
Investment i, t+1  = b0 + b1  Sales Growth i,t +  ei, t+1  
(Equation 1) 
Firms then classified based on the magnitude of the residuals 
(i.e., deviations from predicted investment) and use these groups 
as the dependent variable. Specifically, we sort firms based on 
the residuals from Equation (above) into quartiles. Firm-year 
observations in the bottom quartile (i.e., the most negative 
residuals) are classified as under-investing, observations in the 
top quartile (i.e., the most positive residuals) are classified as 
over-investing, and observations in the middle two quartiles are 
classified as the benchmark group. We estimate a multinomial 
logit model that predicts the likelihood that a firm will be in one 
of the extreme quartiles as opposed to the middle quartiles. 
 
Model 2 = Using C. Chen et al. (2012), firms are grouped into deciles based 
on firm’ cash balance 0.1 (lowest) to 1 (highest), and leverage 1 
(highest) to 0.1 (lowest). Then, firms with less than median 
decile value are denoted as under investment group (Investment 
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(under). 
While firms with more than the median decile value are more 
denoted as over-investment group (Investment (Over). So based 
on Model 1: Over-Invest_D is equal to 1 if over-investment 
otherwise, zero, Under-Invest-D equal to 1 if firms are under 
investment, otherwise 0. 
Independent variable:  
IC_D = 1 if a firm adopt specialized Investment Committee, otherwise 0. 
   
IC_EXP = Natural logarithm of number of directors with CFO or 
investment or chairman or CEO experience. If an IC director has 
any of these experience categories, that director is scored as 1. 
We then sum the number of IC directors with any of these 
experience categories and take the natural log of that value 
(IC_EXP). As an example, OOMS (Oman Oil marketing 
Company) has an IC comprising four directors with one director 
with CEO experience, 0 directors with CFO experience, 1 
director with investment experience, and 1 director with 
chairman experience in the 2009 year. The scoring of experience 
for each director is mutually exclusive-in other words a director 
is scored as 1 if it has experience in at least one of the four 
categories of experience, otherwise 0. 
 
Control 
Variable  
  
SIZE = Natural Log. of total assets. 
BM =   Book value scaled by market value of firms. 
CFO = Cash from Operation scaled to total assets. 
InstitOwn = Institutional Ownership% 
SLACK = Total Cash and short-term investment scaled by total assets. 
ROA = Return on Assets as profitability measure. 
LEV = Total long-term and short-term scaled to total assets  
TANG =  Net Property, Plant and Equipment scaled by total assets. 
DIV = 1 if a firm has paid dividend, otherwise 0. 
Firm CG = Index of CG using Al-Hadi et al. 2015 
AGE =  Natural log. of firms’ age calculated as the difference between 
the establishment date and current year. 
ForOwn = The percentage of firm shares held by foreign investors. 
All continuous variables are winsorized (reset) at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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Appendix V 
The GCC Corporate Governance Codes and board Committees provisions.  
Description OMN KSA BAH UAE KUW QTR 
Compliance 
with 
corporate 
governance 
codes 
Mandatory Mandatory Comply/ 
Explain 
Mandatory Mandatory 
from 2016  
Comply/ 
Explain 
Date of 
issuance of 
corporate 
governance 
codes 
2002* 2006 2011 2007 2013 2009 
Corporate 
governance 
codes 
provide 
separate 
section 
concerning 
the 
provisions of 
board 
committees 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Specialized 
committee 
Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary - Voluntary Voluntary 
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formation 
Specialized 
committee 
formation: 
Under board 
or 
management  
Board Board Board - Board Board 
Provisions 
provide clear 
instructions 
regarding  
reason, 
formatting, 
names of 
committee 
members, 
duties, rights 
and 
obligations 
of 
specialized 
board 
committees  
Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes 
Provision 
regarding the 
number of an 
independent 
directors on 
the board 
committees  
Majority - Majority Majority - - 
Evaluation 
of 
specialized 
committee 
Yearly Periodically Yearly - Periodically - 
*Corporate governance codes for Omani public listed firms have been updated in 
December, 2016. 
Source: the GCC Corporate Governance Codes  
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Investment committee, corporate cash holdings and corporate life 
cycle 
 
 Introduction 
Large cash holdings by corporations have aroused significant interest among 
researchers and public alike. A recent article by New York Times magazine ponders 
over “why are corporations hoarding trillions?”81 The article suggests that American 
businesses collectively hold $1.9 trillion in cash. In this context, some important 
questions that arise from this article are: first, what factors influence the cash holding 
by corporations in US and globally? And second whether these cash holdings vary 
during the corporations’ life cycles?       
Earlier research has widely addressed the first question mainly two different 
perspectives. The first view is from investment perspective (e.g., investment 
opportunities, financial distress and constraint, cash-investment sensitivity). For 
instance, Kaplan & Zingales (1997) find that firms classified as less financially 
                                                     
81 https://www nytimes.com/2016/01/24/magazine/why-are-corporations-hoarding-trillions html?_r=0 
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constrained actually exhibit greater investment-cash flow sensitivity. However, 
Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach (2004) show that the cash flow sensitivity is positive 
for financially constrained firms, but statistically insignificant for financially 
unconstrained firms. The second view is based on agency cost and corporate 
governance paradigm. For example, Harford, Mansi, & Maxwell (2008) show that 
firms with weaker corporate governance structures have smaller cash reserves. 
Similarly, Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007) show that better governed firms not only 
have large cash holdings but also the value of cash reserves is higher for those firms.82 
In both strands of literature, however, (i.e., investment and corporate 
governance), scholars have alluded to life cycle effects on corporate cash holdings. 
For instance, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson (1999) show that firms with 
strong growth opportunities and riskier cash flows hold relatively high ratios of cash 
to total non-cash assets. Denis & Sibilkov (2010) argue that greater cash holdings 
allow firms that experience external financial constraints to avoid underinvestment 
and reduced growth. However,  Chen (2008b) argues that investors are assertive 
regarding their cash in firms with abundance investment opportunities only if 
effective corporate governance protects their interests. Particularly, some specialized 
and effective monitoring’s board-level committee can enhance shareholders wealth-
maximization. For instance, the establishment of a specialized IC allows committee 
members to focus primarily on monitoring managerial investment decisions and 
requires managers to provide them with better quality reporting on investment 
projects (Ellis, 2011).  
In this paper, mainly we investigate the second question, that we investigate 
the interplay effects between corporate governance (IC), firm life cycle and corporate 
cash holdings. Explicitly, we examine the effects of board’s Investment Committee 
(thereafter IC) on cash holdings over the life cycle of public firms of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.83  
                                                     
82 Their findings indicate that while $1.00 of cash in a poorly governed firm is valued at only $0.42 to 
$0.88, good governance approximately doubles this value. 
83 GCC countries constitute Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain. These countries have experienced unprecedented economic growth in 
the last decade. Their collective equity market capitalization stood at $954 billion in 2014. For more 
information, please see http://www khaleejtimes.com/business/markets/gcc-market-cap-shrinks-in-
2015. 
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 Literature review and hypotheses development  
Most of the underpinnings for the existing literature on cash holding come from two 
main theories; pecking order theory and the free cash flow theory. The pecking order 
theory of (Myers & Majluf, 1984) suggests that firms finance their investments first 
from their retained earnings, second from debt and finally from equity. Building on 
the same notion, financing hierarchy theory suggests that firms will hold more cash 
when there are valuable investment opportunities. This implies that firms’ cash 
holding needs vary over the firms’ life cycles. However, the free cash flow theory of 
(Jensen, 1986) suggests that managers have incentives to increase the amount of cash 
for ‘empire building’. Building on the “agency cost” paradigm, this theory postulates 
that managers have incentives to cause the firms to grow beyond the optimal level as 
this creates managerial powers and increased compensation (Jensen, 1986). The 
dichotomous implications of both theories makes the interplay of corporate 
governance mechanism and firms’ life cycle important in the analysis of cash 
holdings.   
The existing research on the cash holdings has exploited both arguments. For 
example, consistent with financing hierarchy theory of cash holding, Opler et al. 
(1999), Boyle & Guthrie (2003) argue that holding a high level of cash is necessary 
for potential investments, so the need of cash may depend on capital needs for 
investment opportunities. Similarly, Drobetz, Halling, & Schröder (2015) find that 
firms’ need for cash holdings vary over the different life-cycle stages. They show that 
while firms in early stages and post-maturity stages hold large amounts of cash, cash 
ratios decrease when firms move towards maturity.  However, Chen (2008a) argues 
that investors are confident regarding their cash in firms with abundance investment 
opportunities, only if effective corporate governance protects their interests. He 
documents that the impact of effective corporate governance on cash holdings will be 
negative for firms with limited investment opportunities (such as old firms), and 
positive for firms with abundance investment opportunities (such as newly listed 
firms). 
Chen & Chuang (2009) assume product life cycle and a dynamic investment 
environment are important considerations as well. For instance, high-tech firms are 
usually smaller, younger, and face stronger competition than traditional firms 
(Carpenter & Petersen, 2002). To maintain hard-earned competitive advantages, high-
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tech firms devote capital resources to risky investments and thus are often barely able 
to distribute cash to shareholders. As a result, these firms have to generate funds from 
either retained earnings or negotiated financiers. Because the potential return on risky 
investments is high for high-tech firms (Wasserman, 1988), without sufficient funds 
for capital investments, shareholders may suffer when firms pass up value-increasing 
investments. In these situations, whether to accept high levels of cash holdings 
becomes a trade-off for shareholders. To ensure that corporate funds are spent 
appropriately, investors may create contractual agreements such as the establishment 
of investment and risk committees (Van Den Berghe & Levrau, 2002). Thus, 
investors can actively rely on specialized and independent IC which directly oversees 
corporate investment decision making. Moreover, Filatotchev, Toms, & Wright 
(2006) argue that corporate governance parameters may be linked to transitions from 
one stage to another in the firm's life cycle. Similarly, Florackis (2008) finds that 
there are important interactions between internal governance mechanisms and firm 
growth opportunities.  
The growth stage of a firm’s life cycle which is evidenced by profit 
maximization, larger investments, positive operating cash flows (Spence, 1981) and a 
continued preference for debt over equity financing because of the tax deductibility of 
interest expenditure and loan fees (Barclay & Smith, 2005). Mueller (1972) also 
asserts that a firm in growth stage is no longer faces capital raising and thus 
investment uncertainty is reduced. Particularly, at this stage, there is a shift in the firm 
toward greater transparency and increased monitoring and control by external 
providers of resources (Filatotchev, Toms, & Wright, 2006). Furthermore, in the 
mature stage of a firm’s life cycle generally results in a shift toward efficiency 
maximization, reduced uncertainty and declining investment expenditure relative to 
the growth phase, greater capital distribution to shareholders and enhanced 
governance structures (Barclay & Smith, 2005; Filatotchev et al., 2006).  
We premise in this paper that specialized IC as part of the broader corporate 
governance mechanisms can steer the firm’s optimal cash holdings decisions through 
different life cycle stages of firms by achieving the interest-alignment among different 
stakeholders. Based on the above discussion, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: Due to the interest alignment impact, IC induces a varying relation between cash 
holdings and different corporate life cycles 
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 Research design 
5.3.1 Data and sample  
The sample used in this study covers the period 2005 to 2013. We collect the data 
from mainly two sources. First, observations on ICs, corporate governance, and 
ownership structure are hand-collected from annual financial reports of non-financial 
public listed firms on KSA, UAE, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait stock exchanges 
filings and in some cases from the websites of these firms and Capital IQ filings. The 
second data source was the Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ database. The data drawn 
from Capital IQ is used to calculate all accounting, financial and other control 
variables. After matching ownerships with financial data, we ended-up with a sample 
of 1,266 firm-year observations. All of the continuous disclosure variables are 
winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles to mitigate the influence of 
outliers. 
 
Table 26: Sample selection 
Total Observations  
Number of Non-financial firms available in S & P Capital IQ for the GCC countries   1670 
Less: 
Joint listed firms observation       -72 
Key control variables              -332 
Total Observations 1266 
 
Table 26: Panel B: Sample distribution based on country 
  Year     
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total % Percent 
BAH 0 1 1 6 7 8 4 5 32 0.03 
KSA 33 50 66 75 80 85 88 89 566 0.45 
KUW 1 1 1 4 6 8 9 10 40 0.03 
OMN 28 39 40 39 38 66 65 66 381 0.30 
QAT 2 4 5 9 14 15 15 14 78 0.06 
UAE 4 12 17 21 27 30 29 28 168 0.13 
Total 68 107 130 154 172 212 210 212 1265 1.00 
 
Table 26: Panel C: Sample selection based on industry 
     Year      
Industry 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total % Percent 
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CONSD 5 13 11 17 15 27 25 27 140 0.11 
CONSS 7 15 23 26 30 39 38 38 216 0.17 
ENERG 6 8 11 13 13 13 14 14 92 0.07 
HEALT 1 1 1 2 4 7 7 7 30 0.02 
INDUS 16 25 33 40 44 48 48 47 301 0.23 
INFOR 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 7 0.005 
MATER 23 33 38 41 50 57 57 59 358 0.28 
TELEC 4 6 6 7 7 9 9 8 56 0.04 
UTILI 5 6 8 8 8 10 10 10 65 0.05 
  67 107 131 154 172 212 210 212 1265 1.00 
 
Table 26, shows that initially there are 1,670 firm-year observations on public listed 
non-financial firms. The exclusion of joint-listed firms (72 firm-years) and firms with 
missing control variables (332 firm-years) yields a final sample of 1,266 firm-year 
observations. Panel B shows that Saudi Arabia (KSA) represents the highest number 
of observations (45%), followed by Oman (OMN) and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), which together represent 43% of the observations with the remaining 12% 
representing Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar. Panel C shows that materials sector firms 
represent about 28% of our sample, followed by industrial firms (23%), and consumer 
products firms representing 17% of the total sample. 
 
5.3.2 Empirical model 
To test H1, we estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) model for each 
life cycle stage (e.g., introduction, growth, maturity and decline). In doing so, we 
estimate the following equation: 
 
𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉𝒊,𝒕, ൌ 𝒂𝟎 ൅ 𝒂𝟏𝑰𝑪_𝑫𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟐𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟑𝑸𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟒𝑳𝑬𝑽𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟓𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟔𝑵𝑾𝑪𝒊,𝒕 ൅
𝒂𝟕𝑪𝑷𝑨𝑿𝒊,𝒕 ൅  𝒂𝟖𝑫𝑰𝑽𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟗𝑮𝑶𝑽𝑶𝑾𝑵𝒊,𝒕 ൅  𝒂𝟏𝟎𝑪𝑬𝑶𝑶𝑾𝑵𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟏𝟏𝑰𝑵𝑫_𝑩𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕 ൅
𝒂𝟏𝟐𝑳𝑵_𝑩𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟏𝟑𝑳𝑵𝑨𝒈𝒆 ൅ 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒆𝒔 ൅ 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚  𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒆𝒔 ൅
𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚 𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒆𝒔 ൅ 𝒆𝒊,𝒕      
                                                                                                Equation (1) 
 
Then using Equation (1), we regress IC_D on different cash holding measures 
(CASH/TA, Cash_NA, CASH_LN) and the control variables for each life cycle stage 
which are (Introduction, Growth, Maturity, Shake-out, Decline stages) using 
Dickinson (2011) model.  
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 Dependent variable: Proxy for cash holding 
We investigate how the existence of an IC in a current year affects the firms cash 
holding. Prior studies have used different measures to proxy for corporate cash 
holding. We use three models of corporate cash holdings. In the first model 
(Cash_NA), we follow Opler et al. (1999), Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Liu & 
Mauer (2011) which is calculated as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to net 
assets, where net assets are total assets minus cash and marketable securities. In the 
second model (Cash_TA), we follow Bates, Kahle, & Stulz (2009), Bigelli & 
Sánchez-Vidal (2012), Francis, Hasan, & Wang (2014) and Azar, Kagy, & Schmalz 
(2016), as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets. Finally, we use 
(Cash_LN) which denotes the natural logarithm of cash and marketable securities to 
total assets (see Faleye, 2004; Qiu & Wan, 2015). As a robastness check, we use 
(Cash_TA) and (Cash_LN) to reduce any potential endogeneity issues. 
 
 Independent variables (Investment Committee) 
The main independent variable of interest in this study is denoted by the existence of 
an IC (IC_D). IC_D is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has 
a dedicated IC in year t, and 0 otherwise. We read full corporate governacne sections 
in annual reports. If firm does not incldue the corporate governace disclosures in 
annual report - we track the governance disclosures in company's official website, or 
in S&P Capital IQ fillings, or in local official stock market website. In case that 
corproate governacne disclosures are not found we assign missing IC for that firm in 
that year.  
 
 Corporate Life Cycle proxy 
We use Dickinson (2011) model for corporate life cycle. Dickinson (2011) classifies 
all sample firms into different stages of the firm life cycle based on the following cash 
flow pattern classification. Where OANCF represents operating cash flows, IVNCF 
represents investing activity cash flows and FINCF represent financing activity cash 
flows): 
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1. INTRODUCTION: if OANCF < 0, IVNCF < 0 and FINCF ˃ 0;  
2. GROWTH: if OANCF ˃ 0, IVNCF < 0 and FINCF ˃ 0;  
3. MATURITY: if OANCF ˃ 0, IVNCF < 0 and FINCF < 0;  
4. DECLINE: if OANCF < 0, IVNCF ˃ 0 and FINCF ≤ or ≥ 0; and  
5. SHAKE-OUT: the remaining firm years are classified into the shake-out stage.  
As in Dickinson (2011), we use Shake-Out stage as a benchmark. 
 
 Control variables  
Consistent with previous empirical research on the cash holding studies (e.g., (Azar et 
al., 2016; D. Chen, Li, Xiao, & Zou, 2014; Liu, Mauer, & Zhang, 2014; Megginson, 
Ullah, & Wei, 2014; Seifert & Gonenc, 2016), we controlled for several firm 
characteristics, industry factors, and country effect in our regression models. Given 
that large institutions in the GCC emerging markets are economically important and 
highly visible (Al-Shammari, Brown, & Tarca, 2008), the natural logarithm of total 
assets is used to control for firm size (SIZE). We use Tobin’s Q (Q) as a proxy for 
firm profitability, which is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity and the 
difference between book value of total assets and book value of equity in year t, 
scaled by the book value of total assets in year t−1. A firm’s leverage (LEV) is 
calculated as total debt scaled by total assets. Net working capital (NWC) denotes 
working capital less cash and equivalents, scaled by total assets.  Similarly, (CFO) is 
used to control for cash from operations calculated as cash from operations scaled by 
total assets. Furthermore, we also control for capital expenditure (CAPX) calculated as 
the ratio of capital expenditure scaled by total assets. Also dividend (DIV) variable 
measures the effect of dividend policy on cash holding which is measured as total 
dividends scaled by total assets. 
 Consistent with Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007), Chen (2008a) and 
Megginson et al. (2014), where they argue that governance and ownership structure 
have important effects on firm-level cash holding, we controlled for government 
ownership (Gov_Own). We coded 1 if government owns equity in a firm, and zero 
otherwise, CEO equity ownership (CEO_Own) was coded 1 if the CEO of the firm 
owns equity, and zero otherwise, board independence (IND_BSIZE) is scaled by 
board size, as well as, the natural logarithm of board size is used to control for board 
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size (BSIZE). We include firm age (AGE) measured as the natural logarithm of the 
number of years since the incorporation of the firm. Finally, we include the year, 
industry and country dummies in the regression equation. The findings are consistent 
with the control variables used in all models and panels, i.e., size (SIZE), firm 
profitability (Q), leverage (LEV), cash flow from operations (CFO), capital 
expenditure (CAPX), dividends (DIV), are negatively associated with firms’ cash 
holdings. In contrast, government ownership (GOVOWN), and board size (BD_LN) 
are positively associated with firms’ cash holdings. The sign and significance of the 
control variables are generally consistent with prior studies of cash holdings (Azar et 
al., 2016; Megginson et al., 2014).  
 
 Results discussion 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 27 reports the summary statistics for the variables included in the regression 
models. The mean values for the Cash_TA, Cash_NA, Cash_LN variables are 0.12, 
0.17 and 2.69, with a standard deviation of 0.12, 0.26 and 1.21, respectively. The 
mean (median) IC (IC_D) is 0.17 (0.00), with a standard deviation of 0.37. 
Approximately, 17% of the non-financial firms in the GCC have a voluntarily IC 
(IC_D), as compared to some 38% of GCC firms that have voluntarily formed risk-
management committees (Al-Hadi, Hasan, & Habib, 2016). Finally, we find that the 
values of the mean and median of the control variables are consistent with recent 
literature on emerging markets within the GCC region (Al-Hadi et al., 2016; Eulaiwi, 
Al-Hadi, Taylor, Al-Yahyaee, & Evans, 2016).  
 
 
Table 27: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate t-test 
Variable Mean S.D. 0.25 Mdn 0.75 
Cash $(m) 276.40 1308.60 6.20 24.20 108.30 
CASH_TA 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.07 0.16 
CASH_NA 0.17 0.26 0.04 0.08 0.19 
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Cash_LN -2.69 1.21 -3.40 -2.61 -1.83 
IC_D 0.17 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SIZE 5.86 1.84 4.72 5.88 6.95 
SIZE  $ (m) 2352.00 8278.20 111.70 358.40 1047.50 
Q 1.95 1.26 1.13 1.54 2.35 
LEV 0.23 0.22 0.03 0.18 0.37 
NWC 1.40 0.82 0.91 1.34 1.72 
CFO 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.15 
CAPX 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.10 
DIV -0.04 0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 
GOVOWN 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
CEOOWN 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 
IND_BSIZE 0.70 0.33 0.44 0.71 1.00 
BD_LN 2.05 0.22 1.95 2.08 2.20 
BSIZE (No) 7.99 1.78 7.00 8.00 9.00 
AGE 2.92 0.70 2.57 3.05 3.47 
AGE (year) 22.82 13.23 13.00 21.00 32.00 
 Regression results:  
Based on hierarchy theory of cash holding, we argue that firms in growth and 
maturity stages of their life cycle can voluntarily adopt an IC to effectively manage 
their investments and growth opportunities. The regression results shown in Table 28 
suggest that ICs during the growth and maturity stages of the firm life cycle 
(Dickinson model) are significantly positively associated with cash holdings, while 
the introduction and decline stages of firms’ life cycle are not associated with all 
proxies of cash holdings. For instance, in both stages (Growth and Maturity) we find 
the coefficients of IC_D and corporate cash holdings (Cash_NA) are positive and 
significant of (0.0576 and 0.0684) at (p<.10 or better), while in (Introduction and 
Decline) stages the coefficients are not significant of (0.0482 and -0.0296). In 
economic term, the firm with IC_D observes more cash holding in Growth and 
Maturity compared to Shake-out stage of 50 and 60 basis points. This supports our 
hypothesis that the impact of corporate governance and cash holding varies based on 
the corporate’s life cycle. 
We also find that this effect is consistent in all our models even when we use 
other proxies of cash holdings (see Table 29). These results support our assumption 
that qualified ICs have preference to hold more cash, considering that cash represents 
a valuable source of investment funds for business growth opportunities during the 
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periods of growth and maturity. In addition, because insufficient funds may lead to 
relinquishing investment opportunities, shareholder wealth could be adversely 
affected by these cash holding decisions. Finally, cash holding decisions as well as 
identifying investment and growth opportunities are significantly related to the 
presence of IC owing to their risk management oversight. Our results are consistent 
with Opler et al. (1999) and Ozkan & Ozkan (2004) that cash holding is an important 
determinant of firms’ growth opportunities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 28: Regression analysis: The Interaction between IC and RETA and its 
impact on corporate cash holdings 
 
𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉_𝑵𝑨𝒊,𝒕, ൌ 𝒂𝟎 ൅ 𝒂𝟏𝑰𝑪_𝑫𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟐𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟑𝑸𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟒𝑳𝑬𝑽𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟓𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟔𝑪𝑷𝑨𝑿𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟕𝑫𝑰𝑽𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟖𝑮𝑶𝑽𝑶𝑾𝑵𝒊,𝒕 ൅  𝒂𝟗𝑪𝑬𝑶𝑶𝑾𝑵𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟏𝟎𝑰𝑵𝑫_𝑩𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟏𝟏𝑩𝑫_𝑳𝑵𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟏𝟐 ൅
𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒆 𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒆𝒔 ൅  𝒆𝒊,𝒕   
 
  Model1 Model 2 Model3 Model4 
 DV Cash_NA 
Stages INTRO GROWTH MATURITY DECLINE 
IC 0.0482 0.0576* 0.0684*** -0.0296  
(0.74) (1.78) (2.70) (-0.22)  
SIZE -0.0112 -0.0073 -0.0146** -0.0713    
(-0.84) (-0.95) (-2.02) (-0.79)    
Q -0.0287* 0.0728* -0.0004 -0.0396    
(-1.81) (1.90) (-0.04) (-0.56)    
LEV -0.0465 -0.0160** -0.0069 -0.1183*   
(-1.64) (-2.05) (-1.20) (-2.05)    
CFO 0.0486 -0.1696 0.0419 -0.5797**  
(0.18) (-0.90) (0.44) (-2.61)    
CPAX -0.1070 -0.0070 -0.1266** 1.0319    
(-0.96) (-0.24) (-2.58) (0.71)    
DIV -0.4674 0.2528 -0.4936** -2.3099    
(-0.92) (0.45) (-2.58) (-0.53)    
GOVOWN -0.0499 0.0506** 0.0722*** 0.0479    
(-1.44) (2.11) (3.51) (0.39)    
CEOOWN 0.0596 -0.0012 0.0009 0.0223    
(1.24) (-0.05) (0.05) (0.25)    
IND_BSIZE -0.0076 0.0521 0.0130 -0.3918    
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(-0.13) (1.24) (0.32) (-1.61)    
BD_LN 0.2747*** 0.1528** -0.0774* -0.0265    
(2.94) (2.16) (-1.91) (-0.07)    
Intercept -0.3328* -0.3524* 0.5978*** 0.5668 
(-1.80) (-1.73) (3.96) (0.54) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES 
IND FE YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY FE YES YES YES YES 
N 48 291 553 31 
adj. R-sq 0.1881 0.2140 0.1675 0.6984 
Cash_NA is ratio of cash and marketable securities to net assets, where net assets are total assets minus 
cash and marketable securities; IC is1 if a firm adopt specialized Investment Committee, otherwise 0; 
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets; Q is a sum of the market value of equity and the difference 
between book value of total assets and book value of equity in year t, scaled by the book value of total 
assets in year t−1;  Lev is the total long-term and short-term scaled to total assets; CFO is the cash from 
operation scaled to total assets; CAPX is the ratio of capital expenditure, scaled by total assets; DIV is 
total dividends scaled by total assets; GOVOWN is equal one if a firm has government ownership, 
otherwise zero; CEOOWN is equal one if a firm has CEO ownership, otherwise zero, IND_BSIZE is 
proportion of total independent directors to total board size, BD_LN is the natural logarithm of total 
number of board of director. 
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TABLE 29: Association between alternative proxies for Cash Holdings and IC for each Corporate Life Cycle using Dickinson (2011) Model 
 Model1 Model 2 Model3 Model4   Model1 Model 2 Model3 Model4 
 CASH TA CASH LN 
Stages INTRO GROWTH MATURITY DECLINE INTRO GROWTH MATURITY DECLINE 
IC 0.0057 0.0268** 0.0261** -0.0078    0.2323 0.5096*** 0.2039 -1.2589 
 (0.22) (2.04) (2.05) (-0.60)    (0.47) (3.23) (1.57) (-1.60) 
SIZE -0.0051 -0.0020 -0.0097** -0.0185    0.9764*** 1.0834*** 0.8985*** 0.8848 
 (-0.67) (-0.50) (-2.31) (-1.96)    (5.71) (19.66) (20.42) (1.78) 
Q -0.0087 0.0227*** 0.0038 0.0110    -0.2604 0.2670*** 0.0709 0.3460 
 (-1.09) (2.79) (0.71) (1.32)    (-1.48) (4.81) (1.42) (0.88) 
LEV -0.0121 -0.0103** -0.0035 -0.0020    0.0668 -0.1650*** 0.0083 -0.1196 
 (-0.86) (-2.59) (-0.98) (-0.26)    (0.21) (-2.60) (0.13) (-0.34) 
CFO -0.0794 -0.0469 0.0887* 0.0553    -2.2989 -0.0499 1.0538 1.1970 
 (-0.46) (-0.55) (1.85) (1.36)    (-0.78) (-0.05) (1.45) (0.86) 
CPAX 0.0177 0.0064 -0.0548** 0.9752*** 0.5558 0.1831 -1.1326 12.1305 
 (0.28) (0.37) (-2.09) (4.86)    (0.31) (0.62) (-1.47) (1.05) 
DIV -0.3699 0.1073 -0.1185 -0.3526    -17.8293** 1.6925 -1.4484 -43.7697 
 (-1.33) (0.49) (-1.19) (-0.69)    (-2.52) (0.64) (-1.26) (-1.81) 
GOVOWN -0.0174 0.0078 0.0332*** -0.0187    -0.3336 -0.1538 0.2995*** -0.4017 
 (-1.11) (0.77) (3.37) (-1.07)    (-1.00) (-1.11) (2.66) (-0.44) 
CEOOWN 0.0385 0.0153 -0.0108 0.0092    0.6349 0.2145 -0.0600 0.2816 
 (1.47) (1.47) (-1.11) (0.62)    (1.19) (1.62) (-0.50) (0.45) 
IND_BS -0.0071 0.0474** -0.0140 -0.0248    -1.1519* 0.8859*** -0.4141* -1.0208 
 (-0.26) (2.33) (-0.70) (-0.61)    (-1.88) (3.18) (-1.79) (-0.68) 
BD_LN 0.0691 0.0747*** -0.0240 0.1275*   -0.0968 0.9145** -0.1517 2.7713 
 (1.21) (2.79) (-1.18) (2.40)    (-0.07) (2.43) (-0.59) (1.12) 
Intercept -0.0539 -0.1455** 0.2952*** 0.0829 -1.7993 -6.1607*** -1.1649* -3.0855 
 (-0.46) (-2.34) (4.38) (0.72) (-0.66) (-6.50) (-1.69) (-0.48) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IND FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COUNT. FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 48 291 553 31 48 291 553 31 
adj. R-sq 0.0991 0.1456 0.1453 0.8067   0.8443 0.8221 0.7587 0.9027 
CASH_TA is the ration of cash and marketable securities to total Ass assets; CASH_LN is The natural logarithm of cash and marketable securities to total assets Size is the natural logarithm of total assets; Q is a sum of the market 
value of equity and the difference between book value of total assets and book value of equity in year t, scaled by the book value of total assets in year t−1   Lev is the total long-term and short-term scaled to total assets; CFO is the 
cash from operation scaled to total assets; CAPX is the ratio of capital expenditure, scaled by total assets; DIV is total dividends scaled by total assets; GOVOWN is equal one if a firm has government ownership, otherwise zero; 
CEOOWN is equal one if a firm has CEO ownership, otherwise zero, IND_BSIZE is proportion of total independent directors to total board size, BD_LN is the natural logarithm of total number of board of directors. 
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We further look at the interaction of IC and age of the firm. We follow the model 
below: 
 
𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉𝒊,𝒕, ൌ 𝒂𝟎 ൅ 𝒂𝟏𝑰𝑪_𝑫𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟐𝑨𝑮𝑬  ൅ 𝒂𝟑𝑨𝑮𝑬 𝑿 𝑰𝑪𝑫 ൅  𝒂𝟒𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟓𝑸𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟔𝑳𝑬𝑽𝒊,𝒕 ൅
𝒂𝟕𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟖𝑵𝑾𝑪𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟗𝑪𝑷𝑨𝑿𝒊,𝒕 ൅  𝒂𝟏𝟎𝑫𝑰𝑽𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟏𝟏𝑮𝑶𝑽𝑶𝑾𝑵𝒊,𝒕 ൅  𝒂𝟏𝟐𝑪𝑬𝑶𝑶𝑾𝑵𝒊,𝒕 ൅
𝒂𝟏𝟑𝑰𝑵𝑫_𝑩𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟏𝟒𝑳𝑵_𝑩𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕 ൅ 𝒂𝟏𝟓𝑳𝑵𝑨𝒈𝒆 ൅ 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒆𝒔 ൅
𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚  𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒆𝒔 ൅ 𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚 𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒆𝒔 ൅ 𝒆𝒊,𝒕    Equation (2)  
 
The results reported in Table 30 show that older firms, on average, hold less cash 
than new firms. For instance, the coefficients of corporate’s Age (number of years 
since the establishment) in all corporate cash holdings proxies (CASH_NA, 
CASH_TA and CASH_LN) are negative and significant of (0.0353, 0.0232 and 
0.3757) at (p<.01), while the interaction of IC_D and Age is (0.0763) in Model 1 
(CASH_NA) is negative and significant at (p<.05). This is consistent with our main 
argument that when ICs are effective in exploiting growth opportunities, higher 
levels of cash holdings are acceptable in the early stage of these firms. Consequently, 
because of higher business risk, it is difficult for new firms to obtain external 
financing compared to older firms. We also find empirical evidence to confirm that 
the effect of ICs on cash holdings differs based on firm life cycle stages (Age).  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 30: Association between Cash Holdings and interaction between (IC and 
Firm’s Age) 
  Model1 Model 2 Model3 
  CASH_NA CASH_TA CASH_LN 
IC 0.1239*** 0.0342*** 0.2904**  
(5.43) (3.21) (2.21)    
AGE -0.0353*** -0.0232*** -0.3757*** 
(-2.66) (-3.74) (-4.92)    
IC * AGE -0.0763** -0.0096 0.0734    
(-2.45) (-0.66) (0.41)    
SIZE -0.0142*** -0.0049** 1.0118*** 
(-2.79) (-2.08) (34.53)    
Q 0.0221*** 0.0107*** 0.1289*** 
(4.01) (4.14) (4.06)    
LEV -0.0176** -0.0088** -0.1523*** 
(-2.20) (-2.35) (-3.31)    
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CFO -0.1195* 0.0235 0.7658**  
(-1.85) (0.78) (2.06)    
CPAX -0.0026 0.0029 0.1115    
(-0.07) (0.15) (0.49)    
DIV -0.5143*** -0.1671** -1.5190*   
(-3.60) (-2.50) (-1.85)    
GOVOWN 0.0757*** 0.0254*** 0.1298*   
(5.84) (4.20) (1.74)    
CEOOWN 0.0119 0.0031 0.0641    
(0.86) (0.48) (0.81)    
IND_BS 0.0351 0.0094 0.0711    
(1.29) (0.74) (0.45)    
BD_LN -0.0452 -0.0084 0.0802    
(-1.45) (-0.58) (0.45)    
Intercept 0.4026*** 0.1785*** -2.7373*** 
(4.53) (4.30) (-5.36)    
YEAR FE YES YES YES 
IND FE YES YES YES 
COUNTRY FE YES YES YES 
N 1029 1029 1029    
adj. R-sq 0.1642 0.1405 0.7806    
Cash_NA is ratio of cash and marketable securities to net assets, where net assets are total assets 
minus cash and marketable securities CASH_LN is The natural logarithm of cash and marketable 
securities to total assets; Cash/TA is The ration of cash and marketable securities to total Ass assets; 
IC is1 if a firm adopt specialized Investment Committee, otherwise 0; AGE is the natural logarithm of 
firms’ age calculated as the difference between the establishment date and current year Size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets; Q is a sum of the market value of equity and the difference between 
book value of total assets and book value of equity in year t, scaled by the book value of total assets in 
year t−1;  Lev is the total long-term and short-term scaled to total assets; CFO is the cash from 
operation scaled to total assets; CAPX is the ratio of capital expenditure, scaled by total assets; DIV is 
total dividends scaled by total assets; GOVOWN is equal one if a firm has government ownership, 
otherwise zero; CEOOWN is equal one if a firm has CEO ownership, otherwise zero, IND_BSIZE is 
proportion of total independent directors to total board size, BD_LN is the natural logarithm of total 
number of board of directors. 
 
 
 Conclusion  
We investigate the impact of ICs on cash holdings over the life cycle of public firms 
of the six GCC countries. The empirical results suggest that the role of ICs and their 
effect on cash holdings decisions significantly differs across the firm life cycle 
stages. In particular, we find that while the cash holding is higher in the growth and 
maturity stages, it is lower in the introduction and decline stage. Since firms in 
growth and mature stages are most likely to seek for growth opportunities, IC 
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members with greater monitoring and financial expertise increase the level of cash 
reserve to fund future investment opportunities. These results imply that ICs can be 
an effective tool in optimal allocation of resources through different stages by 
aligning the interests of investors and managers.   
This is the first paper that examines that role of IC on the cash holding during 
different stages of firms’ life cycles, especially in the emerging markets context. Our 
empirical evidence contributes to the growing body of literature that focuses on 
corporate governance and cash holdings through different stages of the firm life 
cycles. The results of this study should be informative to various capital market 
participants such as shareholders, regulators, government, auditors and financial 
analysts, especially concerning why firms should establish ICs. In particular, the 
results of this study would be useful for regulators when modifying and/ or 
establishing corporate governance codes, including the voluntary formation of board 
committees such as ICs and the benefits associated with them. It is expected that the 
findings of this study are instructive and applicable to other countries in the Middle 
East region, due to their cultural, social, political and economic similarities. 
The study does, however, have some limitations and suggest a number of 
avenues for future research. The role of royal family involvement in management, 
government ownership, and institutional ownership could be examined in relation to 
the establishment of specialized board committees such as ICs and executive 
committees. It is important also to examine the role of other committees (such as risk 
committee, research committee, audit committee, etc) on corporate cash holding over 
various stages of firm life cycles. We leave this to future research.  
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Appendix VI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Definitions and Measurement                    
Variables   Definition and Measurement           
Dependent Variable:           
Cash Holdings Models:               
Cash/TA = The ration of cash and marketable securities to total Ass assets. 
Cash/NA = The ratio of cash and marketable securities to net assets, where net assets are 
total assets minus cash and marketable securities. 
Cash/LN = The natural logarithm of cash and marketable securities to total assets. 
         
Independent variable:            
IC_D = 1 if a firm adopt specialized Investment Committee, otherwise 0. 
Control Variables:              
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets.     
Q = The sum of the market value of equity and the difference between book value of 
total assets and book value of equity in year t, scaled by the book value of total 
assets in year t−1 
LEV = Total long-term and short-term scaled to total assets.   
NWC = Total current assets minus total current liabilities scaled by 
total assets. 
  
CFO = Cash from Operation scaled to total assets.   
CAPX = The ratio of capital expenditure, scaled by total assets.  
DIV = Total dividends scaled by total assets.    
GOVOWN = 1 if a firm has government ownership, otherwise 0.   
CEOOWN = 1 if a firm has CEO ownership, otherwise 0.   
IND_BSIZE = Proportion of total independent directors to total board size.  
BD_LN = Natural logarithm of total number of board of directors.   
AGE =
  
Natural logarithm of firms’ age calculated as the difference between the 
establishment date and current year. 
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Conclusion and directions for future research 
 
 Introduction 
Corporate governance policies and structures in emerging markets such as the GCC 
region vary from those in developed countries due to a number of factors relating to 
the geo-political and religious dynamics of member countries. The pace of 
development of governance structures varies across member countries and is likely to 
differ from governance levels in developed countries although the GCC model of 
corporate governance practices has been influenced by the Anglo-American model. 
However, the institutional, cultural and religious characteristics of the GCC are key 
ingredients that implicitly or explicitly underpin the effectiveness of corporate 
governance systems and practices. Corporate governance is constantly receiving the 
required institutional and legal considerations aimed at improving the governance 
standards in the GCC, this reflects in recent amendments to corporate governance 
regulations despite the existence of “comply or explain” concept in some GCC 
countries. The thesis is made up of four interconnected topics on corporate 
governance in the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC). The four essays in this thesis 
specifically examine the roles and effects of board multiple directorships and family 
ownersip, joint audit and cost of debt capital, investment committee characteristics, 
investment efficiency, corporate life cycle and corporate cash holdings.  
 
 Summary of findings  
This thesis examined a number of important and interesting issues related to 
corporate governance, ownership structure and capital structure of GCC firms in four 
essays. The first essay investigates the association between outside board 
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directorships and family ownership concentration. Using a sample of 1091 firm-year 
observations of non-financial publicly listed firms from the GCC during the 2005 to 
2013 period, the study finds a positive association between family ownership and the 
number of outside directorships held by board members. This finding is consistent 
with the notion that family ownership reduces a board’s monitoring capabilities.  The 
study also test whether the recent corporate governance reforms in the GCC designed 
to protect investors and minority shareholders affect firms’ incentives to establish a 
board nomination committee (NC). It was found that the existence of a board NC and 
the quality and characteristics of NC membership act to suppress the positive 
association between outside directorships and family ownership. The results are 
robust to the use of alternative measures of outside directorship and family 
ownership and models that test for endogeneity. Overall, the results suggest that the 
institutional specificities of emerging economies such as those in the GCC can work 
against sustained high levels of multiple directorships, which could impair the 
quality of corporate governance. 
 
The second essay investigates the association between joint-audit and cost of debt 
for a sample of non-financial publicly listed firms from the GCC countries. We 
attempt to shed further insights into this debate, using data from GCC countries. We 
document a significantly negative effect of joint audit on cost of debt in GCC 
countries. This effect is most pronounced in cases where at least one of the joint 
audit firms is a Big 4 auditor. We then investigate whether political connections with 
royal families moderate the association between joint audit and the cost of debt. Our 
results suggest that the beneficial effects of joint audits in terms of lower cost of debt 
are greater in firms with such political connections.   
 
The third essay investigates the association between board investment committee 
characteristics and corporate investment efficiency. Using a sample of industrial 
firms from six GCC countries over the 2005–2013 period, the study find that the 
existence of an investment committee reduces both under- and overinvestment of 
these firms. The study also finds that financial expertise of committee members 
positively affects firms’ investment efficiency. These findings are consistent with the 
assertion that a board investment committee assists with the monitoring and control 
of firms’ investments. The study also finds that the existence of an investment 
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committee is likely to reduce over- and underinvestment in firms with high levels of 
foreign ownership concentration. The tenets of agency theory suggest that the 
existence of an investment committee aligns a firm’s investment activities with the 
objective of shareholder wealth maximization. These results are robust based on 
additional tests that use alternative measures of investment efficiency and tests 
relating to self-selection bias and endogeneity. 
 
The final essay examine the association between voluntary formation of board 
investment committee (IC) and corporate cash holdings of firms over the corporate 
life cycle stages for a large sample of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) firms over 
the 2005–2013 period. The paper finds that existence of an IC increases corporate 
cash holdings in growth and maturity stages of firm, compared to introduction/old 
(decline) stages. This suggests that each stage would manifest integral 
complementarities among governance, investment strategy and corporate decision 
making; that corporate complexity would cause each stage to exhibit certain 
significant differences from all other stages. These results have important 
implications for policy makers and regulators. The findings are robust to various 
econometrics specifications. 
 Recommendations to policymakers, regulators and 
investors: 
The recent global financial crisis has exposed major failings in governance and 
regulation, which have undermined trust in public and private institutions alike. 
Government policy makers and regulators can help to improve corporate governance 
policies, reduce economic uncertainty, help to attract institutional and foreign 
investors and capital investment. In this stream, the role of policy makers (managing 
market authorities) is now more important than ever, as they seek to support 
economic growth, investment quality and regulatory reforms, creating job and 
strengthening a country's position in the global market. Given that strong economic 
policy provides a level of stability and assists in minimizing expropriation risks and 
maximizing investment returns, investors are more likely to invest in highly stable 
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market environments. Drawing upon governance and commercial models from a 
wide range of developed countries, this research identified a number of 
recommendations that policy makers and regulators can undertake to improve 
corporate governance strategies, investment opportunities, reduce investment costs 
and attract innovative technologies and capital investment. In addition, due to the 
organisational challenges involved in less developed markets such as these in the 
GCC countries, the managing authorities can play an important role by building 
organisational infrastructure or approving strong organisational networks to 
encourage both operators and investors to resolve some policy and technical issues. 
The effective use of codes and regulation to achieve better social, environmental and 
economic outcomes is advanced by governments in many GCC countries. Finally, 
government funded programmes designed to improve commercial investments have 
been established in the GCC. The tax free policies was set up in all GCC markets in 
order to attract investors and fund the development of infrastructures of which had 
either little or no tax coverage. 
 Limitations of the study: 
Although this research was well prepared, reached its aims, there were a number of 
unavoidable limitations and shortcomings. Due to the limitations of determined time 
for doctoral study, the main data were collected within a relatively short time period. 
The provision of more time to collect data, read, ponder and analyse would have 
been useful for developing models consistent with an emerging market context. It 
would be better if it was done in a longer time to translate the findings may provide 
some thinking but this was only ever passing in the circumstances. Data population 
of this study is relatively small, only six GCC countries over the period 2005-2013. 
This limitation might not represent the majority of the firms accounting activities of 
the time series level. More time given to add another MENA countries and extending 
the period would help to cover the majority of public listed firms among MENA 
countries and enhance the generalizability of our findings. Furthermore, since the 
variables designed to measure the corporate governance attitude among GCC 
markets, firms lacking corporate governance sections in their annual reports are 
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reduced our sample size and excluded from our dataset. Hence, it seems not to 
provide enough evidence of the firms’ actual behaving to disclose their adapting of 
governance codes in their annual reports. The selection of this data are only limited 
for non-financial listed firms since we exclude, for example, financial firms from our 
sample, which may account for some of the discrepancies among findings. Finally, 
the weak corporate governance codes might discourage firms’ motivation to 
introduce more disclosures about their adaptation of rules and regulations and this 
have been clear in the un-consistency in the firm’s annual report. 
 Future research directions 
The thesis noted a number of areas for future research. The GCC countries provide 
an ideal setting in which to examine the role of ICs and their effects on investment 
efficiency, as it is likely that agency and information asymmetry problems are 
entrenched in these countries. In particular, the GCC countries have experienced 
rapid development of corporate governance codes, regulations, capital markets, and 
international trade over the past 15 years, which has affected the establishment and 
reliance on specialized committees such as ICs. Recent regulations of GCC firms 
have enabled significant progress toward the establishment of more independent 
boards of directors and the formation of specialized committees to provide firm 
oversight. This therefore provide an interesting context for future studies to examine 
how these changes affect firm performance, audit quality or earnings management. 
Further studies on investment committee characteristics, corporate life cycle, 
investment efficiency and corporate cash holdings can be extended to other emerging 
markets in Africa and Asia. For example, some Asian countries (e.g., Thailand, 
Malaysia etc.) and some African countries (e.g., North Africa) also share similar 
features such as their political regimes and that follow the application of similar 
governance structure of OECD. Further work could therefore examine the relations 
between investment efficiency, information asymmetry, and firm value. 
Additionally, the roles of ruling family directors and government ownership could be 
examined in relation to the establishment of specialized board committees, including 
ICs and committees on risk, remuneration and Corporate Social Responsibility 
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(CSR). Such studies would be important in the context of the GCC given the rapid 
evolution of governance structures and capital markets in those countries.  
 
Finally, the four essays primarily focused on the effect of family ownership as a firm 
capital structure on director busyness. Many other types of ownership could also be 
considered, such as institutional, state or foreign ownership. The researcher therefore 
encourage future researchers to consider such issues as whether the extent of 
managerial ownership influences the appointment of busy directors and  it in turn 
affect the monitoring quality the firms.   
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